- NEWSDAY.CO.TT - A la Une - 16/Aug 06:09

1990 coup attempt in retrospect

TREVOR SUDAMA AS THE country recently commemorated the 35th anniversary of the 1990 insurrection led by Muslimeen leader Yasin Abu Bakr, I reflected, having been a hostage in Parliament, on my own assessment of the situation in the country prior to this violent attack on the government and other institutions. In a newspaper column in August 21, 1990, I wrote the following: “In many ways the subtle signs and symptoms of an impending crisis in the society seemed to have been on the horizon for some time. Few anticipated, however, that it would have erupted in the peculiar manner and with the unprecedented swiftness with which it did on July 27, 1990. The level of armed and other forms of violence in the last few years affected every community, every sector and every region of the country. "If the citizens of this country had had one common experience it was that of violence. The presence and use of illegal arms evolved into a commonplace occurrence and the population became inured to it. It would only be a matter of time it seemed before illegal arms would be used for higher stakes and a more elaborate purpose. "The political directorate and the security apparatus which they supervised appeared to be blissfully unaware of the seriousness of this possibility and they approached their task of maintaining law and order and pre-empting instability with a casualness and lack of urgency which bordered on the irresponsible. Any determined group with ulterior designs would have been encouraged by the laissez-faire attitude to security concerns. "More so, the reported incidents of corruption and involvement in the nefarious drug trade in the ranks of the protective services were bound to have a debilitating effect on discipline, morale and performance. As it turned out, the intelligence-gathering services were inert and non-functional. This is a small country and a rather open society and the lapse in intelligence cannot be easily explained.” The gross deficiency in intelligence capacity and oversight by the security services is exemplified by the fact that a unit of the army was encamped outside the Muslimeen headquarters on Mucurapo Road, Port of Spain, on July 27, 1990. Yet, the Muslimeen insurrectionists were able to depart the compound undetected by vehicle and foot to carry out their violent and criminal assault on Parliament, police headquarters and the television station. Furthermore, some of the arms in the possession of the Muslimeen came through legal ports of entry. For example, the hundreds of guns hidden in a shipment of lumber from Florida. The question is whether the Muslimeen had infiltrated the Customs and Excise Division. Then there were reports that elements in the army were sympathetic to the Muslimeen and its agenda, which raised the question of the efficiency of the screening process for recruitment into the armed services. There is no doubt that the national security apparatus under the NAR government had badly failed the country and, for being so culpable, the state should at least offer compensation to the victims or their families as recommended by the commission of enquiry. A realistic and candid assessment ought to be made of the general reaction to the events of July 1990. The response from the public in general was mixed. For the majority, there was a sense of shock, disbelief, bewilderment, confusion, uncertainty, and a concern for their own safety. For a significant number, political partisanship dictated either sympathy or antipathy for members of the government and the parliamentarians held hostage. Despite the trauma of the near-death experience of the prime minister, ANR Robinson, and others, views were openly expressed that the Muslimeen should have finished off the job. There were elements among the Muslim community who were supportive of the Muslimeen takeover (temporary as it was) in the belief that Islamic doctrine would have played a greater role in national affairs. The hundreds who came out to the streets were motivated not by support for or opposition to the Muslimeen, but by the opportunity presented to loot, damage and destroy property. We must also be reminded that one political leader reportedly said, “Wake me up when it is all over.” It would be well to recall that, after the state of emergency had elapsed, there were no large public gatherings or marches denouncing the violent assault on the institutions of government and the state or were fully supportive of our system of representative parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and the constitutional and peaceful transfer of power. Annually, there is a perfunctory ritual ceremony of memorial with restricted attendance and the usual platitudes expressed by the leaders. However, there has been no large and robust public expression of commitment to the defence of democracy. There may be latent support for it, but there is also much indifference. Looking back over the last 35 years with various administrations being in power and given the current situation, can the public have the confidence that the national security infrastructure of the country has been sufficiently enhanced and has not been compromised to facilitate a destabilisation of the state and its institutions. The following issues are relevant: 1. The reported fraternising of some political leaders with criminal elements either to maintain a fragile peace or gain electoral support. 2. The suspicion that members of criminal gangs are routinely awarded contracts in state programmes which assist with funding their illegal activities. 3. The speculation that screening for recruitment into the security services and other critical institutions has not been rigorous and incisive enough to exclude rogue elements from being employed. 4. The report in 2024 that staff in the Strategic Services Agency, a significant organisation in the intelligence gathering apparatus, was involved in a plot to overthrow the duly elected government. 5. Criminal elements in the prison population are reportedly organising and masterminding deadly attacks, including assassinations and kidnappings, against members of the public. 6. The increasing use of sophisticated technology by criminals (including drones) to monitor the activities of security personnel. 7. The laxity of the processes of the police, the prosecutorial entity and the judicial system resulting in interminable deferment of criminal cases and suspended conviction and punishment has propagated a sense of impunity among the criminal elements. The post 1990 coup attempt in retrospect appeared first on Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.