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Strengthening Pacific Security: US Shiprider Agreements – Analysis

By Ray Joseph Shiprider Agreements and the US Coast Guard (FPRI) -- Early last year, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) cutter Harriet Lane, with Vanuatu maritime law enforcement officials on board, conducted an expeditionary patrol that moved through Vanuatu’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The United States and Vanuatu have a shiprider agreement. The USCG conducted a dozen joint vessel boardings with its Vanuatu law enforcement counterparts. During the vessel inspections, the Vanuatu officials found “violations in half of the dozen foreign fishing vessels they boarded, including fish catches in their coolers that were not recorded in their logs, lack of proper records for crew transfers between ships and captains fishing under licenses not issued to them.” One Vanuatu official lauded the patrol as “significant and beneficial.” This patrol is part of a US strategy that utilizes shiprider agreements to accomplish US and partner countries’ security objectives in the Pacific. Shiprider agreements allow larger maritime countries to partner with smaller countries to enforce maritime laws, combat IUU fishing, enhance security, and reinforce sovereignty. The United States currently has agreements with twelve Pacific Island countries, with the most recent deal signed in May 2023 between Papua New Guinea and the United States. The United States and several Pacific Island countries also expanded the range of pre-existing shiprider agreements, including Samoa, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia. The United States should continue to expand shiprider agreements in terms of breadth and frequency of use, ensuring it has access to the region, denying China access, and providing value to partner Pacific Island countries. Maritime Security and Tailored Shiprider Agreements Benefits Shiprider agreements bring value to Pacific Island nations by leveraging US capabilities that would otherwise be unavailable. Some of those capabilities include domain awareness, enforcing maritime laws in vast hard-to-reach EEZs, combating increasingly sophisticated IUU fishing operations, conducting humanitarian and disaster aid missions, and providing general security. IUU fishing significantly impacts regional economies, with losses ranging from $10 billion to $23.5 billionannually. A recent Congressional Research Service report states, “Over half of the world’s tuna is harvested in the Pacific,” highlighting the region’s importance. It is difficult for smaller nations to combat IUU fishing without outside resources due to the vast swath of ocean territory. The United States and, specifically, the US Coast Guard have the tools necessary to ease some of that burden. The United States finds value in regularly enforcing maritime laws, promoting territorial sovereignty, and solidifying bilateral relationships by being a good Pacific neighbor and ensuring it has an increased presence in the region. The United States also demonstrates that it is capable and should be the partner of choice when countries weigh cooperating with either the United States or China. Each Pacific Island country has a diverse set of objectives and a different degree of tolerance for US involvement. The United States uses multiple variants of agreements to meet the needs of each country. Recent Variants The United States recently signed new and expanded pre-existing agreements that allow more flexibility. One example is the more flexible and expansive agreement between the United States and Samoa. The updated agreement allows the US Coast Guard to board and inspect vessels in Samoa’s EEZ at Samoa’s request. A recent addition to the US shiprider program is Papua New Guinea (PNG). In May 2023, Papua New Guinea and the United States signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which included a shiprider provision. There have been at least three joint patrols since the signing of the 2023 DCA. The three patrols, conducted by three different USCG cutters, included two PNG law enforcement officials on each patrol. The focus of the patrols was countering illicit maritime activities. According to a US Embassy press release, the onboard PNG officials “decided which vessels to board, and what action to take when violations were found.” This version of a shiprider agreement relies heavily on the partner nation and is a first step in cooperation. An example of a more advanced shiprider agreement is the one the United States now has with the Republic of Palau. The two countries signed an expanded bilateral agreement that allows the USCG to enforce maritime laws in Palau’s EEZ without a physically present shiprider. The new agreement does not replace a physically present shiprider but rather “augments enforcement capabilities,” according to the US Coast Guard. Another version of the expanded shiprider agreement was signed with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The US Coast Guard’s capabilities are more valuable to the FSM because its EEZ is more than one million square miles, and the FSM does not have the capacity to enforce all its maritime laws fully. Similar to the agreement with Palau, boarding and law enforcement are allowed without the presence of officials from the Federated States of Micronesia. Going Forward In September, the United States held its fourth annual Shiprider Symposium in Honolulu. The symposium brought together Pacific Island shiprider partners along with relevant maritime agencies and organizations. The purpose of the week-long meeting was to “gather and share best practices, exchange information among subject matter experts, and foster collaboration and understanding among participating nations,” according to a US Coast Guard press release. For a shiprider agreement to be effective, the United States must be responsive to partners’ needs. Holding annual events and symposiums is a good practice that institutionalizes interactions, ensures best practices are spread, and allows all partners to be responsive to challenges or opportunities. A less remarked upon motivation for the United States conducting joint patrols is denying China potential inroads into the security framework of many Pacific Island countries. It is easy to see why the United States looks to provide maritime security capabilities after the China–Solomon Islands security deal. China’s partnering with Pacific Island police forces is potentially a significant challenge for the US and Australian regional security framework. One way to combat China’s influence is to get there first and demonstrate the utility of US capabilities and the benefits of a strong relationship with the United States. One note of caution: the United States should be responsive to any sovereignty concerns, be careful not to overstep, and make sure the USCG has a collaborative relationship with the partner law enforcement agencies. To be an effective partner, the US Coast Guard must have the support it needs to carry out the mission. The United States has taken an important step by adding a medium endurance cutter, the Harriet Lane, to the Pacific area of operations to augment current USCG forces. The new cutter allows the United States more time on station where it can aid in maritime and fisheries law enforcement. To fully realize the benefits of engagement in the region, the United States should continue to expand the frequency of Coast Guard and Navy patrols through the EEZs of countries in the shiprider program. One patrol a year might be beneficial, but it risks being seen as a novelty or a photo op; a more regular and routinized presence will yield better results. Conclusion The United States uses shiprider agreements to grow and secure ties with Pacific Island countries. These agreements benefit both parties and make it more difficult for China to make inroads in the region. The United States should look to negotiate and sign agreements with regional countries interested in the program and seek to sign expanded agreements where the United States proved valuable to its partners. As the Pacific Partnership Strategy suggests, shiprider agreements are a valuable part of a broader framework that puts the United States in a more advantageous position in the Pacific and provides tangible benefits for local partners as the Indo-Pacific becomes a greater geopolitical focal point. About the author: Ray Joseph is a former intern for the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Asia Program. Source: This article was published by FPRI