Myanmar Four Years After The Coup

Myanmar Four Years After The Coup – Analysis

Almost four years after the February 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar, the military junta’s widespread and systematic abuses against the population – including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings and aerial bombardments of civilians – amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. For ordinary citizens, the human rights situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate daily. According to the UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the military’s unlawful airstrikes in the Sagaing region and Kachin State clearly amount to war crimes. There are significant developments on both the domestic and international fronts. However, many of these developments were continuations of existing trends rather than radical new ones (with the exception of the enactment of the Conscription Act). Hence, ordinary Myanmarese continue to live in fear of arrest, torture and military attack, while most military and political powers inside and outside of the country seem to be involved in pursuing their own interests. Continuing Armed Conflict and Violence Data collected by Vimutti shows an overall increase in military fighting in 2024 compared to 2023. In total, Vimutti recorded 192 reports of fighting in 218 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, in every state or region except the Ayeyarwady Region.Fighting has even spread to some townships that had seen little or no conflict in the four years since the coup, such as Chipwi and Tsawlaw townships, in Kachin State; Gwa and Thandwe townships, in Rakhine State; and Hopong, Hsihseng and Lawksawk, in southern Shan State. (Credit: Map Vimutti) This reflects some of the significant gains made by resistance groups over the past year. Areas under resistance control have expanded further. In some cases, notably in Karen State, this has led to Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) reversing decades-old defeats and losses. Resistance groups have also carried out an increasing number of attacks on the capital, Nay Pyi Taw, and attacked military bases during visits by senior officials. These attacks have occurred in parallel with shifts in the conflict dynamics in central Myanmar, suggesting that the area could become even more important for the conflict in 2025. However, the military junta, SAC (State Administration Council), has managed to retake some territory. The military has also demonstrated its ability to adapt and innovate in response to the changing situation, for example through the extensive use of drones. The reintroduction of conscription by the military was, indeed, one of the most significant developments of the year, and has had a profound impact on psychological, social and economic levels, as much (if not more) than on military levels. Civilian Casualties and Political Killings Vimutti’s monitoring, like that of other organizations, shows an increase in civilian casualties in 2024, partly due to a significant increase in airstrikes carried out by the SAC. Amid territorial losses to armed opposition groups, the military has stepped up its “scorched earth” tactics against civilians. The junta’s extensive air and artillery operations have resulted in bombed schools, refugee camps and medical centers. A group of UN-experts put the number of civilian casualties at more than 6,000. Rakhine State had the highest number of casualties, followed by Shan State and Sagaing Region. The use of indiscriminate explosives by all actors also puts civilians at risk, and in November the International Campaign to Ban Landmines reported that Myanmar would surpass Syria as the country with the highest reported number of landmine casualties in 2023. The media has also reported at least 227 targeted killings in the past year; a similar number to 2023. Incidents occurred in all states and regions except Chin and Karen states. Almost all targeted killings were claimed by resistance groups or can be assumed to be the work of resistance groups, as the targets were aimed at SAC. SAC-appointed administrators were the most common victims. A specific increase in incidents in March and April was directly linked to the introduction of conscription. {A quick note on journalism in parentheses. It is not only in Myanmar that journalists are often forced to navigate difficult and varied landscapes. They often have a different idea of the purpose of journalism than the groups they cover. In Myanmar, according to Hein Thar of Frontier Myanmar, the military regime has completely lost control of the narrative and has given ground to ethnic armed groups and resistance groups after the coup. The military’s hostility towards journalists is notorious; it has arrested, tortured and killed reporters since the coup. But even within the anti-junta forces, there are vastly different media strategies that often reflect their political ideologies.} Education and healthcare From February 2021 to November 2024, the Myanmar military, the feared Tatmadaw, has carried out at least 200 attacks on schools across the country. These attacks include artillery, air and drone strikes, which have damaged or destroyed more than 146 primary, secondary, tertiary (university) and religious schools in Magway, Mandalay and Sagaing regions and in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Rakhine states. Resistance groups have also been responsible for some (although an unknown number of) attacks, including the bombing of two secondary schools in Natogyi Township, Mandalay region, where military personnel were stationed. There have been at least 323 reported attacks on the healthcare sector in 2024. These incidents resulted in the deaths of 28 nurses and damage to 126 health facilities. As of September 3, at least 43 hospitals and clinics were still occupied and used by armed groups for non-medical purposes. These figures nevertheless represent a decrease in incidents, casualties and occupations compared to 2023. In addition to the obstruction of health care, the SAC has closed several hospitals this year for the alleged use of personnel involved in the civil disobedience movement; not to mention the fact that it has recruited health workers to serve as combat medics. Climate-related issues have also had a negative impact on the economy in 2024. The extreme heat wave in April and May, exacerbated by electricity and water shortages, led to outbreaks of diseases and even deaths: 1,473 people died from heat-related causes in April alone. In July and September, flooding caused by monsoon rains and typhoons also resulted in illnesses and casualties, as well as significant damage to education and health infrastructure. In July, a report estimated that more than 1,700 schools were closed in nine states/regions; in December, the SAC estimated 875 damaged schools and 241 damaged health facilities, as a result of flooding in the aftermath of Typhoon Yagi. Post-coup trends in declining enrollment and pass rates in SAC-administered final examinations, limited availability and rising prices of medicines and medical supplies, and poor conditions in SAC prisons have continued. Media reports also indicated that in 2024 fewer students had enrolled in higher education after passing their final examinations, compared to students in 2020. In contrast, the opposition has made strides in providing and/or facilitating higher education. However, the Basic Education Completion Assessment examinations administered by the Government of National Unity (NUG) have been criticized, mainly over the decision not to issue certificates to students who ‘violated examination rules and regulations’. Students and their parents argued that the rules failed to take into account the difficult circumstances in which students lived and were required to sit the examinations. Separately, a new trade policy imposed by the SAC in September, requiring importers of pharmaceutical products to deposit export earnings in foreign currency in SAC-accredited banks before applying for an import permit, has worsened the already difficult situation of obtaining needed medicines and medical supplies across the country. Several pharmaceutical companies and importers have since closed or temporarily halted operations, exacerbating the shortage of medicines and driving up the prices of available supplies. Not only have Myanmar residents lost access to preventive medicines and vaccines, but there have also been a number of preventable deaths due to lack of or delays in access to medicines for chronic diseases such as diabetes, hepatitis B, HIV and tuberculosis. Similarly, restrictions on access to medicines and delays in, or even denial of, treatment have led to a number of deaths in SAC prisons, resulting in the death of at least 22 political prisoners in custody in 2024. Perhaps the most notable death was that of former Mandalay Regional Prime Minister and NLD Vice Chairman Dr Zaw Myint Maung. A large crowd attended the latter’s funeral, making it the largest public gathering since the mass protests immediately following the 2021 coup. The death of Dr. Zaw Myint Maung and other prominent political figures have raised particular concerns about the conditions of other elderly political prisoners and those with chronic conditions. Lack of communication with prisoners and access to prisons -- even for established and independent organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) -- has raised concerns about the welfare of prisoners, potentially fueling anti-SAC sentiment and leading to accusations against the SAC for violations of international standards for the treatment of prisoners. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 21,479 political prisoners were still being held at the end of 2024. Throughout the year, there have been consistent reports of the poor conditions in which political prisoners are being held, their mistreatment by prison officials and other prisoners, and their transfer between prisons. Towards a united resistance? Another major story during 2024 was the SAC’s announcement that it would hold elections. The SAC has promised new elections since the 2021 coup, but in 2024 there was a clear shift towards more concrete preparations, notably the Union Election Commission’s ongoing review of political party registrations and the conduct of a census in October. It remains to be seen whether and how this will be organized further. It also remains unclear to what extent the ‘opposition’ can speak with one voice. Some resistance actors are making efforts to set up their own administrations, which have expanded both geographically (as the area occupied by the resistance has expanded) and thematically. Several of these actors have made progress in setting up legal systems. However, these have sometimes been criticised, particularly for their slowness in processing cases. There have also been other tensions between local communities and resistance administrations, including around taxation, natural resource management and the perception that the administrations are acting in an unprofessional manner. Moreover, overlapping spheres of activity and ideological differences have led to tensions and even conflicts among resistance actors, particularly in Chin State. International Tug-of-War Internationally, the UN and ASEAN have both failed to make significant progress in resolving the Myanmar crisis. The UN’s efforts have been hampered by geopolitical divisions (China and Russia are blocking tougher measures) and the SAC’s refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue. Meanwhile, ASEAN continues to rely on the Five-Point Consensus as the main basis for its engagement in Myanmar. This has not proven effective. ASEAN members remain divided on how to handle the situation, and civil society has criticized the continued engagement with the SAC. The main reason is clearly internal divisions within ASEAN. Despite ASEAN’s decision to allow only non-political representation by the SAC at high-level meetings, this has been systematically circumvented by countries such as Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. Senior SAC officials have attended more than 500 ASEAN meetings since 2021, including 20 ministerial meetings. In this context, the opposition has argued that there is no non-political representation through the SAC. Criticism has also been levelled at the failure of both the UN and ASEAN to formally engage with key opposition actors, such as the NUG and EAOs. As James Shwe argued in a recent opinion piece, “a more nuanced and proactive approach is needed to effectively support Myanmar’s path to democratic transformation”. The role of Western humanitarian aid in helping those in need is also important, but Western diplomatic pressure has so far been negligible, and pro-ASEAN, and therefore ineffective. While sanctions play a role, they will almost certainly have limited impact on any collapse or transformation of the regime. The junta maintains its war economy by manipulating the exchange rate, which has allowed it to weather half-hearted Western measures. The roles of Thailand, India and Bangladesh may be important, but China will be crucial, argues Myanmar watcher David Scott Mathieson. Thailand Of Myanmar's ASEAN neighbours, Thailand has been the most active, including hosting informal ASEAN meetings on the situation in Myanmar. But The Diplomat is pretty tough on Thailand: “Rather than pursuing diplomatic dead ends, Thai leaders should focus their energies on areas that can bring tangible benefits to the people of Myanmar: ending the exploitation, extortion and forced return of asylum seekers from Myanmar; combating rising xenophobia and anti-Myanmar sentiment online and offline; channeling cross-border aid through community groups; blocking all arms sales to Myanmar in line with the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution; and ordering Thai banks to halt financial transactions that sanction junta entities.” But, as I argued here some time ago, there are too many conflicting ‘interests’ preventing this. Recent infractions by the China-backed United Wa State Army ( UWSA) have left Bangkok with some tough decisions to make. The UWSA generates significant revenue from the production and trade of narcotics. Much of the contraband flows through Thailand, meaning that certain Thai businessmen are making big profits. Given this context, Thailand’s lack of decisive action against the UWSA gives the public the impression that some authorities are complicit in or profiting from the illegal drug trade. However, on January 12, 2025, it was announced that Thailand and China have joined forces to combat call centre scams, human trafficking, and transnational crime, with a focus on locating missing individuals who have been deceived into traveling to neighboring countries. China China has always been a major player in Myanmar, but in 2024 it took on a more direct and forceful role. The country has traditionally pursued a policy of alternating between covert aid to resistance groups and support for the junta, all to balance its own geo-strategic and economic interests. China has now positioned itself as the dominant player, unilaterally exerting its influence on the crisis in Myanmar. The Chinese Foreign Minister outlined the three red lines for China regarding the situation in Myanmar at the 9th Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on August 16, 2024 in Chiang Mai, Thailand: (1) that Myanmar should not be subject to civil war; (2) that it should not be separated from ASEAN; and (3) that external forces should not interfere in Myanmar’s affairs. Jason Tower, Country Director for Burma at the US Institute for Peace, summarizes the Chinese position as follows: “Beijing views Myanmar through its own economic and geo-strategic interests, with little regard for broader peace.” In particular, the EAOs in the northern Shan and Kachin states are being pressured by China to stop fighting and negotiate with the SAC. A recent Crisis Group report highlighted how many fraud and human trafficking scam networks operate within the area under the junta’s control, illustrating the intertwining of conflict and criminality. Reports suggest that these operations often involve kidnapping for fraud, with victims forced to work against their will, akin to modern slavery. These alarming developments not only pose a security risk to China, but also pose a challenge to relations with the junta. Meanwhile, India has shown tentative signs of engagement with the opposition and the SAC, possibly signalling a shift in its approach and/or a desire to become more involved in negotiating, possibly to counter China. However, it remains unclear whether this engagement will develop into a coherent and effective diplomatic strategy. US and EU The US, meanwhile, has largely been absent from addressing the crisis in Myanmar, sidelining the country through its passive approach -- (we’ll see if this changes under Trump?). An analysis by Lucas Myers, senior associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center, argues that “from a U.S. national interest perspective, the United States has an unmissable opportunity to support the establishment of a stable, federal, inclusive, and democratic government in Myanmar.” But he adds that “missing that opportunity or delaying it too long risks hampering U.S. influence or, at worst, slowing the resistance’s efforts to overthrow the junta. Disappointment over a perceived lack of U.S. support is increasingly widespread in Myanmar.” Some analysts have therefore suggested that China is taking advantage of this diminished U.S. commitment and exploiting a gap in U.S. leadership in a critical area of the Indo-Pacific region. The European Union has provided aid to Myanmar since 1996, initially focusing on health care, HIV/AIDS programs, livelihoods, and repatriation programs for returnees. The first EU country- specific assistance strategy for Myanmar in 2007 marked a major milestone, and EU assistance played a crucial role in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The EU presents itself as “a leader among development partners and demonstrates a strong commitment to the country’s development despite ongoing crises. EU assistance in Myanmar is strategically organized around three key sectoral priority areas: (1) Peace and Governance, (2) Education and (3) Supporting Livelihoods and Green Growth”. On 6 January 2025, a joint statement was issued by the European Union and the governments of the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Timor-Leste and the United Kingdom to address the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. They urge the military regime and all armed actors in Myanmar to de-escalate violence and respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law. They stress that addressing the underlying discrimination and brutal treatment faced by the Rohingya must be part of a political solution to the crisis in Myanmar. Plus: “We reiterate our full support for ASEAN’s central role in finding a solution to the crisis.” Hence, both the US and the EU, as well as China, believe that ASEAN must continue to play a central role. ... and Russia? Russia’s ties with the military regime have expanded beyond arms sales and military training since the coup. For the junta, Russia is now Myanmar’s largest source of military aid. The Tatmadaw relies heavily on Russian aircraft to suppress anti-SAC forces. Myanmar is also the only country in Southeast Asia that supplies military equipment to the Russian armed forces for use in Ukraine. But the two ‘pariah regimes’ now work closely together in a wide range of sectors. Naypyidaw is seeking cooperation with Moscow to solve the country’s energy crisis by importing Russian oil and working with Russian energy companies to exploit the country’s hydrocarbon reserves and develop renewable energy sources, including wind, hydro and nuclear. The SAC wants Russia to supply Myanmar with nuclear power by transferring small modular reactors. Naypyidaw’s nuclear ambitions have fueled fears that the junta is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. For now, it remains guesswork, but it is clear that the SAC and the Kremlin get along well, although China remains Myanmar’s main source of trade and investment.