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Getting Ready For Tomorrow’s Myanmar – Analysis

By Nicholas Farrelly Myanmar’s top generals have had another bad year. Under relentless attack, their subordinates have surrendered regional military command headquarters, draconian conscription regulations were introduced to bolster the dwindling rank-and-file, and in the north, east and west, rebel armies are strangling access to valuable resources. Old certainties on the battlefields have been overturned by the proliferation of armed groups, including nimble guerrilla squads in central Myanmar and the widespread use, by all sides, of new combat technologies, including drones. The economy, under these conditions, is spluttering — with the national currency, the kyat, now worth only a quarter of its pre-COVID-19 value. Regime officials have imposed price controls on essentials like rice, cooking oil, eggs, fish and meat. Even middle-class families struggle to survive, and flows of desperate migrants are continuing to flee to Thailand and Malaysia. The junta is also clamping down in the digital sphere, limiting access to information and networks through the Internet. The top generals’ devastating misjudgement of the public mood in early 2021 means monitoring and coercing the population is a bigger job than ever. In response, Myanmar’s democrats, ethnic separatists and sundry revolutionaries are steadily undermining the coherence of the dictatorship. While the wars in Myanmar, and the resistance that exists in every town and city, receive only scant media or policy attention, the realities on the ground have shifted, quite profoundly, against the military regime. In terms of the economy, territorial fragmentation, combat capacity, international reputation and diplomatic energy, the regime is faltering. The generals in Naypyitaw could hobble on in this fashion, potentially for years. The history of mismanaged military dictatorship in Myanmar suggests that this is a highly plausible scenario. In 2025, or perhaps 2026, the generals also want to hold an election to try to rebuild their authority and create some greater legitimacy, including for diplomacy through ASEAN. Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, for a start, would certainly welcome such rehabilitation, but the fact is that any such regime-endorsed election would also be immediately dismissed as flawed and undemocratic. It is increasingly clear that Myanmar’s people, and interested outsiders, need to consider what other future the country might face as the present regime continues its downward slide. With Aung San Suu Kyi still locked up, there is no unifying figure for the resistance. The National Unity Government inevitably struggles to draw all of the different fighting forces together. Some local examples help to illustrate the precarious conditions for ’day-after’ scenario planning. The Arakan Army now controls almost everything of note in the western state of Rakhine. In northernmost Myanmar, the Kachin Independence Army is increasingly dominant. Yet, in both areas, there are other political actors, including armed groups, who feel they have claims to specific territory and resources. The Shan State remains highly contested and has been where the Myanmar army has suffered particular setbacks in the past year, including the loss of strategic military bases. Myanmar’s jumbled geographical mandates are nothing new; throughout its history, Myanmar has remained a patchwork of different territorial claims. At times, the central government has, through ceasefires and other agreements, managed to create a somewhat unified national condition. Ideologies of ‘national race’ inclusion that developed over generations, remain a key part of the regime’s response to these fraught political conditions. What has changed is the strongest ethnic minorities’ tolerance for a system that defines their inclusion on Bamar Buddhist terms. Might the mess eventually lead to formal fragmentation? If there are future negotiations about the shape of a federalised Myanmar state, the armies that have fought to secure their own territories will not simply turn over security and economic decision-making to a central government. They will want to control local resources, with extra influence over educational, linguistic, social and cultural outcomes. Balkanisation, however defined, is a part of today’s and tomorrow’s realities. Within ASEAN, chaired in 2025 by Malaysia, there is deepening concern that Myanmar’s internal problems are far too big to ignore. 2021’s Five-Point Consensus clearly failed to change regime behaviour, but the path to a new mechanism for engagement is also far from clear. China has much to lose if Myanmar descends further into the quagmire. But it is not apparent it would contribute to a grand negotiation if that implied contributions from regional competitors like India, Japan or Australia. Russia, limping through its invasion of Ukraine, still keeps Myanmar stocked with sophisticated military equipment. The fall of the half-century Assad regime in Syria, after the rapid withdrawal of Russian backing, naturally heartened Myanmar’s resistance. Closer to home, they also watched the implosion of Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh, with the former prime minister forced to seek sanctuary abroad. These examples have no doubt buoyed Myanmar’s resistance fighters and offer reminders that supposedly settled conditions do sometimes tip quickly. There is little sense, however, that Myanmar has caught US President Donald Trump’s attention. But an unpredicted intervention cannot be completely ruled out. There are Republican figureswith a long-term eye on Myanmar’s democratic prospects and its possible role in thwarting Chinese designs in the wider region. With more bloodshed and turbulence inevitable, questions about how regional and global powers might find common ground to help the Myanmar people shape their own destinies are not going away. About the author: Professor Nicholas Farrelly is a Pro-Vice-Chancellor at the University of Tasmania. From 2015 to 2018, he was the ANU Myanmar Research Centre’s inaugural Director. Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum