Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 03/Feb 23:59

2025: A Pivotal Year For Myanmar – OpEd

Myanmar’s post-coup calamity, unleashed by Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, has now entered its fifth year. With the military’s waning power, the end of their rule appeared increasingly inevitable, even though no clear resolution was in sight. Amid the global geostrategic and economic realignments following the Trump administration’s inauguration on January 20, 2025, the conflict in Myanmar continued to be overshadowed by major events such as the Gaza ceasefire, the release of hostages, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Min Aung Hlaing’s miscalculation of the coup on February 01, 2021, has been met with a nationwide escalation of armed resistance, which has now stretched across the country. The success of Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3TBA) triggered a series of major offensives in Karenni, Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Saggaing, and Magwe. The efforts of the Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) formerly known as EAO’s and the newly formed PDF under the National Unity Government (NUG) overwhelmed the Myanmar military, marking a seismic shift in the balance of power. The military unprecedentedly lost two Regional Command Headquarters and 173 battalions. By mid-November 2024, the junta controlled only 21% of the country—including the major cities—while the resistance groups held 42%. ¹ Map of Myanmar and its divisions, including Shan State, Kachin State, Rakhine State and Karen State. Credit: Wikipedia Commons China, now a rising superpower and Myanmar’s largest investor, exploited the situation to dominate the region. Beijing shifted from hedging its bets to doubling down on its support for the junta by inviting the coup leader to meet with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Kunming, Yunnan on November 6, 2024. Using coercive tactics, China forced two members of the 3TBA—the MNDAA and TNLA—to accept a truce in an effort to halt the momentum of resistance forces marching towards Mandalay, the most strategic city in Upper Myanmar. China, India, and Malaysia—the current chair of ASEAN—are now advocating for an “all-inclusive dialogue” on cease-fire, humanitarian aid, and elections that many view as lacking credibility. These initiatives are likely to fail, much like the Five-Point Consensus, since the generals have never meaningfully engaged in political negotiation. The military will never agree to abandon its political dominance, kleptocratic economic conglomerate, and commitment to centralization. ² Based on bitter historical experiences, the people of Myanmar will not accept a negotiated settlement unless the military agrees to civilian oversight, relinquishes its political power, and ends its impunity. Meanwhile, the time lost in endless, empty talks—and the international community’s mere statements of condemnation—will only prolong civilian suffering and the military’s reign of terror. Yet the junta chief remains too blinkered to admit his catastrophic mistakes and is therefore unwilling to make any meaningful political concessions, despite seven rounds of six-month extensions of the state of emergency since 2021. Cling to power, he has been planning elections in a bid to lend a veneer of legitimacy to his besieged regime. Anyone with common sense will dismiss the prospect of credible elections as absurd in a nation where voting could feasibly take place in only 145 of Myanmar’s 330 townships due to “significant security constraints.” These half-baked elections would only lead to further instability and turmoil. ³ The NUG is critically important as it is the only entity that can claim to be a legitimate central government and counter the State Administrative Council (SAC), which has attempted to control the country as its central authority. Even with sham elections held over limited territories, the military would claim legitimacy as both the de facto and de jure central government. The international community and resistance groups must not allow this scenario to unfold. A functional and effective alliance between the NUG and EROs is essential—one based on aligned political objectives and coordinated military operations through mutual trust, a common goal, and shared responsibilities. A constitutional framework for a new federal democracy must be built from the ground up, ensuring equal opportunity for all ethnic groups. It is vital that the NUG demonstrates leadership by rallying and uniting all ethnic groups into a strong, unified front. While the NUG attracts plenty of sympathy, it must also convince the international community that it is not an exile government. It is time to prove to Beijing, Washington, and other global players that the NUG is a formidable, functional government. As the revolution gains momentum and resistance-held territories expand, the NUG must adapt and transform to meet the growing responsibilities of governance, law and order, military operations, finance, education, and health. It must work more inclusively with allied EROs. Collective leadership should evolve into a more agile executive branch with both charisma and appeal. Likewise, the PDF must be upgraded into a cohesive and organized fighting force under unified command in collaboration with the EROs. The four-year-long war against the military dictatorship has exacted a staggering human cost: 63,000 deaths, 25,000 political prisoners, 3.5 million internally displaced people, and extensive damage to homes and infrastructure. The economy has suffered greatly—GDP in 2025 would be 11% below 2019 levels, and inflation 26% in annual average terms. 4 Rebuilding and recovery will be monumental tasks. Beijing’s short-sighted coercion risks alienating the trust of the people of its neighbors—trust once embodied in the spirit of “Pauk-Phaw.” The Chinese, renowned for their logic and pragmatism, now risk overlooking the dangers of supporting a military that not only hinders the aspirations of the Myanmar people but also continues to lose ground and territory—let alone protect China's own interests. The United States, too, remains passive, maintaining a strategic blind spot regarding Myanmar despite the country's value as a low-cost, high-reward opportunity to counter China’s influence in Southeast Asia and tap into its economic resources—such as rare earth elements (REE), which are essential for military and technological advancements, and natural gas for regional allies. While the resistance continues to advance without Washington’s financial support, US-led political and diplomatic backing remains crucial. A decisive, Trumpian effort in concert with regional partners could expedite the conflict’s resolution and minimize further atrocities and casualties.5 The year 2025 is pivotal for Myanmar’s future. The resistance forces continue to solidify control over most territories in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, Karenni, and Karen, while expanding their operations into central regions such as Ayeyarwady, Bago, Saggaing, and Magwe. The military now faces the impending loss of two more Regional Command Headquarters. 6 Along with these military gains, the resistance—led by the NUG and EROs—must consolidate unity and build diplomatic legitimacy while inflicting financial blows to the junta through targeted sanctions on its hard-currency coffers. This historic, nationwide resistance by all ethnic groups is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to expel the primary source of instability and atrocities, and it cannot be missed. 7 References: https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-s-rebels-closing-in-around-junta-into-fifth-year-of-civil-war-/7958145.html https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/10/18/15165 https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/myanmars-junta-chief-is-running-out-of-road/ https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099121024092015654/p50720310fc16e0251ba691e1227abb7375 https://www.eurasiareview.com/19112024-new-administration-new-outlook-and-new-action-on-myanmar-oped/ https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/01/myanmars-escalating-crisis-year-review-and-road-ahead https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/a-rigged-game-the-regimes-manipulative-call-for-participation-in-elections.html