Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 05/Jan 01:15

Moscow–Pyongyang Partnership Could Derail Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – Analysis

By Ben Sando In November 2024, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya stopped in Kyiv for a surprise meeting with his counterpart, Andrii Sybiha. Iwaya’s priority was to discuss the some 12,000 North Korean soldiers battling Ukrainian forces in the Kursk border region of Russia. This burgeoning military alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow threatens to upset the security balance in Northeast Asia and may force Tokyo to scale back its engagement with maritime issues in East Asia. For the past two decades, a new generation of political leadership in Tokyo has encouraged a pivot away from Japan’s insular, restrained defence posture towards greater engagement in defence multilateralism, led by the United States. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe signalled his resolve in 2014 by reinterpreting Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow greater leeway for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to come to the aid of an ally under attack, an act Japan’s armed forces were previously unable to perform. In 2016, Abe announced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which was geared towards curbing China’s growing influence in maritime Asia. Japan helped revitalise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), and has participated in naval exercises with Quad members in waters as far-flung as the Indian Ocean. In tandem with this enhanced multilateral engagement, the SDF has shifted its focus south and has invested in the defence of its southernmost islands, the Nansei Shoto, against Chinese aggression. Japan’s expansive new foreign policy has cemented it into the United States’ vision for East Asian order and endeared Tokyo to capitals throughout the Indo-Pacific. But Tokyo’s expansive regional vision has implicitly relied on a relatively predictable balance of power in Japan’s immediate vicinity, Northeast Asia. The principal impediment to peace in Northeast Asia — North Korea — has historically been deterred by the US nuclear umbrella and remained weak and impoverished due to decades of economic sanctions. While South Korea has been preoccupied with balancing North Korean military power, Japan has been able to prioritise issues beyond its main archipelago, such as China’s threats to maritime security in East and Southeast Asia. For Japanese defence planners, the North Korean threat is not as urgent as China’s expansionism. North Korea remains a frail power, but its incipient military alliance with Russia promises toboost its technological capacity, enable its independence from China — its traditional security partner — and allow it to project force beyond the Korean Peninsula. This Russian aid is already visible. Moscow has shared air defence technology with Pyongyang and has aided it in its halting efforts at a military space program. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, predicts that Moscow will transfer nuclear submarine technology to Pyongyang. North Korea’s submarines, which presently patrol its shores in the Sea of Japan, could offer an elevated threat to Japan’s Maritime SDF if equipped with more advanced propulsion systems. Emboldened by its freedom from Beijing and replete with advanced weaponry, Pyongyang may escalate tensions with its democratic neighbours in Northeast Asia in a bid to secure diplomatic concessions. Such aggression may force Japan to re-orient from a focus on containing China to deterring North Korea. Simultaneously, the Japanese political elite and public may lose enthusiasm for the FOIP vision that commits defence and diplomatic resources beyond Japan’s main archipelago. Anxiety over North Korea’s military expansion serves the interests of China and Russia, which both oppose Japan’s support for Taiwan and Ukraine. Beijing and Moscow may opt to underwrite a policy by North Korean president Kim Jong-un to impede the expanding regional strategies of South Korea and Japan through calculated aggression. As Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party — the political force behind the FOIP vision — rules with a minority government, Japanese political elites may lose the political capital to convince the public to support engagement beyond acute Northeast Asian threats. Much of North Korea’s strategy will be defined by its interactions with US President-elect Donald Trump. But it is uncertain whether Trump can recreate the conditions needed for any kind of rapprochement with Pyongyang, especially given that North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile technology is established and Kim Jong-un has eradicated the channels for diplomatic engagement with South Korea. Tokyo should not wait for unilateral US diplomacy and should instead double down on successful defence trilateralism with Seoul and Washington. If Tokyo can learn to trust South Korea and the South Korea–US alliance with its own security, it can continue an offensive position that commits the SDF beyond Northeast Asia. There is evidence that this is possible. In October 2022, when North Korea fired a missile over Japan’s main island, it was South Korea and the United States that retaliated with a precision bombing drill near North Korea. But the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Seok Yeol has thrown the prospect of such a policy up in the air. If Seoul commits to blunting North Korea’s escalations against both South Korea and Japan, Tokyo will retain relative comfort in committing the SDF to contain China in the East and South China Seas, even as North Korea and Russia grow more menacing. Only sustained security cooperation with Seoul will allow Tokyo to preserve its FOIP vision and tackle the growing threat of Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. About the author: Ben Sando is Research Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington DC. Source: This article was published at East Asia Forum