- EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 04/Jul 23:19

What Chance For Regime Change In Iran? – OpEd

In any consideration of a possible regime change in Iran, one potential leader stands symbolically head and shoulders above anyone else – the man born to be Shah of Iran and who, for the first nineteen years of his life, was its Crown Prince, namely Reza Pahlavi, now 65 years old. When his father, faced by an army mutiny and violent public demonstrations, went into voluntary exile on January 17, 1979 young Pahlavi was a trainee fighter pilot at a US air base in Texas. Two weeks later Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution, took control of the country. Neither Pahlavi nor his father ever set foot in Iran again. To end his own exile has been Pahlavi’s main purpose in life for the past 46 years. Though living in the West under the constant threat of assassination, he has campaigned constantly for the overthrow of the rule of the ayatollahs and to return home to help create a new modern, liberal democracy that respects human rights, freedom and equality. In pursuit of his aim he leads a body called the National Council of Iran for Free Elections (NCI). The Council, an umbrella group of exiled opposition figures, seeks to restore Pahlavi to the leadership of Iran, either as Shah or as president. Meanwhile it acts as a government-in-exile, and claims to have gathered "tens of thousands of pro-democracy proponents from both inside and outside Iran." On June 23, in a press conference held in Paris. Pahlavi called for an end of Iran’s theocratic government. In its place he proposed establishing a constitution based on the separation of religion and state, with liberty and equality for all citizens. “I am stepping forward to lead this national transition,” he said, “not out of personal interests, but as a servant of the Iranian people.”  Promising a national referendum on the nature of a future democratic Iran, he called on the “patriotic members of our armed forces” to “join the people”.   Pahlavi is not intent on masterminding either a military or a popular coup.  He appears to believe that a spontaneous popular uprising will topple the regime. His starting point is the burgeoning disillusion with the regime among the Iranian people. When Iran’s then-incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was declared the winner of the presidential election in 2009 with 63% of the vote, the Iranian public was outraged. The whole tenor of the campaign had suggested he was about to be ousted by a large majority. Two of the other candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, alleged widespread electoral fraud and vote rigging, and called on the Iranian people to protest. The mass demonstrations that broke out across the country gave rise to what became known as the Green Movement, a symbol of unity and hope for those demanding political reform. The crackdown by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps),was brutal. Thousands were detained, while reports emerged of severe abuse, torture, and even deaths in detention. Some protesters were killed in the streets. Dozens of detained protesters and reformists were paraded in televised trials to intimidate dissenters. That is what might be expected following any attempt at regime change in Iran that was less than meticulously planned, fully prepared, and executed with complete professionalism. It took eight years before economic hardship, government corruption, and anger at the nation’s costly support of foreign proxies of the regime led to another outburst of public anger and resentment. One notable development marked this episode. Among the slogans chanted by protesters across the country and reported in the media were, for the first time: “Bring back the Shah”. Then on September 13, 2022 Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, was arrested by Iran’s infamous morality police. Her nominal offense was that she was wearing her hijab “improperly”. Mahsa was taken to the Vozara Detention Centre. Three days later she died. The Iranian nation erupted in protest. Thousands took to the streets in cities across the country. Very soon dissent expanded beyond the severe dress code imposed on women and enforced by the morality police. Soon the protesters began targeting the regime itself and the Supreme Leader. Posters with the slogan “Death to the Dictator” began appearing, and videos posted online showed demonstrators burning images of Khamenei and calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty. Then, on May 19, a new wave of protests erupted triggered by widespread anger over poverty, corruption, and economic mismanagement by the regime. They were marked by coordinated actions directly challenging the government’s handling of the economy and social welfare, and demonstrators chanting slogans such as “Death to Khamenei” and “Death to the dictator” were recorded. The regime’s suppression of these mass demonstrations was brutal. Security forces confronted protesters with tear gas and batons. Police, backed by IRGC personnel, used force to disperse crowds, and in some cases bulldozed protest sites. There were widespread arrests and a dramatic increase in state executions – at least 175 people were executed during May. What forces does Pahlavi have at his beck and call to counter such ruthless suppression? The regular army remains nationalist and traditionally non-political. He may enjoy quiet sympathy within it, but there is no visible sign of pro-Pahlavi coordination, and he seems to have nothing like the infrastructure needed to lead or support a coup. The regular police (FARAJA) is poorly paid and sometimes shows sympathy with protesters, especially in urban centers, but there is no indication of coordination with external figures like Pahlavi. Reformists and pragmatists inside the Islamic Republic have been marginalized since 2020, but even they do not associate publicly with Pahlavi. Many fear that aligning with an exiled figure would mean accusations of treason and possible imprisonment. As far as the business sector is concerned, those tied to the regime (via IRGC contracts, bonyads, or patronage) will not defect unless the system is collapsing. Finally, and perhaps crucially, Pahlavi’s team has no direct media infrastructure inside the country. Internet censorship, intimidation, and disinformation severely limit his ability to organize or communicate with supporters on the ground. His most effective channels are diaspora satellite stations and social media, which are limited in reach due to filtering and surveillance. In short, there is no confirmed underground or internal network working directly for, with, or under Pahlavi. There are grassroots networks inside Iran: feminist, student, labor, and ethnic groups. These movements are fragmented and internally suspicious of external figures, even when monarchism isn’t the issue. The available evidence seems to indicate that Reza Pahlavi lacks the internal support structure and organizational mechanisms required to coordinate a successful uprising from within. He seems to hope that one will occur, and that he will be called upon to help develop a democratic government afterwards.