Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 15/Feb 00:18

Germany’s Nuclear Red Line Must Hold – OpEd

Europe’s security debate has entered dangerous territory. Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds into a fourth year, pounding cities and power grids. NATO’s eastern flank braces for the next strike. President Donald Trump warns allies to “pay up or fend for yourselves.” And in Berlin, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has begun to flirt with an idea once unthinkable: revisiting Germany’s post1945 renunciation of nuclear weapons. This must stop here. A German nuclear weapon is not a policy option. It is a red line—legal, historical, and civilizational—that Europe cannot afford to cross. This is not about mistrusting modern Germany. It is about preserving the architecture that has kept Europe stable for eight decades. The prohibition on German nuclear arms is not a Cold War leftover. It is the foundation stone of the postwar order. In 1954, the modified Brussels Treaty barred West Germany from producing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. That was the price of rearmament and the only basis on which France and the Benelux states would accept a rearmed Germany inside NATO. It was not punishment. It was the structural guarantee that made Western Europe’s recovery and integration possible. Reunification did not soften this principle—it cemented it. The 1990 Two Plus Four Treaty, the legal instrument that restored full German sovereignty, bound a unified Germany to permanent nonnuclear status. Article 3 explicitly reaffirmed Germany’s obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. Berlin accepted this without hesitation. It was the bargain that ended Allied occupation rights and reassured Europe that German power would remain bounded by law. These constraints were not born of sentimentality. They were born of experience. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union paid a staggering price—over 20 million dead—to defeat Nazi Germany alongside the Western Allies. Entire cities from Leningrad to Stalingrad were reduced to ash. The Red Army’s advance from the east and the Allied landings from the west broke Hitler’s regime. That shared sacrifice shaped the postwar settlement: Germany would be rebuilt, but never again allowed to accumulate unconstrained military power. And history offers another lesson: alliances shift. The Soviet Union, once a wartime partner, became the West’s adversary within a few years. After the Soviet collapse, former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states joined NATO. Today, Russia is again the central threat to European security. The message is clear. There are no permanent alignments—only permanent interests. Precisely because the geopolitical landscape is fluid, some constraints must remain fixed. Germany’s nuclear renunciation is one of them. Yet Mr. Merz and a growing chorus of defense intellectuals argue that today’s democratic Germany—now Europe’s largest defense spender—deserves nuclear parity with France. The argument collapses under scrutiny. EU cohesion is already strained by populism, fiscal disputes, and energy shocks. Eastern European states are increasingly skeptical of Brussels. Betting Europe’s security on the permanence of today’s political consensus is not strategy. It is wishful thinking. A German nuclear arsenal would destabilize Europe’s power balance within months. Nuclear weapons confer unilateral veto authority that no EU voting rule or NATO consultation mechanism can neutralize. Berlin would become the indispensable actor in every continental crisis, whether it wanted that role or not. The consequences would be immediate and severe. Poland—scarred by history and staring down Russian armor—would seek its own nuclear guarantees. The Baltic states would follow. France’s independent deterrent, long Europe’s hedge against American unpredictability, would lose strategic primacy. NATO’s nuclearsharing arrangement would unravel. Within a decade, Europe could fracture into competing nuclear blocs. This is not “strategic autonomy.” It is strategic disintegration. Europe’s post1945 integration—its economic strength, its shared institutions, its ability to act collectively—was possible only because German power remained bounded. That boundary was not a shackle. It was the enabling condition for unity. A nucleararmed Germany would not strengthen Europe. It would break it. Yes, the United States is less predictable. Yes, Ukraine’s agony has exposed Europe’s military shortfalls. But desperation is precisely when nations make decisions they later regret. The answer is not to dismantle the treaties that anchor European stability. It is to strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrent, expand air and missile defenses, and deepen Germany’s defense partnership with France. Berlin’s new 2% defense commitment shows that Germany can meet its responsibilities without crossing the nuclear threshold. Some commitments endure because they have proven essential. Germany’s nuclear renunciation is one of them. It is not an archaic clause awaiting revision. It is Europe’s moral and strategic firewall. Crossing it would not make Europe safer. It would signal that history has nothing left to teach us. And Europe cannot afford that kind of amnesia.