Maroc - NEWSDAY.CO.TT - A la Une - 12/Oct 09:57

Tobago’s failure: not enough whites

The establishment of sugar plantations in the British Caribbean colonies was fuelled by the growing demand and consequent attractive market prices for sugar. These stimulated visions of large-scale profits, which in turn generated heavy investment in the sugar business and the corollary, the growth of human trafficking from Africa to the Caribbean, to provide the numbers of labourers in heavy demand. Despite the fervour of plantation owners in their pursuit of captives to establish and maintain their operations, one measure reflected a need for caution. This was the Deficiency Laws, intended to create a balance between white and black populations because of the recognition of the dangers of having a large, resisting enslaved black population under the control of a small white population. This balance was never achieved in any of the colonies. Although the slave system became fully operational in Tobago shortly after it was ceded to Britain in 1763, and from the very start of its conversion from a heavily forested land into a sugar colony, the disproportion between the enslaved and white populations was always very significant. In fact, this was noted during the episodes of resistance which erupted during the 1770s and posed serious threats to the nascent industry. The problem was perceived to be the black population, and consequently the reaction included imposing the most brutal punishment on the resisters, especially the leaders, intensified repression of the enslaved population, organising and strengthening the militia and depending on British troops to help maintain order, which simply meant tighter, more brutal control of the black population. However, the population remained permanently unbalanced, because the planting community never failed to avail itself of African labourers when they became available. Although this was by no means a new development, it was stated in 1809 that whites remained disproportionate to the black presence, and a law was necessary to curb that practice “for the peace, safety and prosperity” of the island. These were references to concerns about white safety in the event of a rebellion of enslaved Africans, which would also affect successful plantation operations. In addition, there were implications for defence in the event of external assault. [caption id="attachment_1184115" align="alignnone" width="433"] -[/caption] It is striking that after over 40 years of this situation, it assumed greater urgency such as to warrant legislative control in 1809. The fact is that the island’s circumstances had changed in several ways by the early years of the 19th century. Economically, the fortunes of the sugar industry had dwindled significantly, some plantations were incurring debt, estates were changing hands, investors’ interest in Tobago was declining and the prognosis for the industry was bleak. The termination of British involvement in the trade in captive Africans in 1807 significantly reduced the movement of ships to the island, which reduced trade and increased the prices of goods and estate operating costs, which aggravated the economic situation. However, this time around the problem was viewed differently: it was related to the white population, which therefore had to be handled differently. Tobago’s administrators sought refuge in strategies to induce an increased white presence. The first was to impose fines to encourage plantation owners/operators to employ more white people. Every owner, rentier or possessor of enslaved Africans was encouraged to employ able-bodied white males between 15 and 70 in daily and long-term service. For every 50 enslaved Africans on an estate, there should be one white employee; where the enslaved Africans exceeded 200, the owners, managers or rentiers only needed to keep one able-bodied person, which included wives, managers, white servants of any denomination or any resident family member of the proprietor. The deficiency of such a white person on the estate attracted a fine of £25. Non-compliance with the law by those who employed fifty-100 enslaved Africans and were required to keep two or three whites on their properties led to an additional ten shillings per year for defaulting on the required payments. The second part of the strategy included a reward system. From August 1, 1809, the owners/operators of a sugar, coffee, cotton or indigo plantation on which a white population which exceeded the quota was employed was entitled to a bounty of £50 for every white male aged 15-70, while for every white woman who was the wife of the proprietor the bounty was £40. This latter part of the strategy was intended to encourage white families on the estates. To prevent abuse of the system, bounties would not be paid to non-residents or any recipient who left the island without a medical certificate from a registered practitioner. Given the economic reality, it was anticipated that the response would not likely yield the desired results; hence the third part of the strategy embraced another segment of the population, the coloured element, which, though socially scorned by the white sector, was used to support them in times of emergency. The social ambitions of the coloured population rendered them vulnerable to white exploitation. The strategy used to entice the coloureds was decorated in diplomatic language. It stated that the aim was to “encourage and reward” their “exemplary behaviour.” Free coloured males between 15 and 70 who were members of the militia were to be treated as white, and where the required numbers of their presence on an estate existed, the fines were removed. While it was anticipated that the upwardly ambitious coloureds would respond favourably, it was considered necessary to ensure the distinguishing lines between whites and coloureds were not blurred. Therefore, coloureds were not entitled to the bounties paid to whites when their numbers on any estate exceeded the quota. Also, the requirement that only coloured members of the militia qualified was an additional mechanism to buy their loyalty in the event of an explosion between the white and black populations. Responsibility for implementing the strategy rested with constables and magistrates. After owners/operators provided written evidence of the numbers in their employ, constables were responsible for checking residents in their districts to ensure the stated numbers of white employees on the estates were correct. After this they would summon owners/operators before the magistrate to swear to the accuracy of the number of white men and women they employed, and their names and surnames. This law was passed on August 15, 1809, but after its implementation the following September, there is no evidence that any desired substantial change occurred in the population ratio.   The post Tobago’s failure: not enough whites appeared first on Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.