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Why NATOizing Military Assistance To Ukraine Won’t Solve The Alliance’s Ukraine Dilemma – Analysis

By Sara Bjerg Moller (FPRI) -- Despite promises to support Ukraine for as long as necessary, many NATO Allies are starting to reach a tipping point in their military assistance to Ukraine. That reality, and the specter of Donald Trump’s reelection this November, has led some within the Alliance to call for the NATOization of the war in Ukraine. Absent consensus on extending Ukraine an invitation for NATO membership, NATO Allies have spent the last few months finalizing plans for alternative ways to show support for Ukraine at the upcoming Washington Summit. Intended to be a ‘bridge’ to NATO membership, the new measures—which will see NATO taking a larger role in coordination of allied training and security assistance—are unlikely to resolve the underlying dilemma the Alliance has faced since 2014: determining how far NATO should go in supporting Ukraine absent a formal collective defense security guarantee by the Alliance. Moreover, by fundamentally altering NATO’s role in the conflict, the new measures could actually increase ambiguity surrounding the Allies’ commitment to the defense of Ukraine, prompting Russian president Vladimir Putin to potentially test the Alliance’s resolve. A Slippery Slope? On the surface, the crux of the dilemma is simple: NATO operates on the principle of a non-zero-sum view of security, where the security of each ally is linked directly to the security of every other ally. However, Ukraine is not yet a member of the Alliance. That fact, of course, has not stopped most Allies from providing unprecedented military assistance to Ukraine since 2022. This, along with repeated assurances since 2008 that Ukraine’s place is inside NATO, has generated considerable ambiguity regarding the limits of NATO’s obligations to the security of a future member. In recent months, a growing cadre of voices within the Alliance have argued that the organization itself—that is, the military alliance’s integrated command structure and related military architecture—can and should be doing more to support the Ukrainians in their struggle for freedom. At the recent NATO Defense Ministerial, outgoing Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced there is now agreement among allies for a NATO Security Assistance and Support package for Ukraine. Among the proposals expected to be approved at the upcoming Washington Summit is a new NATO command in Wiesbaden, Germany where Allied personnel will provide training and oversee equipment donations for Ukraine. The move represents a fundamental shift in theAlliance’s roleto date. The rationale for the campaign to NATOize the West’s military support to Ukraine stems from the widespread recognition that Ukraine needs not only more weapons but also more better-trained soldiers to carry on the war. Signs that personnel shortages are hindering Ukraine’s combat effectiveness had been appearing for some time but became more acute this spring asRussia’s offensivein the northeast began stretching Ukraine’s reserves. When it comes to Western military support for Ukraine, there is an inverse relationship at play: As Ukraine’s battlefield prospects have worsened, calls for NATO to do more have grown. In February, Prime Minister Emmanuel Macronstirred controversyby suggesting there may come a time when France and other European nations would need to consider sending troops to Ukraine. Despite drawing a swift rebuke from fellow Allies, including Germany and Poland, who immediately declared they had no intention of deploying troops to Ukraine, Macron’s stance that “nothing should be ruled out” when it comes to Ukraine appears to have garnered supporters in recent months. In May, Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas came out in favor of Macron’s position, arguing that Allies who worry such a scenario could lead to a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia had no grounds for such fears, since “there are countries who aretraining soldierson the ground already.” In a further sign that views are shifting within the Alliance, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Q. Brown suggested last month that the Alliance deployingmilitary trainersto Ukraine was inevitable, telling reporters “We’ll get there eventually, over time.” Although it’s unclear whether what Brown had in mind was a NATO training deployment amid active hostilities or following a ceasefire, the comments seemed to underscore that, as has been the case since the start of the war in 2022, Allied views on how far to go in supporting Ukraine’s defensive war against Russia continue to evolve. Other efforts to NATOize the conflict in Ukraine have arisen from within NATO itself. In April, Stoltenberg began publicly floating putting the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), also known as the Ramstein Group, under the Brussels-based military organization. If implemented, the move would mark a fundamental break in NATO’s role in the war to date. To understand why requires briefly examining the military alliance’s role up until now. Since 2014 NATO’s support for Kyiv’s resistance against Russian aggression has been mostly political, with the Alliance consistently reaffirming Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defense and that its future lies inside the Alliance. Over time, however, NATO’s role has gradually taken on a military dimension as well. Along with offering Kyiv its political backing, the Alliance in 2016 began providing what it termed“practical” supportthrough capability development, capacity-building, and training under the Comprehensive Assistance Package framework. When Russia launched its full scale-invasion in February 2022, NATO stepped up itsnon-lethal assistanceto Ukraine, providing materiel like fuel, medical supplies, vehicles, and counter-drone equipment, as well as some communications support to the Ukrainians. Up until now, however, NATO itself has stayed out of the day-to-day business of providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine, which has been coordinated either bilaterally or multilaterally through the US-led Ramstein effort or the G7. This is due to both practical reasons—the Alliance itself ‘owns’ very little military equipment, and political reasons—NATO is a defensive alliance. Placing the responsibility for arming Ukraine within NATO Headquarters, as the Alliance is preparing to announce at the upcoming Washington Summit, could irreversibly alter the delicate political-military balance that the Euro-Atlantic alliance has maintained towards Ukraine since 2014. The move could permanently shift the organization’s current political focus closer toward playing amore pronounced military rolein the conflict, thereby making it increasingly difficult to argue that NATO is not a party to the conflict. Additionally, some analysts worry the NATOization of security assistance and training for Ukraine could lead to more direct involvement in the war by NATO (and thus, the United States) in the future. Given the incrementalism the Allies have practiced to date, there is concern that the logical next step after establishing a NATO training command for Ukrainian soldiers in Germany could be the deployment of trainers to Ukraine itself. Although US President Joe Biden and other Allied leaders (including German ChancellorOlaf Scholz) have previously ruled out the prospect ofsending Westerntroopsto Ukraine, the line between having trainers and troops in a theater of war can often be very thin. In a move that is likely to increase the fears of those in this camp, there are reports that theBiden administrationis reportedly consideringlifting the banon US military contractors in Ukraine. A Shaky Foundation Those who, like Stoltenberg, argue having NATO in charge of coordinating Ukraine military assistance is a good idea do so on the grounds that it would helpstabilizeAllies’ unpredictable record of military assistance to Ukraine. “We need a more robust, institutionalized framework for our support to ensure predictability, to ensure more accountability and to ensure burden-sharing,” theSecretary Generalrecently said. However, moving the Ramstein process into NATO could, in reality, end up doing the opposite. Since the final arbiters of military aid are the national capitals themselves, asking Brussels to take charge of the process would only add another layer of bureaucracy, potentially gumming up the process. NATOization of Western military assistance for Ukraine is unlikely to solve the supply-side issues facing Europe’s depleted arsenals, nor is it likely to reconcile the fundamental policy differences emanating from the capitals of Europe, which lie at the root of the problem. Because the question of how far the NATO Alliance should go in militarily assisting Ukraine is fundamentally a political one, the solution can only be found in the individual capitals, not NATO Headquarters. As EU foreign policy Chief Joseph Borrell recently noted afterunsuccessful meetingsaimed at persuading Europeans to send additional air defense systems to Ukraine, “the Patriots are in the capitals. And it’s up to them to take the decisions.” Shifting these discussions from an informal US-led forum to a NATO forum will not address the underlying financial and political issues which are the main impediments currently preventing capitals from providing more support to Ukraine. In addition to the time required to establish NATO’s new coordination procedures, embedding the coordination of Western military assistance inside NATO could introduce new risks by putting decisions in the hands of all thirty-two allies. Because NATO operates according to the principle of consensus, its gears often grind slowly. Those Allies concerned about escalation risks would likely continue to urge caution at each step of the way, while countries like Hungary and Turkey, which have resorted to transactionalism in the past, would gain another opportunity toobstruct NATO business. Stoltenberg’s recent success in securing a pledge from Hungary’s Viktor Orban not toopposethe NATOization of military assistance allows the process to move forward for now. However, it’s unlikely to stop his government from potentially interfering with the plans and obstructing NATO business through other means down the road. The coalition composition of the UDCG introduces an additional layer of complexity for NATO. With fifty-plus members, nearly a third of whom are not members of the Alliance, new procedures for integrating all the UDCG coalition members into NATO coordination procedures will need to be developed. In this respect, the process could end up mirroring another NATO-led coalition effort, the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan, which required the Alliance to establish new working mechanisms for day-to-day management during the eleven years NATO oversaw the mission. Nor is it likely that the move will “Trump-proof” NATO’s support for Ukraine, as some supporters of the plan have argued. In truth, no such thing is possible, as that would first require downgrading the role of the United States in the military alliance. NATO’s military commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, along with much of the staff at Allied Command Operations, the headquarters responsible for planning and conducting military operations, is American, meaning they are automatically in the U.S. chain of command. The same is true of the new command NATO is establishing inWiesbadento coordinate training, security assistance and the transfer and repair of equipment to Ukraine. Home to the European headquarters of the U.S. Army, it’s likely that a significant number of the Allied personnel promised by Stoltenberg for the NATOtraining missionwill be American. In all, Stoltenberg said he anticipates several hundred Allied personnel to be involved in the new NATO effort, which will also consist of additionallogistical support. Ultimately, however, these and other efforts—like the rumored appointment of a NATO envoy for Ukraine—to bridge the divide over the status of Ukraine’s membership at the upcoming Washington Summit are unlikely to clarify the ambiguity that exists surrounding the Alliance’s commitment to the defense of Ukraine. An Immoveable Feast At its core, the debate over NATO’s role in Ukraine boils down to two different views toward crisis management and the extent to which strategic ambiguity or redlines are (de)stabilizing, as well as one’s comfort level with risk. In the first camp are those like the French president who believe that, “by defining the limits of our action,” Europe has surrendered the strategic initiative to Moscow. TheFrench leader’s positionon military trainers is part of his broader effort to get the Allies to embrace strategic ambiguity. Only by keeping Putin guessing over what action it might take next, Macron and his supporters believe, can NATO deter Russia from going further, either in Ukraine or in Europe. In the other camp are those who contend that attempts at increasing the military alliance’s involvement in the war are exceedingly dangerous. Given the lack of a clear end state in United States and Alliance strategy toward Ukraine, analysts worry that the Alliance could soon choose to send trainers to Ukraine, as the US Chairman predicted, setting a dangerous game of escalation into motion. Rather than deterring Russia from seizing more Ukrainian land or targeting Ukrainian civilians, this camp argues, putting NATO in charge of training the Ukrainian military could increase the likelihood of the Alliance and Moscow becoming engaged in direct conflict by blurring the line between actions taken by individual Allies in their national capacity and those undertaken collectively as part of the defense organization. Others worry it could lead Putin to try and test Alliance resolve by targeting Allied trainers inside Ukraine. Supporters of efforts to embed Western military assistance to Ukraine inside NATO counter critics’ concerns by arguing that Putin does not wish to see a direct confrontation with the Alliance and that Russian nuclear saber-rattling is merely a bluff. By contrast, skeptics of NATOization are more risk averse and contend that Putin’s intentions are ultimately unknowable save to a few in his inner circle. Setting aside the degree of confidence with which either camp can know Putin’s true intentions, those in the NATOization camp fail to engage the second variant of the escalation argument—the risk ofinadvertentescalation. Because the fog of war can never be ruled out, neither can accidental escalation, detractors warn, cautioning against the creation of conditions which they argue would increase the risk of misinterpretations in high-pressure situations. Although not as common as the escalation argument, there’s a second reason why critics of NATOization argue it is unwise and could be destabilizing for the Alliance and the wider European security landscape itself. The reason comes down to Allies’ demonstrated lack of commitment toward Ukraine’s defense since 2008, when the Alliance officially recognized Ukraine’s aspirations for membership. Had the Allies been willing to go to war with Russia over Ukraine, critics argue, they would have already extended NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee to Ukraine by inviting it to join the Alliance. The fact that, more than two years into the war, some Allies are still not willing to extend a security guarantee to Ukraine makes it clear to all—including Moscow—that there is no collective willingness to defend Ukrainetoday. Thus, they argue that any NATOization of the conflict amounts to a dangerous gamble in which the Western Alliance is essentially bluffing about the extent of its commitment to Ukraine’s security. Similarly to the escalation line of argument, the danger here lies in a scenario where Moscow—either intentionally or inadvertently—attacks Allied personnel inside Ukraine. However, unlike the earlier example, the risk in this case stems not from escalation but rather from inaction or a lack of timely response. Given the divisions within the Alliance over Ukraine, NATO political and military officials would face the formidable challenge of trying to come up with a unified response all thirty-two allies could endorse. Due to long-standing divisions over Alliance policy toward not only Ukraine but also Russia, it is conceivable that the North Atlantic Council—the Alliance’s top decision-making body—might fail to reach consensus about a collective military response. While individual allies might act independently on their own or in a coalition (heightening the risk of escalation,) NATO could find itself placed in the uncomfortable position of being unable to mount a coordinated and cohesive Alliance-wide response. Essentially, the entire premise behind NATO and collective defense would be undercut, bringing the whole deck of cards tumbling down. To avoid precisely this scenario, critics of NATOization caution the prudent thing is not to put NATO in a position where it could be tested and found wanting. All Eyes on Washington Ukraine’s supporters inside the Alliance would like nothing better than to see the Allies extend an invitation to Kyiv at the Washington Summit, which they contend would decisively resolve the ambiguity over NATO’scommitment to Ukraineonce and for all. In reality, the opposite may in fact be true. Were the Allies to invite Ukraine to begin the accession process while the war remains ‘hot’, a prospect most analysts agree is highly unlikely, each of the thirty-two allies would still need to ratify Kyiv’s accession protocols before Ukraine would come under the Alliance’s Article 5 security umbrella. As illustrated recently by the case of Sweden, the accession of new members is neither assured nor timely in all Allied capitals. Thus, although Ukraine would then have formally acquired the status of ‘invitee,’ entitling it to more privileges at NATO headquarters, it could still find itself languishing in the waiting room for years. Rather than shrink the aperture of ambiguity surrounding NATO’s commitment toward Ukraine, such a move would instead increase uncertainty regarding NATO’s collective responsibility for Ukraine’s defense: a situation which could prompt Putin to try and test the waters. Unlike the case ofSweden and Finland—both of whom received security assurances from the United States and United Kingdom to bridge the time between invitation and accession—the long-term bilateral security agreementsWashingtonandother Alliesrecently concluded with Ukraine do not appear to contain the same security guarantees. In short, there is no golden fix for what in the end boils down to a dilemma of the Alliance’s own making stemming from 2008. At the same time, leaving Ukraine permanently on the cusp of membership doesn’t look good when the country is fighting for its survival. But rather than add clarity about their future security prospects, stopgap measures like the ones expected to be announced at the Summit this month are unlikely to address the fundamental issue dividing Kyiv and Brussels: absence ofcollectivewill within the Alliance to actively defend Ukraine. The NATOization of Western training and security assistance and the addition of a NATO envoy for Ukraine is unlikely to resolve the debate over the extent of the Alliance’s responsibility for Ukraine’s security. Instead, it merely represents the next stage in the ongoing clash between the zoomers and slow-rollers, between those who argue that NATO should move quickly to welcome Ukraine into the collective defense fold, and those who argue for taking it slow. Ultimately, the views of the two camps on Ukraine boil down to their perspectives on escalation dynamics: Those advocating for swift action on membership favor the logic of fait accomplis and acting in one fell swoop, while those urging caution embrace a strategy premised on small incrementals, what Thomas Schelling called ‘salami slicing.’ Neither strategy is devoid of risk. A strategy premised on small incremental steps could prove as dangerous as a fait accomplis completed in one fell swoop. As one commentatorrecently put it, “The risk in salami slicing is that, if you push too far, you may lose a finger.” For now, only one thing seems certain, regardless of what position NATO leaders adopt toward Ukraine at the Washington July Summit: The certitude of each camp is unlikely to change. About the author: Sara Bjerg Moller is an Associate Teaching Professor in the Security Studies Program (SSP) at Georgetown University and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Source: This article was published by FPRI