Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 05/Jan 00:37

Poland’s EU Presidency: Thinking In Polish – Analysis

By Shairee Malhotra On 1 January 2025, Poland assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU). The EU’s rotation system, which changes presidencies every six months, marks the beginning of a new trio of presidencies led by Poland, Denmark, and Cyprus. Poland will preside over the presidency until 31 June, during which it will drive the EU’s political agenda while factoring in its own national interests. After Hungary’s controversial tenure, where top EU officials boycotted meetings in Budapest, the Polish presidency is expected to be markedly different. Hungary was the first country to have an EU presidency while being under EU sanctions over rule of law tensions. Moreover, much to the EU’s chagrin, Hungary’s eurosceptic Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, undertook unilateral “peace missions” to Moscow and Kyiv during his EU presidency. On the other hand, the victory of the pro-European Donald Tusk in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections, over the nationalist and eurosceptic Law and Justice party (PiS) that ruled Poland for eight years, marked Warsaw’s return to the European mainstream, already bolstered by its leading role in Europe’s response to Russian aggression. Tusk’s experience, based on his tenures as the former head of the EU Council from 2014–2019 and as the Prime Minister during Poland’s first EU presidency in 2011, ensures the EU is in sound hands during Poland’s presidency. Poland takes charge at a critical juncture for Europe—the Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth year, and on the other side of the Atlantic, the uncertainties accompanying Trump 2.0 loom large. Meanwhile, the incoming European Commission’s new legislative framework will soon emerge. Polish priorities  Tusk emphasised the EU’s need to “think in Polish”, making it capable “not only of survival but also of a political offensive.” The overarching theme and motto for the Polish presidency is “Security, Europe!” with security organised into seven dimensions: external security, internal security, energy security, economic security, food security, health security and information security. This encompasses a comprehensive approach to security that goes well beyond the military domain. External security dimensions include continued Ukraine support, as well as scaling up domestic defence production to expand Europe’s defence industry. This includes mobilising greater European defence spending, which reached a record 279 billion euros in 2023—a 10-percent increase from 2022—but it also requires an additional 500 billion euros over the next decade, according to Mario Draghi’s report on competitiveness. A key priority is strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) eastern flank through defence infrastructure initiatives like the East Shield, which Poland wants the EU and its member states to co-finance. Initiatives such as the to finance the EU’s military-industrial complex over the 2025-2027 period, fall short of funding requirements, and Poland advocates the use of common euro bondstowards defence. External security also includes tackling challenges at the EU’s external borders and hybrid threats such as the “instrumentalisation of migration”. As Europe braces for Trump’s planned tariffs on European imports, and as economic ties with its other main trading partner, China, remain strained, economic security, which includes deepening the single market and eliminating barriers to cross-border trade, is highlighted as a key priority. With regard to food security, the Polish programme emphasises “a competitive and resilient European agriculture”. In this context, a strong Common Agricultural Policy to support farmers and strengthen their position in value chains, and the development of rural areas is highlighted. Poland also intends to address challenges arising from future EU enlargement in this sector. The programme reiterates the need to boost energy security through diversification and a further reduction in dependency on Russian sources. It also necessitates reduced dependence on imported technologies, components, and critical raw materials, while decreasing costs for European citizens and businesses. Poland advocates for a more flexible energy-climate policy, focusing on “rewards and incentives [rather than] penalties and obligations”. Information security involves enhancing cybersecurity while also battling disinformation and information manipulation. In reference to health security, Poland focuses on addressing mental health challenges, empowering the digital transformation of healthcare, and strengthening European pharmaceutical manufacturing. The programme also emphasises strengthening transatlantic ties, and among EU member states, Poland is well-equipped to do so. Trump’s contempt for NATO and his pledge to end the war in 24 hours on terms likely to favour Russia are concerns for Warsaw. Still, Poland, despite being amongst the staunchest supporters of Ukraine, is on the same page as Trump when it comes to the need for increased European defence spending, leading by example. Poland currently spends 4 percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) on defence—much higher than the 2 percent NATO threshold—and it intends to raise this to 4.7 percent in 2025. Moreover, 35 percent of the Polish defence budget is committed to buying American weapons, thus cementing Warsaw’s status amongst the top five importers of American military equipment, thereby fulfilling Trump’s push towards “buying American”. In other priorities, Poland will encourage the EU to impose further sanctions on Russia, with the 16thsanctions package expected to be adopted in February 2025. It will also focus on accelerating EU enlargement since the EU decision in December 2023 to open membership talks with Ukraine and Moldova. Can Poland deliver?  One caveat is the Polish presidential election, which is scheduled for May 2025, a decisive vote for the country’s future presented as a choice between the hard-right and centre-right. This may pose distractions, especially as several EU initiatives, such as the European Green Deal, the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, and the grain imports agreement with Ukraine, are not favoured by Polish voters. Yet, member states such as France and Spain have conducted national elections during their EU presidencies, proving that domestic political pressures and EU ambitions can be balanced. Russia’s war against Ukraine vindicated Poland’s warnings about Russian aggression and Western European dependencies, heightening Polish credibility. In the words of the Polish Minister for EU Affairs, Adam Szłapka, Poland is now “an expert for the greatest challenges” confronting the West. For Poland, the presidency is an added opportunity to fortify its role as a major European power centre, given the eastward shift in Europe’s centre of gravity, reinforced by political turmoil in the traditional hubs of Paris and Berlin. Moreover, Tusk’s return to power in Poland also sparked a revival of the Weimar Triangle. On the other hand, Poland’s participation in the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8) meeting in November 2024 reflects its increasingly close ties with the Nordic and Baltic nations that share its security concerns regarding Russia. Poland will have to navigate a challenging terrain, but it is well-positioned to take over the EU presidency, bringing to the table strategic foresight, action-driven leadership, and an ability to unite member states. About the author: Shairee Malhotra is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation