Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 09/Sep 23:05

There Was A Housing Bubble In Atlanta Prior To The Crash – OpEd

Kevin Erdmann argued in a Washington Postcolumnon Thursday that the main problem with U.S. housing policy is over-restrictive lending rules from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While there may be some issues with current policy being overly restrictive, that does not explain the collapse of the housing prices in 2007-2009, nor the current inadequate supply of housing. The Atlanta example Erdmann uses in his piece is very helpful in making these points. Erdmann says there was no bubble in Atlanta’s house prices and therefore there was nothing to burst. He attributes the sharp decline in house prices in 2007-2009, and especially in the bottom tier of the housing market, to tighter credit requirements from Fannie and Freddie. However, the datadosupport the case that there was a housing bubble building in the decade prior to 2007, especially in the lower tier of the housing market. Here’s the inflation-adjusted Case-Schiller index for the lower tier of the housing market (bottom third) from 1992 to the present. As can be seen, there is a sharp rise in the index from 1996 to the middle of 2005. At that point the index levels off and then starts falling rapidly in 2007. In the price run-up, inflation-adjusted house prices for the bottom third of the market rose by 38.8 percent. This contrasts with rents in Atlanta, which rose at almost exactly the same rate as overall inflation. This had been the general pattern for house prices in the period before the housing bubble. Nationwide house prices rose roughly in step with the rate of inflation from 1896 to 1996. There were enormous divergences across regions, with prices hugely outpacing inflation in places like New York and San Francisco, while falling far behind inflation in Detroit, St. Louis and many small cities and towns. Erdmann points out that house prices in the lower tier of housing fell much more than the price of more expensive houses in Atlanta in the crash. This is true, but house prices at the higher end rose by much less in the bubble. Prices in the top tier rose by 27 percent in real terms over the period from 1996 to the peak in 2005. This was still a bubble, given the trend in rents, but considerably smaller than the one in the lower tier in Atlanta. For that reason it is not surprising that there would have been a sharper fall in house prices in the bottom tier. The other point worth noting in this graph is that house prices for the bottom tier of housing in Atlanta had largely recovered their bubble peaks just before the pandemic. Since the pandemic, real house prices for the bottom tier have actually exceeded their bubble peaks. This is true for the higher tiers as well. This suggests that builders have serious incentive to be building lots of housing in Atlanta and elsewhere, but for some reason they are not. The tightening of credit standards by Fannie and Freddie cannot explain this failure to build more housing, since that should be reflected in house prices, which it clearly is not. There is one other point worth noting about Erdmann’s point on Fannie and Freddie credit standards. The average credit score hasrisensubstantially over the last two decades. This means that using a fixed credit score as a cutoff would imply a smaller share of potential borrowers are being excluded. It also would have been helpful if Erdmann had included data on mortgage issuance in the 1990s before credit standards had been relaxed and the bubble had begun to build. In any case, this point is secondary. If excessively high credit standards were the factor that was really clogging the housing market, we should not be seeing real house prices at above their bubble peaks. These prices give builders plenty of incentive to build, but for some reason they are not constructing housing at anything like the bubble pace, or even the pre-bubble pace. This article first appeared on Dean Baker’s Beat the Press blog.