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A Decade of Resilience: Lieutenant General Lagbaja's Strategic Appraisal and Review of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Operations

The 22nd Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, LIEUTENANT GENERAL TAOREED ABIODUN LAGBAJA recently delivered a lecture at the Third Strategic Counter Terrorism Counter Insurgency Operations (CTCOIN) Seminar in Abuja, titled "Over a Decade of  Terrorism, Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria: An Appraisal".THE PAPER BELOWINTRODUCTION 1. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, the topic given to me for this lecture is 'Overview of Counter-Terrorism/Counter Insurgency Operations and National Security, but have decided to give an updated version of my paper to the Army War College of Nigeria journal article. The topic of that paper is 'Over a Decade of Terrorism, Insurgency, Counter Terrorism and Counter insurgency in Nigeria: An Appraisal. The topic given to me would attract more of theoretical postulation, while the paper am delivering is an appraisal of what has been done in the last ten years of confronting the twin scourges of terrorism and insurgency in the country. 2. Globally terrorism is not a new phenomenon as nations, groups and organisations have used it from the medieval period to intimidate others in the pursuit of a course. The scourge of terrorism is also not confined to Africa in the contemporary era as the young generations of people on the Continent are being made to believe. Encyclopaedia Britannica (2024) revealed that Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) otherwise known as the Basque Separatist Organization, waged a campaign of violence for more than 30 years in the later part of the 20th Century, claiming the lives of at least 800 people in Spain, while threatening other parts of Europe. ETA struggled for the separation of the Basque Region from the main Spanish entity, which in reality was an insurgency but utilised terrorism as its strategy. 3. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in the UK were related to the Irish Republican Army (IRA)'s activities in Northern Ireland from 1960s through 30 January 1972 'Bloody Sunday' to 1998's Good Friday Agreement until 2005. It was an insurgency based on an attempt for separation from the British rule. It was the July 2005 London bombings by Islamic extremists which caused the deaths of 56 people that prompted the European Council to adopt what some experts referred to as the 4Ps consisting of preparation, prevention, protection and pursuit in tracking criminals involved as its counter terrorism strategy. In spite of these measures, the Paris attacks of November 2015 by the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) which caused 130 fatalities, Nice attacks in 2016, which led to 86 deaths and the Manchester Arena bombing of May 2017 with 23 people dead took place years later (Statista, 2024). These represented some of the worst terrorist incidents in Europe, prompting reviews of the measures in place. 4. Across the Atlantic Ocean, the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA by the al-Qaeda was the deadliest terrorist attacks on American soil in USA history. Some 2,750 people and more than 400 police officers and fire fighters lost their lives in New York, 184 people died at the Pentagon, while 40 people lost their lives in Pennsylvania (Bergen, 2024). The incident led to the creation of the USA Department of Homeland Security with heightened levels of collaboration internally and with foreign partnerships to build capabilities necessary to prevent, degrade, detect, and respond to terrorist threats. 5. The above issues are indicators of the difficulty of separating in many instances insurgency from terrorism, as was the case in Spain and UK. However, it is not all terrorist incidents that are insurgency induced, but experts have argued that in the case of the USA, although al-Qaeda may not plan to take over the government of that country, but the terror group was really pushing for the establishment of a Caliphate agenda across a swath of countries and continents, which is akin to a global insurgency. The main example of terrorism not linked clearly to insurgency is the Colombia situation, where the drug lords that formed the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the other rebel groups actually aspire to forcefully control the Coca producing areas by intimidating the government to allow such control and not for any political control or change of government in Bogota. Even this is a form of insurgency as the political landscape in the country would have been seriously affected. It is therefore difficult to separate insurgency where it occurs from terrorism. 6. Nigeria is facing different forms of insurgencies from the six geo-political zones. Those involved have resorted to the use of terror in the pursuit of their agendas. Thus, the country is indicated to have one of the highest terrorism threat levels in the world (Statista, 2023). This has been blamed on the fact that several terrorist and militant groups are active in Nigeria, leading to attacks on both civilian and military targets. Notable among these groups are Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) in the North East in pursuit of a supposedly Caliphate initially physically, but now on a digital form; the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South East pursuing a break away agenda from the country. Furthermore, despite a general decrease in terror-related deaths in the last two years, the country ranks eighth in the global rating of countries with the highest number of people who have died from terrorist attacks worldwide, after Myanmar (Statista, 2024). The Statista report revealed that around 10,172 terrorist attacks across the world resulted in over 29,289 deaths in 2020 alone, while about 21,943 people lost their lives due to terrorism in 2022. The terror groups operating in Nigeria are involved in kidnappings, abductions and attacks on government facilities, socio-economic centres and innocent citizens.7. Recently, armed herdsmen who are not insurgents and do not constitute a single terrorist group, have adopted terrorist tactics in their conflicts with farmers in different parts of the country, but more pronounced in the North Central and South West zones. In 2019 herdsmen were responsible for about one quarter of all terror-related deaths nationwide (Sasu, 2023). It should be noted that emphasis is placed on terrorism, which is the strategy adopted to devastating effects by those involved in insurgency. Even the official policy statement and strategy is more on countering terrorism, since that is the manifestation of events. In countering the various terrorists groups in the country only military strategy was utilised at the onset and for a long period of time. The Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) was able for instance to degrade Boko Haram's combat efficiency particularly between 2015 and 2022. However, experts have posited that defeating terrorism and insurgency requires more than a military strategy and efforts but rather a comprehensive national strategy. The spread of the twin issues in the country continue to pose serious threats to Nigeria's national security. 8. It is important to examine the impact of terrorism and insurgency and the counter measures adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) in the last one decade. This is the crux of this presentation, which will clarify some concepts, highlight the historical trends of terrorism and insurgency and the implications on Nigeria's national security. It will thereafter examine some relevant frameworks on terrorism and counter-terrorism, appraise the activities so far before proffering the way forward. AIM 9. The aim of this presentation is to examine over a decade of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria and appraise the counter measures adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) with a view to proffering a way forward CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 10. It is necessary at this juncture to clarify a couple of concepts for a clear perception and understanding of the issues under discuss. The four concepts this paper will clarify are terrorism, insurgency and counter terrorism and counter insurgency. 11. Terrorism. The word terrorism is derived from the French word "Terreur", meaning terror. Oche and Dokubo (2005) view terrorism as a tool used to attain specific objectives by creating fear in the minds of people in order to attain or prevent the attainment of certain goals. The authors opine that there are state-directed and state-sponsored terrorism as well as non-state sponsored terrorism. Calvert (2010) sees terrorism as governments description and construction of opponents who use violence against them. Levin (2006) opines that terrorism shares undeniable and inextricable linkage with premeditated act of violence or threat of violence which are designed to spread shockwaves of fear and anxiety to government, leaders, or some segment of the public. Although Seteolu (2011) describes terrorism as the resort to violence or terror for political ends by non-governmental groups in pursuit of specific political goals and opines that the concept of terrorism is subjective, transient and problematic. In view of the aforementioned, terrorism could be conceptualised as the use of violence by government, groups or individuals to intimidate or coerce people or government in furtherance of political, social or religious and selfish objectives. 12. Insurgency. The British Army Doctrine Publication on operations defines insurgency as "the actions of a minority group within a state intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such change. The goals of insurgents may be diverse but it is simply an organized armed political struggle". Insurgency can be explained simply as actions of someone or a group, which could be political, ethnic or tribal, religious or social from within or outside the country who is or are not happy with situation of things and desire a change or a different political system or independence from the main group. The small group resorts to the use of force to effect its desired change. The objectives are the people, change in the structure of the system and politics. Insurgents will resort to intimidation and violence to achieve their objective, thus the use of terror as a strategy. This has been fuelled in recent times by the rise of ethnic nationalism and religious extremism. Four stages of insurgency have been identified which are; intimidation phase, terrorism phase, open confrontation against security agencies phase and consolidation phase. Counter-terrorism. In citing the United Nations Book of Global Orism, Bala and Tar (2019) describe counter-terrorism as any passive, nsive, preparatory, protective or legal measures against terrorism. anterterrorism is, in most cases, a reactionary measure. Consequently, the mors describe counterterrorism as a strategy, focused predominantly on cting to a terrorist activity and preventing a future recurrence. Rees and drich (2005) posit that the reactionary nature of counterterrorism could feature Filitary-led retaliatory and pre-emptive action; regulatory measures that rengthen law enforcement and judicial functions to punish terrorist suspects; nd measures taken which would appease terrorist threat, either through the use of force or legal action. However, Pillar (2001) appears to have given a more balanced description of counterterrorism by conceptualising it as the reactive, tactical stage of terrorism counteraction and reactionary measures taken in response to terrorist incidents including contact with a terrorist organization to end the incident within minimum timeframe, before the actual loss of lives and property. Counterterrorism and terrorism reflect a reciprocal relationship. Technically, terrorism is a problem that counterterrorism is designed to manage. Counterterrorism therefore, describes the measures and strategies taken by the government, acting on behalf of the state, to rid the country of the incidences and the accompanying menace of terrorism. 14. Counter Insurgency. The British Operations Doctrine defines counter insurgency as actions of an existing state authority or government to combat insurgency and prevent recurrence, which is also true of counter terrorism. Intimidation or Phase 1 of insurgency hardly receives much attention from governments as the resolve is usually to warn and arrest some of those involved to stem the tide. It is from the terror or Phase 2 of such insurgency, that affected government starts reacting. It is therefore the usual practice, to lump counter insurgency and counter terrorism, which is the reason for the coinage, counter terrorism and counter insurgency (CTCOIN). Wilcox (2006) defines CTCOIN as the policies and methods used to deter and defeat terrorism and insurgency, which involve information gathering, law enforcement, diplomacy, military force and protective security...effective counter-measures also attempts to discover and remove the causes that motivate terrorists and insurgents. Wilcox's standpoint captures both military and non-military aspects of CTCOIN operations, such as diplomacy amongst others. Furthermore, his perspective encompasses attempts to discover and remove the causes that motivate terrorists and insurgents. A successful CTCOIN encompasses full range of measures taken by government - agencies to effect an end to the carnage. Above all it is about identifying minating the causative factors of the crisis. The key to insurgents having antage in a state is the popular support they enjoy and not necessarily their y might. ORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA As mentioned earlier the Siamese twins of terrorism and insurgency are alt to separate, thus, the historical perspectives are treated with emphasis on sm. Contrary to the popular notion that the formation in 2002 and quent operations of the Boko Haram sect is the beginning of acts of ism in Nigeria, Nwolise (2017) observed that traits of terrorism in Nigeria ted the creation of Boko Haram in 2002 in Yobe State, as explained in equent paragraphs. a. Early Cases of Terrorism. Two issues are used to show early incidents of terrorism in Nigeria prior to the formation of Boko Haram in 2002. In 1986, a letter bomb was used in the assassination of Dele Giwa, the then Editor of the Newswatch Magazine in Lagos. It could be argued that the incident was the first use of such a tool of terrorism in the country and actually marked the advent of terrorism in Nigeria. The second case is related to the 'June 12' annulled presidential election saga in 1993. A fall out of the annulment, was the activity of elements of the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy group, that hijacked a Nigerian Airways Airbus A310 in Kano and took it to Niger Republic on 25 October 1993 (ICIR, 2017). b. Niger Delta Militants. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, several militant groups sprang up in the Niger Delta Region adopting terror tactics as part of their modes of operation. This was part of their efforts in forcing the government to agree to their objectives. Prominent among the groups were the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) led by Ateke Tom and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo. Their demands include a greater share of the oil wealth from both the state and FGN and independence for the Delta region (Gamji.com, 2012). Experts opined that agreeing to the demands by the government would have been the first step towards a new political arrangement for the entire country. The groups employed different methods such as armed assaults and destruction of oil infrastructure, kidnapping, abduction of oil employees for ransom, murder of Nigerian soldiers and policemen, which were indeed a threat to Nigeria's national security. C. Boko Haram. Boko Haram's aim is the replacement of the country's secular state with an Islamic one based on a strict compliance to the Sharia law (EUAA, 2021). The Global Terrorism Index ranked the group as the second deadliest terrorist group in 2019 (Bensouda, 2020). Its operations were initially confined to the North East states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, but has been expanded in to the North-West and North- Central zones. Since 2009, Boko Haram activities have adversely affected some 15 million people, displaced over three million people and caused more than thirty thousand deaths. The group has committed widespread human rights violations, such as suicide bombings, killings of innocent people, burning down of entire villages, attacks on places of worships and schools. Other atrocities of Boko Haram are cruel and degrading treatment following sentences by its 'courts', extrajudicial executions, abduction on a massive scale, including school children, forced displacement, child recruitment, grave violation of rights of women and girls such as slavery, sexual violence and forced marriages. d. Indigenous People of Biafra. The organisational structure of the IPOB and its mobilisation strength and strategy, both locally and internationally, have combined to threaten Nigeria's national security. Increased pervasive use of internet-enabled devices in spreading propaganda by IPOB encourages some Igbo youths to gradually mobilise themselves for the Biafra agenda. Nigeria's unity is therefore under a serious threat. In 2017, the FGN proscribed IPOB and designated the self- determination group a terrorist organisation. Its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, is currently being tried on terrorism charges by the government. IPOB's military faction, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) has been responsible for various acts of terrorism in the South-East Nigeria, including attacks against military installations, killings and kidnappings of innocent civilians as well as extortion. The seeming failure to quickly nip IPOB in the bud has resulted in its growth into an ethnic monster threatening Nigeria's national security. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has uncovered 27 cells belonging to IPOB in 22 countries across the globe. IPOB has several bank accounts in different countries where funds are being received from various contributors. A major source of revenue for the group is crowdfunding mostly by Nigerians. IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY ON NATIONAL SECURITY 16. There are numerous implications on Nigeria's national security and development from activities of terrorist and insurgent groups which may be different from zone to zone. However, some of these implications, which include loss of lives and properties, cover for other crimes, dwindling economy, displacement of innocent citizens, threats to national unity and loss of fundamental human rights are highlighted in subsequent paragraphs. 17. Loss of lives and Properties. The use of lethal weapons and explosives both conventional and improvised by terrorist and insurgent groups have been responsible for the high fatalities and destruction of property, including places of worship. The death include not only innocent and law abiding citizens but a substantial number of AFN and other security agencies personnel, which is a great loss to the country. This has also led to a reduction in the expectations of citizens on national protection for which the military and other security agencies were created. 18. Cover for Other Crimes. Terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria have created cover under which other crimes and violence are perpetrated by criminal gangs. Armed robbers have found an alibi to loot banks, while politically hired assassins operate under the cover of terrorists like Boko Haram (Omotosho 2010). The increasing terrorist activities of IPOB in the South East has heightened insecurity in the zone by giving criminals the opportunity to exploit the violent situation. 19. Dwindling Economy. Following the resurgence of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, the country's sources of revenue have dwindled as economic activities have halted in affected areas. This has added to the reduction in Nigeria's economic growth rate, as the country's business environment is described as unsafe as terrorists actions scare potential foreign investors away from the country (Nwokike and Oche 2014). UNTAD report indicates that FDI flows to Nigeria fell to 6.1 billion US Dollars in 2010, a decline of about 29 per cent from 8.65 billion US Dollars in 2009 fiscal year (Nwokike and Oche 2014). This was at the beginning of Boko Haram activities and has continued till date. There is also the flight of highly skilled persons from the society which has further reduced the capacity of the economy to grow, because farms and factories are being abandoned in virtually all the geo-political zones due to activities of terrorists. 20. Displacement of Citizens. Another security implication is the displacement of citizens as internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees. Such rising number of refugees in another country is considered a security threat especially to the host communities (Nnoli 2006). Displacement of people caused by terrorism in Nigeria has disrupted production and distribution, considering the fact that the actively productive members of the population constitute the fleeing IDPs and refuges. Besides, the influx of IDPs in a state or community generates divisive socio-economic competition between their requirements and those of the host population. 21. Threat to National Unity. IPOB's unconstitutional creation of the Biafra Secret Service, Biafra National Guard and the ESN for instance portend great threat to Nigeria's national security and unity (Jonah et al., 2021). Apart from portraying a brazen disregard to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, this development could also encourage dissident groups from other parts of the country to unleash violence on the public. An example of this assertion is the incident of an O'odua Nation faction's failed attempt to attack and take over the Oyo State Secretariat in Ibadan early 2024. The calculated ethnoreligious, hate and inciteful speeches employed by terrorists could also elicit counter ethnic intolerance and violent protests in other parts of the nation. 22. Loss of Fundamental Human Rights. IPOB's sit-at-home order for instance and other criminal activities by terrorists have denied citizens in South East Nigeria their fundamental human rights of free movement, education, and healthcare among others, while summarily shooting those who defied the unlawful order. A sad example was the inability of students in some parts of the South East to write the 2024 WASC Examination, in compliance with IPOB's sit- at-home order. Section 14 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) provides that the security and the welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of governments. This implies that protection of human rights, access to education and health care, equal opportunities and good governance are threatened by these terrorists and insurgents activities. CTCOIN MEASURES IN NIGERIA 23. The FGN has embarked on measures locally and in collaboration with the international community to counter activities of terrorists and insurgents in the country. These counter measures will be highlighted on four pillars of frameworks or provisions, kinetic or military operations, civil efforts and collaborative activities. 24. Frameworks or Provisioning. There are frameworks or provisions by government for particularly counter terrorism in the country. These are legal and policy frameworks. a. Legal Frameworks. In 2011 the Terrorism Prevention and Prohibition Act was enacted and amended in 2013 by the FGN. The Act provides a comprehensive legal framework prohibiting and criminalising terrorism in the country. The Act formally establishes the National Counter Terrorism Centre to better coordinate the counter terrorism polices and strategies (Dakwak, 2023). Additionally, the Act provides for the creation of National Sanctions Committee for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on countering the financing of terrorism. These instruments have improved Nigeria's capacity to respond to and counter the threat of terrorism. The Act also establishes a Special Victims Trust Fund, domiciled in the Office of the Attorney-General to pay compensation, restitution and damages to victims of terrorist attacks (Dakwak, 2023). Although there were no changes to Nigeria's counterterrorism legal framework, nevertheless, in October 2021, UNODC and the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies launched a user guide to the Terrorism Act for law enforcement and judicial officials. b. Policy Frameworks. Nigeria has enacted the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) (2016), which among others provides for responsibilities for all ministries, departments and agencies of government and tasked the Ministry of Defence to establish a special counter terrorism force. The National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (2017) is also in existence and the nation is actively pursuing the implementation of the policy frameworks to address the root causes of violent extremism (Dakwak, 2023). Other policies promulgated by the country in its CTCOIN efforts include the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (2016), the National Security Strategy (2019), the National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (2021) and the National C Management Doctrine (2022). In broad terms, these policy docum emphasize a whole-of-government approach involving all the minist departments and agencies in combination with a whole-of-soc involving civil society organisations and the citizenry (Buhari, 2023) 25. Military or Kinetic Operations. Military operations as part of CTCOIN measures include but not limited to the following highlighted on g political basis. a. Operations in the South-South Zone. The FGN's CTCC efforts in in the South South Zone include the establishment of Operat RESTORE HOPE, tasked principally to defeat militancy threatening nation's economic survival (Global Security.org, 2019). It la transformed into Operation PULO SHIELD in 2012, which covered ni states namely Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Im Ondo and Rivers States. In 2018, Operation PULO SHIELD gave way Operation DELTA SAFE (Global Security.org, 2019). The operation al covers elimination of piracy and all forms of sea robbery within its Area Responsibility (Global Security.org, 2019). b. Operations in the North East Zone. Military operations agains Boko Haram's uprising was initially code-named Operation RESTORI ORDER I- IV conducted in succession between 2011 and 2013 by Division of the NA. On May 14, 2013, the FGN declared a state o emergency in the three most affected states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yob and changed the designation to Operation BOYONA (Abdullahi 2021). Operation BOYONA was later renamed Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA in August 2013. In 2015, Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA was renamed Operation LAFIYA DOLE and between 2015 and 2019, Bokc Haram was pushed to the fringes of Lake Chad, thus liberating the 22 local governments under the occupation of the terrorist groups. To consolidate these gains, the operation in the North East against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) was renamed again in 2022 as Operation HADIN KAI. It currently comprises the Army, Navy and Air Force in collaboration with other security agencies conducting campaigns across the vast terrain ranging from desert, marshy, riverine, savannah forest and mountainous locations (Abdullahi, 2021). C. Operation in the South-East Zone. Operation UDOKA was established to end the sit-at-home menace in the South-East region, achieve peace and preserve the unity of Nigeria (Icheku, 2024). To this effect, several non-kinetic exercises were conducted in all the sectors of the operation, covering all the South East states, to win the hearts and minds of the people and help in enhancing intelligence gathering. This was done through several medical outreaches to communities, humanitarian support and donation of relief items to widows, elderly and children homes; give educational support through provisioning of books and writing materials, desks and chairs; and random clearing of blocked drainage, among other sanitation exercises by troops. All these have helped to improve the populace belief and cooperation with the military and steadily, Operation UDOKA is making appreciable gains. d. Operation in the North West. The North West geopolitical zone has most of its border areas ungoverned with little government presence (Yahaya 2019). Terrorism, banditry and religious intolerance have undermined the security of the zone, leading to the establishment of Operation SHARAN DAJI. This is complemented by Operation WHIRL PUNCH to curtail terrorists activities in parts of Kaduna and Niger states. 26. Civil Efforts. The civil efforts in the CTCOIN programme of the FGN involve other stakeholders, which have become more visible and pronounced since 2015. Two of these efforts will be highlighted, which are tracking of terrorists financing and the evocation of the adoption of a whole of government of approach to national security'. a. Tracking of Terrorist Financing. Nigeria operates a largely cash based and informal economy which has made it difficult for security agencies to trace the movement of illicit funds, especially funds meant for funding terror. The cash and informal basis of the economy has made it easy for most terrorists funds to move outside the radar of the financial intelligence units and formal banking system. (Sulaiman, 2023). Furthermore, Nigeria lacks a comprehensive citizen identity and information data to track individuals, making it more difficult, while terrorists have become more localised generating their own funds within their immediate environment, through local entrepreneurship, smuggling, kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking. Consequently, there is the need f b. or synergy between security and development efforts in addition to provision of better equipment (Sulaiman, 2023). Nigeria has been working in concert with relevant organisations like the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), an ECOWAS regional body, as Nigeria's Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has been in the fore front of the effort with other financial institutions in tracking terrorists financing. This has been enhanced with the NFIU becoming an independent agency, to make it more effective at combating money laundering and corruption (US Department of State, 2021). b. A Whole of Government Approach. The Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) is responsible for coordinating all security and law enforcement agencies, on the adoption of a whole of government approach to national security. This issue covers what is expected of all MDAS. For instance border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, DSS, NSCDC, Customs, Immigration, and the military. Unfortunately, the shared responsibilities have been major issues due to lack of understanding of requirements for inter-agency space, making coordination among the agencies difficult and limited. 27. Collaborative Efforts. The FGN's collaborative efforts are examined from two main perspectives, which are the regional and United Nations angles. a. Regional Cooperation. Nigeria is working closely with ECOWAS on the non-kinetic angle, while collaborating with neighbouring countries under the Multi National Joint Taks Force (MNJTF) on the kinetic sphere to counter terrorist activities in the Lake Chad area, principally Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The persistent threat to security and livelihoods by terrorists in the area and to international peace, necessitates collective action and approach by the region as well as the international community and partners to strengthened national and regional responses. Through closer cooperation within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the MNJTF continues to be more effective in the fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP. This is done in combination with the non-kinetic stabilization responses by the LCBC, including the Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience and the Territorial Action Plans for affected communities. Nigeria continues to spear-head the funding for MNJTF, the first regional formation for countering terrorism in the region (Dakwak, 2023). b. Collaboration with the United Nations. On 30 August 2023 the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the FGN signed two Memoranda of Understanding, aimed at enhancing their partnership in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. These include initiatives to counter terrorist travel, enhance border and maritime security, strengthen global, regional and national responses. This will be through the promotion of dialogue and partnerships and capacity- building activities (UNOCT, 2023). Nigeria has continued its high level participation in regional security and counterterrorism conferences and trainings sponsored by the United Nations. APPRAISAL OF MEASURES 28. It is difficult to put a score on the performance of the various agencies and organisations earmarked for CTCOIN activities in Nigeria. However, it is also necessary to appraise or assess the effectiveness of the CTCOIN measures by the FGN, which will in turn assist in proffering the way forward. 29. Legal Framework. The provisions of the Terrorism Prevention Act, its establishment of the Counter Terrorism Centre at the Office of the NSA and the Special Victim Trust Fund are all apt. However, there are some shortcomings affecting effective implementation. The Act provides for both the NSA and IGP to coordinate the counter terrorism efforts, which is actually disrupting coordination. Furthermore, despite the launching of the user guide for law enforcement and judicial officials, much more is required from the latter particularly in the quick and fair trial of suspected terrorists and associated criminals to reduce the level of impunity in the country. Such trial would serve as deterrence to those who may wish to join terrorist and insurgent groups and provide a platform for the FGN to ensure the criminals lose hope in the attainment of their end states through criminal activities. 30. Policy Framework. The FGN policies on counter terrorism are apt, but such policies in reality are constraints to the military in their kinetic operations. Policies which include the National Security Strategy and the Defence Policy provide the end state and indicate the means without being specific. The military is expected to develop appropriate strategies to achieve the policy objectives, which is always difficult as the ends will always not be clear irrespective of the country and the means will also not be enough. This becomes clear when strategy is examined from the formular 'ends + means + ways. The end is never specified clearly, means are never adequate and only the ways cannot achieve the objectives. The means is improving now since 2015 as the requirements for military operations are being met by successive governments. 31. Military or Kinetic Measures. A nation in crisis or war according to Clausewitz in his 'paradoxical trinity' depend on three pillars; the government and its policy; the citizens or people and their sentiments and the military with its game of chance and friction between plans and reality on ground. Asymmetric warfare is intelligence driven, particularly human intelligence provided by the citizens. Unfortunately, this has not been forthcoming due to a variety of reasons, which include poor integration of citizens in the national security architecture. Although experts have bounded the concept of a whole of society approach to national security, but this is not yet working as expected. 32. Civil Measures. The two civil measures examined are terrorism financing and a whole of government approach. Performances on these issues are getting better but with much to be done to improve on them. NFIU has improved on its performance and actually doing well, but there is still much to be done in tracking terror financing. Mere rhetoric on the whole of government approach is really not good enough for the asymmetric challenges the nation is confronting. Although the concept is provided for in the National Security Strategy, but not really operationalised, while there is a huge requirement for citizens involvement in intelligence provision, which a whole of government does not cover. 33. Collaborative Efforts. Collaboration is at the heart of the FGN's CTCOIN measures, particularly when terrorists move from Nigeria's territory to neighbouring countries and that no single nation can secure itself independently. However, collaboration at the domestic level requires effective coordination, which for the past couple of years has been improving, but could be better. On the international scene, Nigeria needs to realise that the driver of cooperation in the system is national interest. Placing emphasis on assistance from other countries, without examining their national interests will not provide the desired outcome. WAY FORWARD 34. The way forward will also serve as the conclusion to this paper. The essence of any government is to provide for its citizens, ensure their safety and security. Although the security challenges is not only a Nigeria issue, but a global problem, which is fluid and unpredictable. Steps have to be taken to consolidate the gains made so far in the nation's CTCOIN efforts. Thus, the way forward include but not limited to the under listed factors. 35. Good Governance. Provision of good governance is the most important factor in the CTCOIN measures of any country. Good governance will ensure that the citizens are provided for, resulting in the vast majority having a sense of belonging, as there is fairness, equity and justice, which in turn reduces the feelings of marginalisation. As part of the good governance indices local governments in the country must be made to function effectively, as there is no crisis that cannot be traced to one of the 774 local government areas in the country. 36. Sense of Patriotism and Pride. Nigerians must be encouraged to imbibe an unflinching sense of patriotism and pride in the country, which is a major responsibility of the Ministry of Information and the National Orientation Agency. Families, schools and social organisations have important roles to play in inculcating the sense of patriotism in individuals through security education and awareness. Ministry of Education must also ensure that schools at all levels have curricula showing the rich historical development of the country. 37. Adequate Analysis Investigation and Adaptation. All the ministries, services and law enforcement agencies involved in security provisioning must have the capacity to adequately analyse the security challenges being confronted which will continue to mutate and require adaptation in management. An issue related to this is terrorism financing which requires security agencies and particularly the NFIU to investigate transactions by any suspect linked to known terrorists or financiers; unauthorised tax collections or forced donations in terrorism-prone areas and Bureau de Change operators facilitating transfers within suspected networks. 38. Operationalisation of Whole of Society Approach. It is important for ONSA to operationalise the whole of society approach to security in the country as provided by the National Security Strategy. However, its meaning and scope needs to be defined to suit Nigeria's environment and requirements. The concept should encompass all government entities (the whole of government approach), civil society organisations and the entire citizenry. This will assist in the patriotism and pride issue mentioned earlier. Responsibilities of all the stakeholders must be clearly stated for ease of coordination. 39. Review of Frameworks. All the provisions on counter terrorism including legal and policy frameworks should be reviewed on a continuous basis as the challenges are always mutating, which require update in ideas and forms of countering. Furthermore, the reviews will assist in correcting any shortcomings or weaknesses contained therein. There must be clear directives on coordination of the efforts with specifics and details on responsibilities given to offices. 40. StrengthenING and Effective Collaboration. There is a huge requirement to strengthen law enforcement and judicial capabilities, expand aviation and border security, deepen global information sharing and improve crisis response. Nigeria's national interest needs to be clearly articulated which will assist in developing relationship with other countries for effectiveness in the collaboration required. The ONSA needs to work closely with the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Finance and Budgeting and the Intelligence Community for effective coordination and integrated counterterrorism efforts. 41. Development of National Industrial Base. Nigeria is a mere consumer and importer of goods and services, which is increasing the level of poverty in the country. The need for developing an industrial base cannot be overemphasised. The Defence Industries Cooperation Act 2013 could be utilised to serve as the base for the national industrial complex. The FGN would need to provide the enabling environment and implement the public-private partneship provision therein, to ensure the country begins to produce its consumption requirements. This will involve provision of infrastructures particular affordable power for the associated industries to thrive. All these will assist in reducing the level of employment and poverty which are drivers of insecurity in the country.www.twitter.com/spyetv