Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 18/Mar 23:54

RedNote Walks China’s Digital Tightrope – Analysis

By Xiangyu Ma and Jiawei Zhang RedNote, a once little-known app outside of China, gained international attention in January 2025. When the United States banned TikTok, one million US users flocked to the Chinese-owned platform in just two days. RedNote blends social networking with e-commerce and draws over 3.4 million daily active users. Unexpectedly, RedNote has become a bridge for US–China cultural exchanges. Under the hashtag ‘TikTok refugees’, US and Chinese netizens greet each other, exchange memes and swap outfit tips. Even after US President Donald Trump lifted the TikTok ban, many chose to stay. Experts warn of data and national security risks, but some brush them aside. To these users, Silicon Valley also has privacy abuses, and Washington’s digital Cold War rhetoric is under increasing scrutiny. RedNote’s novelty and rare sense of cross-border connection make it worth staying. In China, Western social media such as Facebook, Instagram and X are inaccessible. Even on Chinese platforms, large-scale interaction between Chinese and international users is nearly impossible. This results from China’s prevailing regulatory model for Chinese social media platforms — ‘one app, two systems’ — one version tailored for domestic users, another for the global market, such as TikTok/Douyin, WeChat/Weixin and Kwai/Kuaishou. The domestic versions adapt to China’s unique legal environment, featuring tighter censorship, screen time limits for minors and localised data storage. Some speculate that China will follow the old playbook, splitting RedNote into two systems to curb foreign influence. But Beijing might reconsider this approach. The ‘one app, two systems’ model is Beijing’s go-to strategy in regulating social media. On the one hand, the government places regime stability above all else. It has hardened information control by erecting internet firewalls, enforcing real-name registration and mandating the display of users’ locations. In doing so, it seeks to seal off domestic users from the global internet, where its reach is limited and uncensored narratives proliferate. On the other hand, China is eager to extend its influence abroad. Social media platforms such as TikTok are treated as cultural exports, subtly shaping how the world views China while advancing its technological and economic ambitions. RedNote is currently an outlier — both Chinese and US netizens are in the same system. But this is not how it was meant to operate. Originally aimed at domestic urban users and Chinese diasporas, RedNote had not developed an English version or a separate international system. The sudden influx of foreign users has already brought complications, including how best to respond to foreigners’ thorny questions about the relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong. These interactions, regardless of how small, tread on issues that Beijing wants to keep off the table. Lacking clear guidelines from above, RedNote has resorted to hiring more English-language moderators. Its real concern is how long, and to what extent, Chinese regulators will tolerate a borderless RedNote. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to restore the tightly controlled information cocoon woven for Chinese users. But how authorities plan to achieve this goal with RedNote remains an open question. Beijing’s most intuitive regulatory response would be to adopt the default model — split RedNote into two systems. But this time, the old formula collides with China’s latest rhetoric shift. With Trump back in office, Beijing wants to cast itself as a defender of globalisation. This shift was evident when Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun responded to RedNote’s sudden surge abroad — ‘As a principle, China has consistently supported and encouraged cultural exchanges to foster mutual understanding worldwide’. Splitting RedNote would undercut this message. A more adaptive regulatory approach would use AI-enabled censorship to avoid splitting RedNote. By sorting users based on language and IP address, the platform could discreetly channel specific content to targeted users. This idea has already surfaced in Chinese policy discourse. At one of Shanghai’s annual political meetings in January 2025, a delegate called for expanding AI’s role in social media content control. This approach could also incorporate other subtle restrictions on foreign users’ content, such as disabling RedNote’s copy-and-paste function and translation tool. The adaptive approach aligns more with China’s current policy goals. China’s external propaganda machines have toiled to ‘tell China’s story well’. Yet state efforts to reshape its international image via Western social media have been largely unsuccessful, with persistent struggles overcoming scepticism. With RedNote connecting Chinese and international users directly, Beijing has a rare chance to demonstrate its self-claimed openness. A globally integrated RedNote also enables Beijing to sharpen its AI tools for information control. Over the past decade, China has been doubling down on algorithmic governance. A major part of such efforts is requiring AI-enabled content moderation to adhere to ‘core socialist values’. Such vague censorship guidelines demand continual adaptation of AI algorithms. RedNote offers a larger testing ground for AI-driven information control technologies. A more adaptive regulatory strategy — combining AI censorship with subtle restrictions — allows China to project its soft power while preserving its information bubble. Beijing might hesitate before opting to split RedNote. This mass user movement is also a wake-up call for both Beijing and Washington that users will always gravitate towards the platforms of their choice. Instead of controlling information flow, a better, more sustainable path forward is to foster a robust marketplace of ideas. About the authors: Xiangyu Ma is PhD candidate at the College of Law, Governance and Policy, The Australian National University. Jiawei Zhang is PhD candidate at the Technical University of Munich and Guest Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition. Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum