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Decoding Social Media’s Role In Taliban 2.0 And Its Implications For Afghan Youth – Analysis

By Muhammad Akran, Asim Nasar and Shama Perveen The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan (here- after Taliban 2.0) following their takeover on Aug. 15, 2021, marked a significant turning point in the nation’s socio-political landscape (Akram et al., 2023). Amidst their two-decade-long resistance, the Taliban employed various tactics, including the strategic use of social media platforms, to influence public narratives and consolidate their power. Other tactics included, but were not limited to, addressing people’s grievances in rural areas, continuous messaging about their will to retake the country, and framing themselves as the true warriors of Islam (Misra, 2002). The usage of social media by extremist groups and individuals to radicalize for violent extremism is a threat that goes beyond any one country (Almoqbel & Xu, 2019). The under-controlled spread of misinformation on social media helps extremist groups to disseminate radical and violent beliefs to a wide range of audiences. With minimal financing, social media can spread propaganda to the wider population (Nakov & Martino, 2021). Social media platforms allow people of diverse backgrounds and worldviews to share their opinions in an open and unstructured way, but on the other hand, it has also eased mass radicalization by extremist groups (Gallacher et al, 2021; Ul Rehman et al, 2021). Since moral intuitions are central to defining human behavior, extremist groups target people’s moral intuitions to propagate their radi- cal and extremist ideologies (Hopp et al., 2021). Young people, especially between the ages of 15 to 24 who spend comparatively more time online, are highly vulnerable to radicalization amidst their higher chances of exposure to hateful and extremist content online (Costello et al., 2020). “The Taliban is probably the only armed group that has gained command of a whole country (now second time)...and they were never a welfare orga- nization but instead had a very narrow and radical vision of public management” (Harpviken, 2012). Even before Taliban 2.0 happened, the Taliban had a significant presence on the internet since the group launched its webpage named “Alemarah” (Johnson et al., 2021). Taylor (2013) noted that Bin Laden himself advocated using media to spread anti-West messages among his followers and other target audiences such as youth in Pakistan or other Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda heavily used media outlets to inspire and recruit their audiences, particularly Muslim youth, including suicide bombers and field fighters. Bin Laden once said, “Media war in this century is one of the strongest methods (of warfare).” Post 9/11, the Taliban used social media as a public relations method to draw the international public’s attention to their military opposition to the foreign troops in Afghanistan. In their online communication, the Taliban termed the Interna- tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as brutal “invaders,” and called the Afghan government and security forces puppets of the international forces, while portraying themselves (the Taliban) a moder- ate force seeking to deliver a sovereign and Islamic Afghanistan to its people (Bernatis, 2014). Drissel (2015) added that the Taliban used social media to frame themselves as fighters for Islam, fighting for Pashtuns’ integrity, and protecting Afghans from imperialism and colonization. Over the years, the Taliban were able to apply social media tactics to make their online propaganda more robust, which benefitted them on the battlefield (Johnson, 2013). One analyst noted, “now almost every Taliban fighter has a smartphone in his pocket” (Barthwal, 2021). They used smartphones to record and then post their strategic gains on social media. A critical research gap exists in comprehensively examining the role of social media in the resur- gence of the Taliban, particularly during late 2020 and early 2021. This study examines the Taliban’s utilization of social media such as Facebook and X (former Twitter) to influence public narratives leading up to their territorial gains in 2021. It also explores how critical social media literacy can help young Afghans navigate life under the oppressive regime of Taliban 2.0. Theoretical Underpinning Root narrative theory (Simmons, 2020) presumes that abuses of power have legacy effects, i.e., “conflicts only endure and escalate where there is a clash of interpretations about the history of institutional power.” One of the key ideas in this theory is “radical disagreements” among parties in a conflict. In the case of Taliban 2.0, the Taliban spread propaganda through social media to claim themselves heroes who are “victims” of their unjust ouster from ruling Afghanistan back in 2001 who then continued fighting for the “freedom” of Afghanistan. In their narratives online, the Taliban portrayed the republic governments as “the bad king” who are puppets of the West. They portrayed themselves as the rightful rulers of the country and claimed they had transformed from radicalism to modernism. Their social media propaganda was also infused with the notion of what root narrative theory calls “libertarianism” from foreign occupation. They claimed that the republic governments did not respect Afghan culture and Islamic values (defined as consent by root narrative theory) and that the country is being ruled by the enemies of Afghanistan (defined as a merit by the root narrative theory). Hence, root narrative theory guides how the Taliban used social media to build their narratives around liberation and the rationale of citizenship to advance their propaganda. Findings 1. Taliban 2.0 Use of Social Media Amidst their fight for Taliban 2.0, the Taliban used their ground activities to supply social media content to strengthen the narrative of their control over various regions in the country. Before Taliban 2.0, the group was able to retain its influence over various areas of the country through different tactics. One such tactic was addressing the griev- ances of rural communities ignored by the country’s fragile governance and judicial systems (Mehran et al., 2022). To mediate the grievances of rural communities, the Taliban offered their own style of instant justice to resolve local disputes or conflicts. They also used social media posts for ideological expansion, fundraising, and youth recruitment. Access to social media enabled the Taliban to tailor public narratives and influence peoples’ perceptions by portraying their desired image of community activism and welfare (Farrell, 2018). Though the Taliban had limited resources compared to the former Afghan government, they were better at utilizing social media to disseminate manipulated information propagating their political agenda (Ibrahimi et al., 2015). Before Taliban 2.0, their spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid was posting more than 15 tweets a day, which reflects their level of social media activity. The Taliban used Facebook and X to report their attacks on security forces and to publish statements reiterating their commitment to the Afghans’ “freedom” (Bahar, 2020). The Taliban have extensively used social media in a targeted and personalized way. Before Taliban 2.0, the Taliban’s spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid personally answered people’s queries and questions posted on their social media accounts. For example, he responded to a question about the Taliban’s governance style with “These rules do not come from us, they come from God, and we must follow them” (Hasrat-Nazimi, 2012). Bahar (2020) noted “A Taliban Twitter account created in 2011 and run by their spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, who posted more than 15 tweets per day.” The four major themes of the Taliban’s narrative on social media have been “their national sovereignty over the Afghan soil, the military strength of their ranks, the sacredness of the Taliban’s jihad, and the authority of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate” (EFSAS, 2020). 2. Anti-Tech Taliban is Now a Social Media Beneficiary Contrary to their previous regime in the 1990s, the Taliban used social media and other online spaces such as radio throughout their two decades of war (Ruttig, 2021). Though the Taliban banned the use of the Internet in their previous regime, they heavily relied on Internet communication including social media platforms after losing their rule over Afghanistan in 2001. Yousaf and Jabarkhail (2022) argued that the “Taliban of 2021 are different from the Taliban of 1996, at least in terms of their media messaging, propaganda, and political maneuvering.” In their pursuit of retaking the country, the Taliban continued posting videos on the internet including on social media to keep themselves in the limelight and to communicate with their members to renew their commitment to continuous fighting (Bodetti, 2016). Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, the web editor of a Taliban website, once said that “wars today cannot be won without media. Media aim at the heart rather than the body, [and] if the heart is defeated, the battle is won” (Gawakh, 2011). An Afghan extremism expert said, “It was only after the fall of the Taliban (in the 1990s) that they began using this form of media for propaganda. Over time they have changed their approach to winning the war of the media” (Hasrat-Nazimi, 2012). One analyst notes that “Insurgents have always wanted to make themselves look like winners. The internet makes it a whole lot easier....Taliban [were] all over Twitter, and they are [were] incessantly tweeting” (Michaels, 2012). The official Taliban account, @alemarahweb, included a link to the Taliban’s official website. The chat features of different social media such as WhatsApp and Messenger also allowed the group to communicate and coordinate with one another. Courchesne et al. (2022) found that the Taliban employed five distinct narratives through X while retaking control of Afghanistan: (1) projecting the Taliban as a government-in-waiting; (2) promoting the military victories of the Taliban; (3) delegitimizing the republic government; (4) exaggerating the civilian deaths caused by republic government and foreign forces; (5) reporting the defections from the Afghan military; and (6) publicizing the Taliban leadership’s relations with foreign governments. Corsello (2022) found that the main argu- ment in the Taliban’s social media activity was that “the (former) government was illegitimate.” The social media met the Taliban’s need to communicate with distant audiences. They posted content in multiple languages, including Arabic, English, Pashto, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu. They used Telegram, Twitter, and a WhatsApp chatroom that was updated throughout the day and included cell- phone numbers from Afghanistan, the Emirates, Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Qari Muhammad Yousaf Ahmadi, the Taliban’s former spokesperson, once said: “Given the realities on the ground, social media allow us to contact foreign and local journalists easily.” He further said, “I use computers and have accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (for) winning over the minds and hearts of the masses” (Bodetti, 2016). Taylor (2019) noted that the Taliban used social media to support their ground activities in Afghanistan for building propaganda, influencing narratives, and gaining or sustaining their local support. 3. Escalated Use of Social Media in Taliban 2.0 After the US announced on Apr. 14, 2021 the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the Tali- ban expanded their use of social media to publicize their territorial gains. Taliban 2.0 started from rural areas and worked toward the key transportation routes, the district headquarters, the provincial capitals, and then seized the capital of Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021. Taliban social media attempted to prepare the way by shifting Afghan public narratives based on fear of another Taliban regime (Karimi & Faiez, 2021). It also undermined the confidence and morale of former Afghan forces and discouraged them from fighting back against the Taliban. The Taliban repeatedly used social media to call on the former Afghan forces to surrender. They shared photos and videos showing some of the soldiers surrendering or handing over their weapons to the Taliban (Nossiter & Abed, 2021). When the Taliban entered Kabul, they posted videos and photos of themselves “exercising hard, eating ice cream, and looking terrific” (Corsello, 2022, p. 52). The capital of Nimroz province, Zaranj, was the first provincial capital to fall to the Taliban on Aug. 6, 2021 (Akhgar & Gannon, 2021). Though the former government initially denied this news, the Taliban posted photos and videos on social media showing their soldiers inside the airport and government buildings and posing for photos and selfies at the city’s entrance (Makoii, 2021). Unverified videos of Taliban fighters speeding on motorcy- cles toward district capitals and releasing prisoners from government prisons were all over social media (D’Agata, 2021; Karimi & Faiez, 2021). Such unrestricted content on social media added to the fear among common Afghans that the Taliban would retake the country soon (Noorzai, 2021). The Taliban’s narratives of being the “good guy” and winning the war strengthened the perception of the Taliban being the country’s inevitable future power (Sofuoglu, 2021). In mid-2021, as they enjoyed territorial gains, the Taliban projected a friendlier tone in their social media messaging. At that time the Taliban’s spokes- person Suhail Shaheen had more than 350,000 X followers. “Today’s Taliban is incredibly tech-savvy and social media smart--they’re nothing like the Taliban of 20 years ago,” said Rita Katz, executive director of SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks online extremism (Corsello, 2022). The Taliban employed sophisticated social media strategies to build local narratives in their favor. Lee et al. (2022) did a sentiment analysis of tweets immediately after the event of Taliban 2.0 and found that most of the Afghan-originated tweets reflected no surprise about the Taliban retaking their country. Countering Extreme Narratives through Social Media The utilization of social media by extremist groups such as the Taliban has challenged efforts to counter extremism and terrorism, which requires understanding of the behavioral traits being influenced by radical content on social media (Weimann, 2016). As of January 2022, there were an estimated 9.23 million (23 percent) internet users among the 40.29 million Afghan population, with and 4.15 million (10 percent) of them social media users (Data Portal, 2022). These statistics have an interesting correlation with the 2018 Afghan parliamentary election as there were nine million registered voters, almost the same as the number of internet users, and four million of them cast their votes across the country, almost the same as the number of social media users (Bahar, 2020). The responsible and politically literate use of social media can help raise Afghans’ voices and concerns about threats and attacks on their rights, freedoms, and socio-economic insecurity under Taliban 2.0. This can be possible by inculcating critical social media liter- acy among Afghan youth to navigate the linguistic implications of the Taliban’s political and propaganda posts on social media (Ventsel et al., 2023). Since the extremists are increasingly using social media platforms to propagate their ideologies to radicalize youth and adults for violent extremism (Akram & Nasar, 2023), the counterextremism efforts are shifting from on-the-ground to online spaces (Aziz & Beydoun, 2020). “Social media is a refuge for (Afghan) people, a place where people can talk, connect, and feel that someone else is listening to them. Social media makes people powerful” in oppressive regimes, an Afghan political activist tweeted (Mehrdad, 2020). The strategic use of social media by the Afghan youth can be a competing force against the Taliban flooding social media with their own statements, selfies, photos, and videos that build and strengthen Taliban propaganda (Ray, 2021). Social media can further help monitor violations of fundamental human rights and individ- ual freedoms of Afghans to ensure some degree of public accountability of Taliban 2.0 (Mehrdad, 2020). Moffett and Sgro (2016) referenced a campaign, #RaiseAFlag, which asked young social media users to flag extremist and radical content whenever they encounter it on social media. Afghan youth can adapt such methods not only to flag Tali- ban propaganda but also to share cases of Taliban oppression of the public. In such a case, the algorithms of social media platforms like Facebook should be customized not to disclose the identity and location of the Afghans to ensure their safety from the Taliban’s crackdowns and punishments (Manca et al., 2021). Conclusion This study has shed light on the role of social media in shaping public narratives during the resurgence of Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan. It argues that the Taliban have evolved in the tactical use of the internet and social media and significantly accelerated their use of it after the US announced the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. After that, the Taliban accelerated the application of their “learned” social media tactics, built a narrative online of their coming back to power by posting photos and videos of their territorial gains, and eventually succeeded. Hence this study argues that social media was one of the key tools the Taliban used to keep themselves in the limelight, build narratives in their favor, and eventually retake Afghanistan by conditioning the Afghan people to believe they would not have any option other than Taliban rule after foreign troops left the country. For Afghans living under the Taliban 2.0 regime and those living abroad, critical social media literacy skills are needed not only to protect themselves from the Taliban’s propaganda but also to safely report on the oppressions by the Taliban. Furthermore, social media service providers such as Facebook and X should not only flag and block the propaganda and disinformation by the Taliban regime, but also nudge Afghan social media users to be cautious if they interact with the Taliban propaganda online. Exercising critical thinking while using social media can help young Afghans to safely monitor and report on the violations of human security of Afghans under Taliban 2.0. About the authors: Muhammad Akram is Ph.D. Candidate at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. He is a graduate of MA Conflict Transformation from Eastern Mennonite University in Virginia, USA. 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