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What Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion Tells Us About Putin’s Russia – Analysis

By Olga Khvostunova (FPRI) -- In early August, the Ukrainian army broke into Russia and, virtually undeterred, rapidly advanced seizing a significant area of the borderline region of Kursk. Given that this was the first foreign invasion of Russia since World War II, Russia’s fierce retaliation should have followed. Instead, Russian authorities pretended that this was nothing but a local crisis and a temporary setback. The reality is more complex and the implications are more serious than the Kremlin would like to admit. What is Happening in Kursk On the night of August 6, the Ukrainian Armed Forces crossed the border at Russia’s Kursk region and launched a surprise offensive on several regional towns. Within twenty-four hours the Ukrainian armyadvancedup to ten kilometers into Russia and reportedlycapturedthe regional center ofSudzha. A month later, not only had they not been stopped by the Russian counteroffensive, but managed to advance further,claimingcontrol of over 1,300 sq km in the Kursk region (other estimates range from 1,150 sq km,accordingto the Institute of the Study of War, and 480 sq km,accordingto Russian officials). Moscow’s reaction to this unprecedented development has been and remains of dual nature. On one hand, following along-established tradition, Russian authorities maintain the appearance that the Kursk incursion is not a serious threat, but somethingakin to a naturaldisaster in a remote region. President Vladimir Putin made no public comments about the Kursk incursion for about a week after it had been launched. He only brieflyspokeabout it at a televised meeting with governors and military staff on August 12, demanding that the Ukrainian forces be expelled from Russia and blaming the West for what he called a “provocation.” At another publicmeetingnine days later, he referred to the Kursk situation in the context of Russia’s “enemies and adversaries” seeking to “destabilize the country.” As the Ukrainian forces advanced deeper into Russia, Putin alsowenton a two-day state trip to Azerbaijan, signaling that he had more important business to attend to. Following suit, not a single federal official nor even the acting governor of the Kursk region has visited any of the areas engulfed in fighting. On the other hand, the Kremlin did take some drastic action in response to the incursion, although these actions were barely discussed in the state media. A federal emergency situationwas declaredin the Kursk and the neighboring Belgorod regions and acounter-terrorist operationregime was introduced in the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions—thelargestin modern Russian history in terms of the affected population. According to official data, over 120,000 Kursk residentswere evacuatedfrom areas controlled by the Ukrainian forces. AccordingtoMeduza’s sources in the Russian government, despite appearances, the incursion did come as a shocking surprise to the Russian elite who did not anticipate the audacious move by the Ukrainian army, which partially explains the Kremlin’sslow response. But in two weeks, “the shock faded, and we got used to it,” explained the source. To manage potential public anxiety over the incursion, the Kremlin decided to employ the usual propaganda tropes to frame the situation as the “new normal.” The key message is that while “enemies” indeed broke into Russia, they will be inevitably defeated, although this might take some time. What Ukraine is Trying to Achieve Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has repeatedly defied low expectations and delivered strategic surprises reaffirming Western allies’ support and boosting public spirit inside the country. The Kursk incursion is just the latest of such surprises. But there has been a debate among observers about the motives for Kyiv’s bold move, considering that the Russian forcescontinue to advancein Ukraine’s Donetsk region closing in on the strategic town ofPokrovsk. One possible motive,accordingtoAFPsources, is to “stretch” Russian forces across the front line and to divert Russian troops from Donbass, undermining their achievements in this direction. Should the move be successful, it would also boost military and public morale in Ukraine, which had been declining as the war of attrition grinds on. Indeed, this is whatreportedlyhas happened. But as for the Russian troops’ diversion from Donbass to Kursk, it isnot happeningat the rate that Kyiv would prefer. Another explanation could be that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sought to strengthen his negotiating position in potential peace talks with Russia. In a statement before the Kursk incursion, hestatedthat there could be a “real foundation for a fair end to this war this year.” However, the immediate effect on Russia seems to be the opposite. At the August 12 briefing, Putinemphasizedthat “[Ukraine] is apparently striving to improve its negotiating positions in the future. But what kind of negotiations can we talk about with people who indiscriminately strike at civilians, at civilian infrastructure, or try to create threats to nuclear power facilities?” Still, the fact that the Ukrainian army seized a significant chunk of the Russian region holds undeniable symbolic power and has cast a painful blow to the facade of a regime that places premium value on appearances. Ukraine’s Kursk operation is unlikely to be driven by a single goal, meaning that these and other motives contributed to the Ukrainian leadership’s decision to break into Russia. But one of the most significant might be the following. Since the beginning of the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, Putin has repeatedly spoken about the “red lines” to curtail what he viewed as unacceptable support of Western allies to Ukraine. The result, he alleged, would be a massive retaliation, including a nuclear strike. But, as the war dragged on, the many “red lines” that had been publicly drawn by Putin and other Russian officials, werecrossedwith no significant repercussions. The Western supply of military equipment and weapons to Ukrainegraduatedfrom Javelin and Stinger missiles and HIMARS rocket launchers to Patriot missile systems and finally toF-16 jets. However, at each incremental step, fear of triggering a major escalation by Russia causedcostly delays. On many occasions, Russian officials were indeed bluffing. Rhetorical “red lines” can be drawn in troves, and, in this game of chicken, obscured by the fog of war, it is difficult to discern which ones are real. While caution in such decisions is justifiable, the delays still played into Russia’s hands and against Ukraine’s interests. Therefore, it is possible that by breaking into Russia, Kyiv sought to demonstrate to Ukraine’s Western allies that fear is not a good advisor and that many more false “red lines” in Putin’s rhetorical arsenal can and should be ignored, if the West is to help Ukraine secure its future as a sovereign state. Through the Kursk incursion, Ukraine created a precedent, and, to echo the Kremlin’s own propaganda message, this is indeed a new reality. How the Russian Public Has Reacted But what about Russia? Does this new reality have the potential to galvanize a fierce protest of the Russian public against the Kremlin’s policies? The short answer is that it seems unlikely, if the Russian public opinion data are to be trusted.Western observers are often preoccupied with the state of Russian public opinion, looking at the poll numbers and trying to explain the high levels of support for Putin or for the “special military operation”—this is what the Ukraine war is still officially called in Russia, and those who disagreecan be arrestedand put in jail for up to fifteen years for spreading “fake information” about the Russian army. Levada Center, the only remaining independent pollster capable of producing all-Russia surveys,has been criticizedfor delivering survey results that are aligned with Kremlin propaganda. However, the validity of social surveys in authoritarian societies remains a major challenge even beyond Russia, as direct questions about people’s political views are unlikely to reveal theirtrue preferences. It is a matter of debate whether most Russians actually support the war in Ukraine or just say that they do. Levada’slatest pollon Ukraine was conducted before the Kursk incursion and showed a small decrease in the number of war supporters (from 77 percent in June to 75 percent in July), with the majority (58 percent) also saying that there is a need to move on to peace negotiations. Only 17 percent of Russians explicitly said they did not support the war. According to Levada, the July survey showed the highest level of support for peace talks (previously, it peaked at 57 percent in October 2022 and November 2023) and the lowest support (34 percent) for a continuation of the war since it began in February 2022, as this number has dropped by nine percentage points over a two-month period. Levada also offered a demographic breakdown of the war supporters versus peace supporters in Russia. The support for the war is mostly high among men (78 percent), respondents aged fifty-five and up (80 percent), respondents who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (84 percent), those who approve of Putin’s job as president (81 percent), and those who trust television as a source of information (83 percent). Similarly, those who support the continuation of the war are most often men (43 percent), respondents aged fifty-five and up (41 percent), respondents who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (39 percent) and approve of the president (37 percent), as well as those who trust information from television (38 percent). Interestingly, it is also wealthier Russians (36 percent) and Muscovites (48 percent) who believe that the war should go on. The low level of support for the war is mostly observed among women (73 percent), respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four (66 percent), those who believe that the country is moving down the wrong path (50 percent), those who disapprove of the president’s activities (34 percent), and respondents who rely on information from social media and YouTube channels (71 percent each). After the Kursk incursion, the two state-funded pollsters, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM),released the resultsof their weekly surveys—the first two studies attempting to gauge the reaction of the Russian public to these events. Given the source, their results should be taken with a grain of salt, but it is also the case with the Russian government that it might use data from these pollsters to take the actual temperature in the society to control it better. FOM’s survey asked the respondents to recall the main event of the past week, and 39 percent named the situation at the Ukrainian border, which was perceived not just as local clashes, but specifically as an “invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into Russian territory.” According to FOM, the level of anxiety across the respondents increased from 39 percent in the previous week to 45 percent, which is the highest number since the beginning of 2024. Still, this shift in the public mood had no effect on Putin’s approval ratings, which polled at 82 percent (down only by two points compared to the previous week). VTsIOM reported a marginal increase in Putin’s approval rating—from 76.9 percent to 77.1 percent. If these numbers are close to the truth, a possible explanation for these dynamics could be the “rallying around the flag” effect or perceiving “the government as the only protector,” asnotedby a Russian political analyst Alexei Makarkin, who also argued that “people don’t see an alternative [to the government], and here they are absolutely rational—they can’t go to the opposition.” On balance, the Kursk incursion did not result in public pressure inside Russia that could undermine Putin’s position, but it did create a public image problem for the Russian president, even as he tries to shrug it off. This precedent also sent a strong message to Western policymakers about the validity of Putin’s red lines. It is important to be shrewd when it comes to Kremlin propaganda and warmongering—to differentiate between empty threats and real ones. If Putin’s background in intelligence is any indication, the real threats are almost never talked about. But he has been in the public eye long enough for experts and policymakers to make accurate deductions about his true intentions. About the author: Olga Khvostunova is a 2024 Templeton Fellow and a Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She is also a PhD student at Stony Brook University’s Political Science Department. Source: This article was published by FPRI