Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 08/Apr 16:24

Iran Truce Or Dare? – Analysis

By Björn Stritzel (EurActiv) -- After five weeks of bombardment, a ceasefire is now supposed to take hold. Yet the central elements of this truce remain entirely unclear: when or whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to shipping; whether Iran will relinquish its highly enriched uranium or continue enrichment; whether its ballistic missile program will be dismantled and whether Tehran will persist in pursuing its imperial ambitions through proxies. The Israeli and American air campaign was at first conspicuously successful, with much of Iran’s navy destroyed and dozens of the most senior political and military leaders eliminated. Yet, the Iranian regime proved more resilient than many anticipated. Its command structures remained intact despite decapitation strikes, and the hunt by Israeli and American air forces for Iranian missile launchers failed to prevent continued ballistic missile launches, even if they succeeded in curtailing them. Not only the regime itself, but also its partners in Moscow and Beijing, are likely relieved by the ceasefire. China purchases 90 percent of Iranian oil and supplies weapons to Tehran in return. Russia’s partnership with the regime has deepened steadily since 2022, with Tehran providing substantial support in Moscow’s war against Ukraine as well as tips on how to circumvent sanctions. All for nothing? Over these five weeks, a new confrontation between superpower blocs has also become unmistakably visible: the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis has now extended the war it wages in Ukraine into the Middle East. Opposing it is what remains of the West, with a capital W – essentially three nations. First, Israel, which, driven by sheer necessity, had no choice but to preempt the immense destructive potential of the antisemitic regime in Tehran. The Jewish state faces an existential threat from Iran and its proxies: Iran’s ballistic missile program alone constitutes a strategic danger to Jerusalem. Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border – often falsely described as a Lebanese militia, while de facto an Iranian light infantry division – has demonstrated remarkable tenacity. Second, the United States under Trump, pushing back – at least in this theatre – against a widely perceived Western decline. A largely overlooked aspect is that, beyond the nuclear issue, Washington has hard military reasons to confront the mullah regime: even after last summer’s conflict, Tehran rapidly rebuilt its ballistic missile capabilities with Chinese assistance. While the logic of air defence is not quite as simple as often portrayed, the hard costs of interception systems exceed those of the attacker’s arsenal. Already, the US has had to redeploy assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East; in any anticipated conflict with China, it would face a heavily armed Iranian regime as a simultaneous adversary. Ukraine goes where Europe will not Third, Ukraine. Like Israel, Kyiv faces an existential threat. Volodymyr Zelensky acted with notable strategic acumen: not only recognising the opportunity to weaken one of Moscow’s key allies, but also leveraging Ukraine’s expertise in countering Iranian drones to court partners in the Gulf. The rest of Europe, by contrast, has behaved very differently. A continent that has long since drifted away from a once monolithic West, led by America, oscillated between open collaboration with the Iranian regime (Sánchez) and meandering criticism of both Washington and Tehran (Merz). Now that the guns are to fall silent for two weeks, the usual platitude automatons – from Kallas onward – can once again run through their well-worn phrases about “diplomacy” finally being given “a chance.” An EU that took so long to deliberate whether the slaughter of 30,000 Iranians justified designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terror organisation has done little to oppose the regime. For decades, Europe has all but passively tolerated Tehran’s agents carrying out assassinations on its streets. Nor is the EU likely to be stirred by the regime’s impending wave of executions against those who sought nothing more than a better life, like the teenager Amirhossein Hatami, executed just six days before the ceasefire. At least one change: unlike a decade ago, EU diplomats will probably not be found sharing cheerful picnics with executioners at the notorious Evin Prison. The schadenfreude of Europe’s professional know-it-alls and do-nothings that a regime change triggered by the much-disliked United States has for now been averted may yet prove premature. For unlike Europe, the Iranian regime is guided by principle. Its apocalyptic worldview – centred on a salvational Hidden Imam whose return requires the destruction of the Great and Little Satan – is not open to negotiation. This is reflected in the stark discrepancies between the competing US and Iranian ceasefire proposals: even temporary tactical concessions appear to meet strict limits in Tehran. It is therefore not inconceivable that this very rigidity could usher in a new round of kinetic confrontation, at the end of which the regime itself may face decline, Europe notwithstanding.