Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 31/Oct 16:47

Japan Enters A New Phase Of Political Instability – Analysis

Japanese politics has entered into an uncertain terrain following the worst performance by the long-time ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner the Komeito, in 15 years in the snap polls on 27 October called by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba barely a month after coming to office. As it transpired, it was an ill-conceived move and showed that Ishiba failed to judge the public mood. Now Ishiba is under pressure to resign. The most worrying aspect is that Japan is feared to have entered into a phase of political instability. That shall have impact in both domestic and foreign policy of Japan, though sector wise, the impact shall is minimal.                 As no party has secured a majority, a lot of negotiations, bargaining and compromises are going to be seen in the next 30 days which is mandated by the rules to cobble up coalition partners to form a government. Ishiba who won the LDP presidential race on 27 September and thereby became the Prime Minister hoped to consolidate his position amid public outrage over a political funding scandal and rising living costs. As it transpired, his gamble backfired. The ruling coalition won just 215 seats, far short of the 233 needed for a majority. The LDP’s seats in the lower chamber plunged from 247 before the election to 191, a staggering loss of 56 seats. For the LDP, which has dominated Japan's post-war politics, it was the worst showing since 2009, when the party lost power for four years. Japanese political system is indeed entering a new and uncertain period. Its coalition partner Komeito did not fare better either. Komeito also incurred a significant loss of eight seats, down to 24, making the combined total for both parties 215, which are 18 seats short of the majority threshold of 233. This dramatic loss of majority in the lower house, first time in 15 years, did not deter Ishiba from declaring his intention to remain in office. While admitting the severe security and economic environment that the country faces, he was unprepared to accept “any stagnation in national politics”. But continuing the administration without regaining the public’s trust would be a tall order. The political volatility and spectre of instability can be foreseen as the opposition despite making considerable inroads is too divided to form a government. Many opposition parties ranging from Communists to far-right groups have ruled out joining a coalition with the LDP and Komeito. This complicates the path forward. The LDP and Komeito may try to form a minority government, relying on smaller, center-right parties like the Democratic Party for the People and the Innovation Party, to pass legislation on a case-by-case basis. Such ad-hoc arrangement does not guarantee political stability and the government would always be vulnerable to collapse if it fails to meet opposition demands. Ishiba suddenly has become politically weak as many from the Ishiba and Abe allies lost their seats after being implicated in the slush fund scandal. Even if Ishiba becomes the Prime Minister, his stay at office could be short-lived. The elections to the Upper House is due in July 2025 and that would make Ishiba’s position more vulnerable as he may have to make many compromises to meet the demands of the Opposition, thereby raising the spectre of political instability. Then situation looks too messy. LDP’s coalition partner, the Komeito fared no better, with leader Keiichi Ishii, who replaced long-time party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi as party president on 28 September and deputy leader Shigeki Sato losing their elections. In the western Kansai region around Osaka, Komeito’s traditional stronghold, where the party had seldom lost elections due to its powerful organizational base, it faced challenges from candidates of Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party) in four Osaka districts and was defeated in all of them. The first political fallout of the electoral loss bearing responsibility was when Shinjiro Koizumi, chairman of the LDP’s Election Strategy Committee resigned to take responsibility for the electoral pasting, as a matter of principle. Out of 46 lawmakers who became mired in the scandal over political funds amassed and distributed by LDP factions, 28 failed to be re-elected, and only three of the candidates who were not endorsed by the party as punishment for their implications in the scandal managed to win. These outcomes point to the deep anger and malaise centring on distrust the scandal had generated among the voters. Ishiba remains undeterred. While committing himself to heartfelt soul-searching and be reborn, he promised to spearhead hard-hitting reforms in the party, eliminating everything that the public thought logic of party insiders. But the people remember that Ishiba has a history of contradicting his own previous vows and now see contradicting his own promise of political fund reforms after he won the LDP leadership race in September. The point of scrutiny by the people centres on the dark clouds of policy activity expenses, which the LDP currently distributes to individual party executives and the disclosure of how Diet members spend their fixed monthly allowances to cover research, travel and communications expenses, which were formerly known as “buntsu-hi” for short. Ishiba was also found wanting on his promise of the early establishment of a third-party institution for monitoring political funds.  The backlash against the LDP certainly influenced Komeito’s poor performance. Komeito’s poor show demonstrated that it failed to play an effective role in pushing the LDP toward political funding reforms as a ruling coalition partner. With the drubbing it received, the party will now find it difficult to recover its strength. It was not just the slush fund issue that damaged trust in politics. The LDP’s link with the former Unification Church, formally called the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification that had consumed Abe’s life by an assassin who suspected Abe’s hand and which led to his family’s financial ruin also played its part in LDP’s poor show in the elections. For example, Justice Minister Hideki Makihara and former education minister Masahito Moriyama, two lawmakers whose relationships with the former Unification Church, were questioned, lost in a single-seat constituency. In addition, they also failed to gain seats in a proportional representation bloc under a system of double candidacy. This is a clear manifestation of deep-rooted distrust related to this issue. Having lost the majority in the Lower House, if Ishiba cobbles up a coalition government with smaller opposition parties, the LDP-Komeito coalition cannot pass the budgets or other bills without the cooperation of the opposition. This would mean concessions, compromises and ultimately policy paralysis. The government could then be seen as recuperating in the intensive-care-unit, counting days for its survival.  The domestic political turbulence does not necessarily mean that Japan’s foreign policy shall be dramatically recast, though some priorities may shift. Ishiba, a former defense minister who became the prime minister, had embraced several controversial proposals, such as forming an Asian version of NATO and a nuclear-sharing arrangement with the US. His weakened position now would mean these plans are unlikely to gain traction. Instead, if he survives, Ishiba will likely focus on areas with broader political consensus on domestic issues rather than tinkering with foreign policy issues. It is to be seen how the Japanese leadership shall deal with growing threats from North Korea and pressure from China. It major treaty ally, the US, is bogged down on the presidential election and shall have little time to focus on foreign policy issues.  This does not mean that Japan is going to undermine its alliance relationship with the US, its principal ally. Though a policy paralysis is not likely immediately, the opposition shall be emboldened to oppose if Ishiba can cobble up a majority to form a government and decide to boost Japan’s military capabilities. Any decision or move to raise tax revenue to help support the growing necessity for Japan to rearm itself more fundamentally is likely to be fiercely opposed. If Donald Trump wins the US Presidential election in November, it would be tough for Ishiba or whoever becomes the Prime Minister to negotiate with Trump on foreign policy and security issues. To deal successfully with Trump, Japan’s prime minister needs to be strong and for that he/she needs to be endowed with strong political capital. In the present scenario, no Japanese leader possesses that. Japan’s vulnerability shall remain for quite some time.