Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 06/Aug 18:47

Moscow’s New Indo Pacific And Arctic Focus – Analysis

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Malaysia on 27 July marks an extension of the larger objective and plans for the region for Moscow. Malaysia remains important due to existing policy centrality and affiliation, which makes it easier to extend Russia's economic and defence overtures to the region,especially when Malaysia is to chair the ASEAN Summit next year. Past good ties with Russia in the form of defence and military assets and space ventures in the 2000s, all make it easier to enhance Moscow-KL ties and to repair and recapture the lost decade of bilateral ties where the West and China are more preferred. Now is seen as the best time for elevating Russia-Malaysia ties as Malaysia seeks to diversify its economic and defence preference and dependence, and as Malaysia intends to join BRICS. Malaysia's joining BRICS will require the support of Russia, and this presents a new opening for Russia to also be able to extend its leverage and new openings for elevation of partnerships. Russia is eyeing this part of the world, as it seeks to expand its partnerships and influence and support away from its traditional sphere of interests South East Asia remains pertinent for Russia because it can directly counter US efforts and also serves to complement Beijing's objectives and influence The region is also increasingly directly affecting Russia's economic and defence interests, as the US moves in closer to the region Russia's own Northern Sea Route (NSR) will also seek to divert some of the importance and trade route dependence of the region, and having a second front presence in this area will serve Russia's economic and trade interests. Having few close partners in the region and limited only to Vietnam and India and others, Russia would want to expand the presence of non Western movement through BRICS and engagement with ASEAN. Malaysia is seen as the critical player in this aspect in maintaining the centrality of ASEAN and thus denying the space for the US in expanding its presence and deeper engagement. Apart from a deeper historical partnership with Vietnam especially in the domain of security and defence, Moscow will want to extend its friendships and partnerships with other players and especially strengthen ties with ASEAN. Russia also praises Malaysia's balanced stance in the Ukraine conflict during the visit. Moscow sees this region as critical in denying the forward space being deployed from AUKUS to the Squad, and would not want to be left behind in the scramble by European powers and possibly Nato in engaging the region. Knowing that the next potential full blown conflict will be in the region, Russia would want to play a stronger role in expanding its presence, and trying to present a different narrative and perspective in differentiating itself from the US and to a certain extent, China. Russia will want to be seen and accepted by the region as both a force of economic and resources including energy and food security, and also as a defence and security assurance despite the Ukrainian crisis. Europe has traditionally always been the most important strategic theatre for Russia. Moscow's quest for security, great-power status, and recognition as an equal to other European countries is reflected in its preoccupation with major European powers. The eastward expansion of NATO dealt a major blow to Russia's historical ambitions and objectives in Europe. NATO claimed responsibility for European security, and from there, Russia felt that NATO has never left its fixation on cornering it. The Arctic as Moscow's Next Geopolitical Advantage Apart from the focus on securing its Western border with Europe and NATO, Moscow realises the next frontiers lie in the Arctic and the Indo Pacific. Russia's investments in Arctic energy projects are part of its broader strategy toward Europe and the wider world, but Europe remains the most important arena in the Kremlin's strategic calculations. The revenue from these investments in the Arctic and Indo Pacific is hoped to help sustain Russia's defense capabilities needed for balancing against NATO. The exploitation of Arctic riches accelerated in post-Soviet Russia. Oil and gas remained the main tenet in restoring the country's economic fortunes in the early 2000s. The role of oil and gas in Russia's Arctic ambitions was highlighted in 2006 as part of the Kremlin's agenda to establish the country as an "energy superpower" and to justify its inclusion in the G8. Rising temperatures would make those riches more accessible and ensure the Kremlin a steady source of revenues, and with that, the ability to sustain its agenda in Ukraine and further push back against deeper forays by the US led system. It will provide the Kremlin with an opportunity to diversify its energy policy by eventually linking the Russian Arctic to markets in Asia, thus reducing the country's reliance on Europe as a critical energy market and on Ukraine as a critical conduit to that market. The Arctic navigation and maritime access to Asia will enable it to reduce its dependence on Europe, and as a needed platform in sustaining its war effort in Ukraine. The limited northern Arctic potential in the past that has hampered Moscow's geostrategic potential has now turned to be one of the most exciting and rewarding openings for Moscow, a drive that is well capitalized by the strategic thinkers in the Kremlin with the Arctic Strategy 2035 formulation. The militarization of the Arctic is inevitable, and the potential economic rewards and military foothold with greater power projection resilience are further too enticing for Moscow to forgo. Warming temperature led to the path of development for the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's Arctic coastline that provide the Kremlin with an opportunity to diversify its energy policy and along the process, cutting short the trade route from China and the East to European ports, making the dependence on the Suez Canal and the Malacca Straits less formidable. This has not only given a new strategic lifeline for Moscow but Beijing is destined to reap the greatest returns and benefits in turning around its stalled Belt and Road push. By linking the Russian Arctic to markets in Asia it also helps in reducing the country's reliance on Europe as a critical energy market and opens up new avenues for new markets in the emerging South and Southeast regions of Asia for its energy exports through the sea route. This next geostrategic gem will be heavily defended and fortified in ensuring its territorial guarantee, with initial priority in defending immediate territories around Kola Peninsula and enhancing anti access/area denial to US and NATO forces. The Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command is ensuring that new military strategic maneuvers will give resilient options and support in defending these interests where melting ice and improved mobility will give new strike options and improving deterring second strike capacities in the Kola Peninsula. This invites countermeasures from NATO where the proximity of major Russian military installations to the Baltic states makes them vulnerable to NATO's longer- range precision weapons. Moscow's Long Term Resilience With long open plains that lack substantive natural barriers for external offensive threats, coupled with persistent NATO and US pressure from the West and the trapping of its northern flank that has limited maneuver capacities, the Kremlin is cornered and entrapped that fueled the impetus in its drive and search for strategic warm water ports and openings for both economic and military power projection and survival assurances. China and Central Asia remain an asset and positive ally dependent for now, further strengthened by the No Limits Ties with Beijing but historical baggage might limit future potential and resilience. Shared survival and strategic needs form the current basis for the ties, pillared on the need for China to serve as the natural barrier and buffer in its southern flank and to continue Moscow's grip and influence on Central Asian states to ward off any potential Western influence and incursions from that geographical sphere. In future power parity and military calculations, the Ukraine setback will eventually not matter much or directly affect the balance of power parity. It is unwise to assume and conclude that Moscow's fate of its power lethality and staying power of military challenge is sealed. The 2008 Georgian war proved that despite the substandard performances, it galvanised the shake-up and revamp in its military, producing the desired change as seen in the 2014 annexation and the Syrian intervention. The next century will provide a new and different perspective and opening for Moscow, and it realises it will have to grapple with a declining West and a risen China that will provide new twists and another spectrum of a long hold competition with China and the rise of the rest.