Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 30/12/2024 01:16

What Awaits Moscow Under Trump – Analysis

By Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash President-elect Donald Trump’s second term marks a policy shift from the previous Biden administration. He aims to shift Washington’s focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s rise. Trump wants to do so by ending the Ukraine war by facilitating negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow. Further, he hopes to split the maturing Moscow-Beijing and the Moscow-Tehran partnership. The President-elect, however, has not mentioned how he plans to do so. Despite the nature of United States (US) policy towards Ukraine likely changing under Trump, the Kremlin has reacted cautiously to his victory because Trump, despite wanting to improve relations with Moscow in his first term, was unable to do so. Second, Moscow is sceptical of Trump’s ability to deliver on Moscow’s demands about European security architecture. Meanwhile, Trump wants North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to increase their defence spending and wants to continue arming Ukraine while pursuing a ceasefire. Endgame in Ukraine? Since the early days of his campaign, Trump has claimed that he would end the war “in 24 hours” if elected. While Trump has not outlined his plans, a few proposals have emerged from his aides. In September, Vice-President-elect J.D. Vance presented the plan of freezing the conflict along current lines, creating a heavily fortified demilitarised zone, offering security guarantees to Ukraine and assuring Moscow that Ukraine would not join NATO. Another plan was presented by Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, former Chiefs of Staff in the National Security Council under Trump, which suggested that US military aid to Ukraine would be contingent on Kyiv negotiating with Moscow and imposing a moratorium on its NATO membership. Easing of sanctions would be contingent on Moscow’s willingness to negotiate, and levies would be imposed on the revenue generated from Russian energy exports, which would be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction. With the nomination of Keith Kellogg as the special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, Washington’s policy approach to the war will likely reflect this plan. While Ukrainian ruling elites are aware that the terms for ending the conflict will lead to the ceding of some territory to Russia, the official stance for negotiations remains that Russia would have to withdraw from all of the occupied territories, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. However, for Russia, the war in Ukraine is not about territory alone, as Moscow wants guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO and remain neutral. However, outgoing US President Joe Biden granted Ukraine permission to use long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs), significantly escalating the conflict. Biden’s last-ditch efforts to arm Ukraine, which are exacerbating the conflict, are probably driven by his desire to drag the Trump administration into continuing support for Kyiv. Ukraine currently fires ATACMS and Anglo-French Storm Shadow missiles into Bryansk and Kursk regions in Russia. This has led to Putin approving changes to the Russian nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Also in a show of determination to the West, and to reemphasise red lines and stop further escalation, Putin launched the intermediate-range ballistic missile ‘Oreshnik’ on an industrial plant in the city of Dnipro, Ukraine. For Putin, despite scepticism, there is some hope for marginal de-escalation in the conflict. He will also seek a dialogue with the US about European security, but Washington’s position on this is unclear. On splitting the Russia-China and Russia-Iran partnership  Trump’s desire to break the Russia-China and Russia-Iran partnership may be more difficult to achieve than he anticipates. Beijing is Moscow’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade increasing from US$88 billion in 2014 to US$240 billion in 2024. With markets shrinking in the West because of sanctions, China has emerged as a pivotal partner to Russia, with cooperation spanning across military, economic, critical technology, energy, and other sectors. Beijing is an important stakeholder in Moscow’s strategy to pivot eastwards and move its supply chains from Europe towards Asia.  With the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s reliance on China has increased further, with the Chinese yuan becoming an important reserve currency in Russia. Despite growing asymmetry with concerns over Chinese banks not processing ruble transactions, and China complying with certain sanctions and export control regulations due to its business interests in the West, China still remains an important partner for Moscow, as both nations have shared grievances with the West. This is reflected in Russia-China cooperation within regional and plurilateral organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS, where both countries aim to carve out an alternative geoeconomic framework to the West. Thus, along with increasing political-economic interaction, the prospect of Moscow de-linking from China looks highly unlikely. Similarly, in the case of Iran, the Moscow-Tehran partnership improved in the 21st century, with Russia assisting Iran in developing its nuclear energy, and with talks to expedite deliveries of advanced military platforms such as the S-400 Anti-Missile System. Since 2022, Iran has increased its supply of drones to Russia. Further, Iran is an important regional player for Moscow, as it is a critical node in the International North-South Trade Corridor, connecting Russia to the Indian Ocean. Further, Iran is an important partner in intergovernmental and plurilateral organisations like the SCO and BRICS. Trump 2.0 a repeat of Trump 1.0? Trump’s arrival in the White House in 2016 came with the possibility of a reset in America’s relationship with Russia and was thus well-received by Moscow. Still, despite the campaign promises, Moscow’s hopes were unaddressed. Sanctions imposed by Trump’s predecessor continued and required the assent of US congressional committees for its revocation. The first Trump administration continued to impose more sanctions against Russia, particularly on Russian energy, with the sanctioning of the Nord Stream 2undersea gas pipeline, which aimed to transport gas from Russia to Europe via the Baltic Sea. Further, it was during Trump’s first term that the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) treaty. For these reasons, uncertainty looms over what the future holds for Moscow under Trump 2.0. While Russia’s concerns about European security remain unaddressed, it is unlikely that US sanctions on Moscow will be lifted, as certain sanctions, such as sanctions on Russian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), profit the USas it increases American LNG exports. Further, it is doubtful that Russia’s frozen sovereign assets (worth US$300 billion) will be unfrozen, and it is unlikely that Russia will agree to these funds being used in Ukraine’s reconstruction or to pay a tax on its future energy sales to contribute to the reconstruction. Thus, while Trump may attempt to end the conflict in Ukraine by offering certain concessions to Moscow, it is unlikely that a lasting, long-term peace will be achieved in 2025. About the author: Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation. Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.