- EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 01/Jul 16:17

The EU’s Black Sea Strategy: A Neighbourhood Reassessment

The current state of unpredictability and hostility in international affairs is forcing actors to modify their approaches to their neighbours. As the new international order, based on multi-polarity and regional cooperation continues to take shape, the Eurasian continent remains firmly at the heart of this transformation. One of the key actors affected by this process is the European Union and its member states. In recent months, politicians in Brussels have looked ‘East’, re-engaging with Central Asia and the South Caucasus through separate cooperation initiatives but also through connectivity projects which facilitate interregional integration. However, over the last several years, a combination of both internal issues and an increasingly challenging geopolitical situation have weakened the EU’s grip in its neighbourhood. The EU is confronted with new realities at both the regional level but also on a systemic, international level, a challenge which will test the ability of member states to act as ‘one’ in external engagements. This calls for a strategic re-evaluation and an acknowledgment that previous concepts and approaches are no longer sufficient, especially if the EU’s goal is to develop the strategic actorness necessary to maintain its influence beyond traditional European borders.  The new status-quo Despite the heavy emphasis on military investment and the building of war-time readiness, the EU maintains normative and soft power tool mechanisms which, if applied fairly and reciprocally, can stimulate regional economic growth and promote mutually beneficial cooperation. This includes the Caspian region, with various projects linking the EU to the East via the region. At the same time, significant commitments to boosting war-time readiness and improving member state coordination are underway and now inevitable, with various European states re-committing themselves to meeting what they believe is a “generational challenge" in the face of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This is precisely what is echoed throughout the UK government’s recently published Strategic Defence Review, which argues that current levels of military readiness in Europe are insufficient for the current status-quo.   However, decision-makers in Brussels should not abandon alternative sources of influence in international affairs. This is particularly relevant in the context of the rapidly growing and widening geopolitical competition in regions like Central Asia, where China, the United States and Russia are actively working to maintain their influence through a range of initiatives. In Russia’s case, the over-extension of its resources in Ukraine has led to a weakening of its influence in regions like the South Caucasus. A new strategic reality following Azerbaijan’s restoration of its territorial integrity and the country’s growing role in transregional projects have weakened Russia’s previously assertive position in the region. Therefore, to take advantage of and keep up with newly emerging regional frameworks, the EU must ensure its neighbourhood policy is adequately equipped. This requires the EU to ensure that the foreign policy identity and vision it stands for remains appealing enough for its neighbours, something which has proven to be a major challenge in recent years. This cannot be achieved by prioritising leadership in one specific element or sphere. Any effective ‘soft power’ must be recognized as a power with credibility. Hence, before directing attention to a specific region or project, the EU needs to address issues at the core of its ‘personality’ as an actor. However, the war in Ukraine has undoubtedly complicated this, with several of the EU’s bilateral neighbourhood projects stalling as a result. Member state division on Ukraine itself but also on how to proceed with the accession programme has presented the EU as a fragmented unit, a symptom which goes directly against the rapidly evolving cooperation spirit in the Eurasian (and Caspian) region. Essentially, if the EU is to cooperate with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries, take a leading role in transregional projects such as the Middle Corridor and maintain its economic prestige, it must find a way to restore its appeal as a decisive, uniting and consistent actor. This challenge has, fortunately, been accepted in Brussels. The re-formatting of its approach to its neighbours has begun and serves as a crucial first step to boosting its soft power reputation.  The Eastern Neighbourhood The tension at the heart of the EU’s weakening appeal and also influence is its largely inconsistent approach to relations with its neighbours. For better or worse, the EU systematically institutionalized its relationship with its immediate geographic neighbours. This includes the wide-reaching European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) concept, consisting of 16 countries, but also the narrowed down Eastern Partnership (EaP) which serves as the “Eastern dimension” of the ENP. The goal of both programmes was to bring the EU closer to its “partners” which are non-members but are either striving to accede to the EU or are tied to Brussels through extensive economic and geopolitical cooperation. Based originally on the principle of conditionality and incentives in exchange for alignment with the EU’s vision and key values, the programmes were launched in pursuit of mutual interests which would, a priori, lead to economic development and security. The primary tool was political dialogue and the adoption of Agreements in the “Association Agreement” or “Partnership & Cooperation Agreement” format, which would serve as roadmaps for the relationship between the sides.  This format of institutionalized cooperation and financial assistance was designed to achieve more than just bringing close partners even ‘closer’. The EU was keen to expand the scope of its influence beyond its traditional borders. This, in a way, is a form of ‘soft power’, which ties closely with the normative power literature that in the early 2000s shaped the global understanding of the EU’s foreign policy identity. However, even if an actor’s soft power arsenal is extensive and supported by economic power, this does not always translate into the final objective of “getting others to want the outcomes you want”. This, in the words of the late Joseph Nye, was the ultimate aim of any actor seeking to influence international affairs through non-military means, as was the case with the EU for many years. Essentially, effective soft power without credibility, which is measured by the extent of acceptance of the given actor’s normative stance and broader vision, is deemed to fail. There are numerous examples of countries that began widespread cooperation with the EU and even entered the complex accession ladder. However, more often than not, this momentum has cooled, diverting the essence of the relationship away from prioritising rapid approximation to pragmatic cooperation.  Even though some of these instances have originated from decisions made at the domestic level, the scope of the EU’s broader ‘pull’ factor has undoubtedly deteriorated. First, the EU has been unable to consolidate itself as a leader vis-à-vis Ukraine. Despite positioning itself at the heart of the effort to uphold Ukrainian territorial integrity through financial and military assistance, member states regularly show division on the scale and type of military support that should be provided. Moreover, it is a widely accepted fact that without American support, EU resources are insufficient if the objective is to force Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territories. In the South Caucasus, the EU has, more often than not, acted in an inconsistent and highly divisive manner. Despite officially calling for and supporting peace and championing international law, the EU failed to adequately influence the reality on the ground and address the three-decade long Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory. In addition to the organization of military assistance for the country via the European Peace Facility, the deployment of a border mission has on several occasions dest...