Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 16/Jan 00:36

The Philippines-US Alliance: The Biden Legacy – OpEd

On January 14, 2025, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. delivered his final address at U.S. Department of State. Echoing his past statements, President Biden declared that the world is at an “inflection point” and that the “Cold War period is over, and a new era has begun.” This new era is underpinned by a “fierce competition” primarily between Washington and Beijing. President Biden underscored that that the U.S. is “winning the worldwide competition…America is stronger, our alliance are stronger, our adversaries and competitors are weaker.” Mr. Biden’s remarks were in part delivered to consolidate his foreign policy legacy as the 46th President of the United States. As he leaves the White House, it might be worth looking into his administration’s record in dealing with the Philippines-U.S. alliance, the oldest of Washington’s bilateral alliances in East Asia. Repairing Ties President Biden came into office in January 2021 at one of the lowest points in the history of the Philippines-U.S. alliance. Nearly a year before, then-Philippine President Rodrigo R. Duterte declared the abrogation of the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), a crucial pact which provides the legal basis and framework for the presence and treatment of U.S. forces in the country. The abrogation of the VFA was the culmination of Mr. Duterte’s efforts to upend Philippine foreign. After all, President Duterte was vocal about his desire to “separate” from the U.S. and “realign” the Philippines with China. The VFA is an important component of the Philippines-U.S. alliance which is anchored on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Under the latter, Manila and Washington agreed to “act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes” in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific Area.” The allies also agreed to “develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” These provisions of the MDT can fully be implemented if Washington has military presence in the Philippines. In other words, the VFA operationalizes the Philippines-U.S. alliance, which is but part of a broader network of U.S.-led system of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Without the VFA, the Philippines-U.S. alliance would largely be an alliance only in paper. Thus, there was strategic imperative for the Biden administration to restore stability in the Philippines-U.S. alliance. At the start of its term, the Biden administration adopted what was already becoming a bipartisan consensus in Washington – the strategic competition with China. Indeed, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, issued within just two months into Mr. Biden’s term, provided that China is the “only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” Owing in part to its geographical location, the Philippines was (and is) a key actor in the evolving regional power balance. As such, the Biden foreign policy team needed to move quickly to repair the alliance with Manila. Fortunately for the Biden administration, there three major developments which helped persuade President Duterte to reconsider his decision to withdraw from the VFA. First, the Whitsun Reef incident of March 2021 when the Philippine government expressed concern over the presence of more than 200 hundred fishing vessels manned by Chinese maritime militia. This incident, which led to a “terse exchange of statements” between Manila and Beijing, provided an opportunity for the Biden administration to express its support for the Philippines, as well as to reaffirm the public commitment that the MDT is also applicable in the South China Sea. Second, by its final full year in office, the Duterte administration has little to show for the supposed major infrastructure projects from China. This in turn strengthened the position of those who have strong reservations about Duterte’s foreign policy, including the Philippine defense establishment which has close historical links with the U.S. Third, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. donation of much needed vaccines. Philippine Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez convinced President Duterte to reconsider his decision to end the VFA in light of the health and other challenges caused by the pandemic. Subsequently, Mr. Duterte himself admitted publicly that he “conceded the continuance of the Visiting Forces Agreement, in gratitude” for the vaccines provided by Washington. Thus, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III visited the Philippines in July 2021, the Philippine government announced President Duterte decided to fully restore the VFA. Malacañang announced that President Duterte and Secretary Austin had “open and frank discussion on the status and future direction of Philippines-U.S. engagement.” They agreed that the “alliance can be further strengthened through enhanced communication and greater cooperation.” Seizing Opportunities The restoration of the VFA provided some measure of stability in the security relations between Manila and Washington. However, it was the Philippine presidential transition in 2022 that provided the Biden administration the opportunity to reinvigorate the alliance with Manila. Although initially perceived to continue the “Pivot to China” initiative of the Duterte administration, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. shifted course in foreign policy. Indeed, in his speech at the 77th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) barely three months into his term, Mr. Marcos declared that “[b]y reinforcing the predictability and stability of international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, [the Philippines] provided an example of how states should resolve their differences: through reason and through right.” President Marcos reaffirmed the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award which his predecessor has dismissed a mere “piece of paper” which he would “just throw away.” In a stark departure from Mr. Duterte’s vocal anti-American tendencies, President Marcos, in his first bilateral meeting with President Biden at the sidelines of the 77th UNGA, declared that the Philippines “continue to look to the United States for that continuing partnership and the maintenance of peace in our region.” Seizing the opportunities, the Biden administration achieved major strides in strengthening the Philippines-U.S. alliance. First, the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Signed in 2014, EDCA provides for the increased rotational presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines. As an implementing agreement of the MDT and VFA, EDCA also seeks to promote interoperability and support the AFP modernization program by identifying “agreed locations” in which the U.S. military is authorized to, among others, deploy forces and materiel, train, and preposition equipment and supplies. In 2016, the allies announced the initial five EDCA locations: Basa Air Base in Pampanga; Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija; Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan; Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu; and Lumbia Air Base in Cagayan de Oro. In 2023, the Biden administration brokered a deal with the Marcos government for the “full implementation” of EDCA. This entailed the addition of four new EDCA sites in addition to the original five: Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; Balabac Island in Palawan; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan. The strategic location of the bases may suggest that the allies are not just forging closer security cooperation in the context of the West Philippine Sea (WPS), but also of Taiwan. Second, the agreement on the Bilateral Defense Guidelines (BDG). With the aim of promoting better alliance management, the BDG aims to, among others, foster “a common understanding of roles, missions, and capabilities within the framework of the alliance to face emerging regional and global security challenges.” Anchored on previous U.S. private assurances and public declarations, the BDG provides that an “armed attack in the Pacific, to include anywhere in the South China Sea [SCS], on either Philippine or U.S. armed forces – which includes both nations’ Coast Guards – aircraft, or public vessels, would invoke mutual defense commitments under Article IV and Article V of the MDT.” Cognizant of China’s coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, the BDG underscores the need to “build interoperability and cooperation in both conventional and non-conventional domains while taking into account asymmetric, hybrid, and irregular warfare and gray-zone tactics as well as artificial intelligence and other emerging technology areas.” Moreover, mindful of the historical asymmetry that characterized Philippines-U.S. alliance, the BDG provided guidance in order to promote a more equal relationship, including alliance coordination and bilateral planning. Third, the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The agreement will serve as a “framework to facilitate the exchange of classified military information between the Philippines and the United States.” Manila also announced that GSOMIA will “allow the Philippines access to higher capabilities and big-ticket items from the United States [and ] also open opportunities to pursue similar agreements with like-minded nations.” At the time when GSOMIA was signed, the allies also broke ground on a new combined coordination center at Camp Aguinaldo, the center of the Philippine defense establishment. The Biden administration also saw an expansion of military training exercises and aid to the Philippines. Indeed, the 2024 Balikatan Exercises – the last under the Biden administration – was the largest thus far, with about 16,000 American and Philippine military personnel who participated. With the participation of other like-minded partners like Australia and France, the 2024 Balikatan Exercises “prepared the combined forces for potential contingencies and disasters and increased each country’s ability to work together to protect Philippine sovereignty and preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region.” In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) announced in April 2023 that it “intends to expand funding on top of the $82 million” that has already been allocated toward infrastructure investments in the original EDCA sites. In October 2023, Manila and Washington approved sixty-three additional projects to be constructed in the EDCA locations. In 2024, the Philippines announced that it plans to procure the Typhon missile system from the U.S. In its four years in power, the Biden administration managed to take advantage of the opportunities to modernize its oldest bilateral alliance in East Asia. Indeed, the Biden administration also sought to strengthen the alliance management with the convening of first 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (among defense and foreign ministers) in seven years, and the inaugural 3+3 Meeting (among defense and foreign ministers, and national security advisers). A Network of Alliances While revitalizing the bilateral Philippines-U.S. security relations, the Biden administration also made steps to build a network of alliances in the region. Indeed, in April 2024, Washington hosted the first Japan-Philippines-U.S. trilateral summit. In his remarks, President Biden underscored that “a great deal of history in our world will be written in the Indo-Pacific over the coming years… we commit to writing that story and a future together, to building an Indo-Pacific that is free, open, prosperous, and secure for all.” In the Joint Vision of Statement issued by Presidents Biden and Marcos, and then-Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, the leaders expressed their “serious concerns about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.” The three leaders also expressed their “strong opposition to any attempts by the PRC to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea,” as well as underscored the “importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of global security and prosperity.” The trilateral summit launched Luzon Economic Corridor initiative as part of the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI). As the first PGI initiative in the Indo-Pacific region, the Luzon Economic Corridor aims to support connectivity among Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas in the Philippines. The three countries expressed their commitment “to accelerating coordinated investments in high-impact infrastructure projects, including rail; ports modernization; clean energy and semiconductor supply chains and deployments; agribusiness; and civilian port upgrades at Subic Bay.” Apart from the historic trilateral summit, the Biden administration also sought forge and strengthen cooperation among its allies and partners through other platforms. Indeed, a meeting among the defense ministers of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. was convened for the first time in June 2023. The following year, another meeting of the “Squad” was convened. In 2024, a Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) among the four countries was conducted in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In doing so, the Squad underscored that they are “safeguarding the international order based on the rule of law that is the foundation for a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region. Our four nations reaffirm the position regarding the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award as a final and legally binding decision on the parties to the dispute.” Quo Vadis? Indeed, President Biden will leave a legacy of an enhanced Philippines-U.S. alliance. As such, administration of Mr. Donald J. Trump has a strong foundation to build upon as it implements its foreign policy agenda in the Philippines and beyond. There are three areas where the Trump administration can focus on with respect to the Philippines-U.S. alliance. First, the continuous implementation of EDCA, BDG, GSOMIA, and other agreements. Second, further institutionalizing the mechanisms for alliance management. Third, strengthening the efforts to build a network of alliances and partnerships in the region. However, it remains to be seen how the second Trump administration will deal with the Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless, if the first Trump term is any indication, there is reason to believe that President Biden’s successor would likely sustain the upward trajectory of the Philippines-U.S. alliance. After all, it was the first Trump administration that underscored that “strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security,” while describing China as a “revisionist power.” Moreover, it was the Trump government that clarified treaty commitments to the Philippines in both public statements and domestic legislation, and clarified US South China Sea (SCS) policy. Time will tell if second Trump administration will indeed build upon its predecessor’s foreign policy legacy.