The "sacred" Russian May 9th has transformed into a visible capitulation. With a total absence of heavy armor and Air Defense systems stripped from...
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Maroc - ENG.UATV.UA - A La Une - 03/May 11:19
Ukraine is changing the rules of modern warfare — and even the United States acknowledges this. While Russia prepares an increasingly modest parade on Red Square, Ukrainian drone technologies demonstrate effectiveness that challenges traditional military superiority. In a conversation with journalist Jonathan Fink — about deep strikes into Russia, the new geography of war, psychological pressure on Russians, and Ukraine's impact on global security. Learn why the Pentagon is adapting the Ukrainian experience and what this means for the future of warfare. — Operation Clear Horizon—whatever that means. Let’s talk about this. The other day in Florida, the Pentagon completed the Clear Horizon drills. This is an interesting case because the American military actually copied Ukrainian tactics of network-centric warfare using swarms of drones. We are used to talking about helping Ukraine, but now we see the reverse side of it. My question is: to what extent do you think this Ukrainian experience can actually change the old habits of war and doctrines of the United States and NATO? And is it changing in any way in the first place? — That’s an interesting one. I get mixed impressions. I’m not in the military, I’m not affiliated with it, and I hear different things based on different countries and experiences. I think those who are advancing fastest have come to the conclusion that drone warfare is not just a supply line or a procurement process, or developing a set of equipment. It is about creating an ecosystem. It is about innovation, training, and embedding these systems into a culture of defense and security. Those who still treat it as a traditional procurement process are furthest away from being able to replicate what is happening in Ukraine. As many Ukrainians tell me, it is impossible to replicate unless you are working very closely with the most effective battalions and testing your equipment—not just testing in Ukraine, but having your equipment used in combat situations where Ukrainian servicemen feel confident enough to risk their lives and operational opportunities to use your kit. That is the ultimate test: whether they use it and whether it withstands those conditions. — Experience comes at a price. We are used to measuring aid to Ukraine in dollars, currencies, or units of equipment. But how do we assess the value of experience? — Experience is the difficult one. Unless you are at war, you do not have that combat experience. Unless you are faced with the existential risk of the erasure of your country and your cities, you cannot replicate that intensity that drives innovation. The challenge is that Russia is also innovating. They are not defending their territory or values—many are fighting for money or for a dictator prolonging his regime. Nonetheless, they have found ways to innovate. We should be extremely mindful that the second-largest drone army in the world is in Russia, with forces like Rubicon set to expand massively. — Are we mindful? — We are not nearly mindful enough. There are two things we are not mindful of. First, we are not mindful of what it takes for Ukraine to resist. We tend to simplify it: “it’s just Russia.” We do not recognize Ukraine’s achievement as extraordinary, paradigm-shifting, and history-making—which it is. It is a revolution in warfare that comes at incredible cost, driven by Ukrainian will, innovation, and problem-solving capacity. Second, we are not seeing the Russian threat in the full sense of what they are capable of. It is as if we lack the historical imagination to understand the moment we are in and what it takes to survive it. In 2014, Ukraine’s army was hollowed out, with almost no equipment. Viktor Yanukovych had stripped the state for the benefit of the Kremlin. Civic society stepped in. By 2022, that remained critical, but now infrastructure and processes support it. Ukraine is maturing at a pace that dramatically outpaces changes in Western procurement and defense systems. Ukraine is accelerating, while we are very slow. Can we catch up? I doubt we can in peacetime. — Let’s talk about the experience of the United States. It has always relied on expensive, large-scale technologies. Looking at the Clear Horizon case, can we say that Ukraine is forcing America to reconsider the very concept of what a modern army should look like? — Yes, without a shadow of a doubt. Ukraine is driving innovation at an extraordinary pace. You can go through several generations of drone iterations—software, hardware, electronic warfare—while a single procurement process in the West is still ongoing. That raises questions: will such a process produce usable equipment? No. Will it produce cost-effective equipment? No. The idea that you can procure and stockpile drones—something traditional defense companies rely on—is completely unfit for purpose. It is generations behind the cycle of innovation and deployment. — Let’s move to another topic: deep strikes into Russia and the new geography of war. Ukrainian deep strikes have expanded two and a half times deeper into Russia. Facilities about 1,800 kilometers from the Ukrainian border have been hit. That is an extraordinary distance. Does that mean there are no longer safe zones for the Russian military-industrial complex? — It is an extraordinary distance, and it is difficult for people to imagine. Yes, it is paradigm-changing, and this is just the tip of the iceberg. There are already discussions about drone systems using large payloads carried by weather balloons into Russia, then switching to drone mode near their targets. No facility in Russia will be safe within the next 12 months. This capability will scale up, just as we have seen with other systems. This is not going Russia’s way—there will be more of this. — There is also a psychological aspect. For many Russians, the war has not physically touched them. But now drones are reaching them, and even infrastructure like internet access is being affected. Is this psychological layer important? — Yes, it is very important. The war has not physically affected most Russians—their jobs, their daily lives, or their privileges. Now that is changing. People can hear drones, and disruptions are increasing. This is a very clever strategy. It is not just about physical damage or economic impact. There is a deep psychological layer to these strikes. — Do you believe this psychological impact is working? Could it lead to internal pressure on Vladimir Putin’s regime? — Yes, I think it will, though the extent is debatable. I recently spoke with a Western business consultant still operating in Moscow. He described both the limits and the effects. There are superficial examples, like celebrities complaining about not being able to buy luxury goods. But more importantly, figures within Russia are beginning to express dissatisfaction. Some are openly criticizing the situation, which suggests broader discontent within certain elite groups. There are also signals reminiscent of the early 1990s. When I first visited Russia in 1992, people were growing their own food because they did not know if they would be paid or could afford to eat. Now similar messages are appearing again—even from pro-war voices—warning people to prepare for hardship. This may not lead to revolution or even to Putin being removed. But it sends a clear signal: this is no longer working. Either the direction changes, or something will eventually break. I do not think Putin will change course—he has a tendency to double down. — How does this play out? Should we double down on this? Triple down, maybe? — Yes. It is only Ukrainian pressure that has brought Russia to this point. Ukraine has been raising the temperature. You do not know how it will break or what will fall apart first, but you know something will happen. Ukraine is creating the environment for collapse, for change, for rethinking the so-called “special military operation.” It is not Western pressure that has done this. It is certainly not the United States. In fact, over the last year and a half, Donald Trump’s actions have been aimed at preserving Vladimir Putin in any possible way. There is a clear pattern. Even well-intentioned Western partners have not applied pressure to the boiling point we see now. It is Ukrainian actions—deep strikes, attacks on oil infrastructure, strikes on logistics, and increasing battlefield transparency—that have created the conditions where victory is potentially in sight. This has not been created externally. And I worry that when victory comes, allies and Western partners will try to claim credit. But this is a Ukrainian victory. — I cannot help but ask this question. What is Donald Trump trying to do with Putin? Is he trying to form some kind of alliance, or is there no plan at all? — I do not think there is a coherent long-term plan. Trump does not strike me as that kind of person. But there is a clear alignment of purpose. What Putin wants may differ from what Trump wants, but not by much. Trump has long believed there is a major opportunity for business deals through closer relations with Russia. Within his administration, there is an internal division—some are more pro-Ukraine, and there has been ongoing tension. But overall, the pattern of behavior favors those more sympathetic to Moscow. This includes figures such as Kushner, Witkoff, and Colby, who has tried to block aid to Ukraine. There are also symbolic gestures, like wearing Russian-themed attire at key meetings. From their statements, it appears they expected Ukraine to lose, to be in a weak negotiating position, and to be forced into a punitive peace deal. Ultimately, they seem indifferent to whether the outcome is a frozen conflict they can monetize or a full capitulation. The scenario they did not expect is the Ukraine we see today—a military and innovation powerhouse that challenges the traditional military-industrial model of the United States. Ukraine’s approach—rapid innovation, low-cost systems, and continuous iteration—is not profitable for large defense contractors. If you cannot stockpile equipment, where is the business model? This approach is corrosive to the traditional American defense model and, to some extent, to large European defense companies as well, although they may be more adaptable. Ukraine is now exporting the revolutionary energy unleashed during the Euromaidan into the broader international system. This is a transformational revolution, comparable in historical significance to major revolutionary waves. That is why Putin has tried so hard to contain it—he does not want this model of Ukrainian innovation spreading globally. At the same time, this shift is also unsettling for parts of the United States and Europe. The center of gravity in European defense is moving eastward—toward Ukraine, Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics. New technologies and new cultures of warfare are emerging from Ukraine, and they will continue to shape the global system. — Thank you for your detailed answer. One final question. The Victory Day parade without heavy equipment—no tanks, no missiles, just troops marching. At the same time, Putin is discussing a ceasefire. What does he actually want? Why not negotiate directly with Ukraine? — The absence of military hardware on Red Square is symbolic, and likely disappointing for a society that values such displays. I saw commentary suggesting that Volodymyr Zelenskyy should go to Moscow. That is the last place he should go. I cannot envision him sitting down with Putin. What would be the point? Unless Putin is defeated, what can he offer? What concessions would he make? It goes against his nature. At best, such a meeting would result in long historical lectures, not constructive dialogue. There would be no meaningful concessions. This is not only about Putin—it reflects the broader logic of Russian statecraft, where diplomacy is an extension of war, not the other way around. It is inconceivable that anything beneficial will come from negotiations until Moscow is on its knees. Ukraine needs to bring Russia to a position where it is begging for peace. As commentators like Jessica Berlin have argued, unless Moscow is forced into that position, there will be no outcome that benefits Ukraine. Ukraine should resist any pressure to make concessions until Russia is decisively weakened. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKR9MpfKeXU Read also: Russia Is Turning Ukrainian Children into Instruments of War The post Ukrainian technology shocked the US! — Interview with Jonathan Fink appeared first on Freedom.
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