Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 13/Dec 01:38

Xi Jingping’s Latin Success – Analysis

By Lt Gen S L Narasimhan Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Peru and Brazil from 13 to 21 November 24 made global headlines. There were two purposes for his visit. One, to attend the APEC Summit meeting in Peru and to inaugurate the Beijing-funded Chancay Port, and two, to participate in the G20 Summit in Brazil. He also turned the events into a state visit to both countries. This trip has been interesting as it sought to project China as a champion of the global community in both the summits and separately to improve the bilateral relations with both countries Peru was by far the most impactful of the visits. While there, China and Peru signed an upgraded Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which is expected to boost bilateral commerce by 50%. They signed Memorandums of Understanding on bilateral cooperation in food security and education. The high point was the inauguration of the Chancay Port, done via a video link by both the Presidents. This port in western Peru, a $3.6 billion project and part of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), has been constructed with Chinese assistance, with state-owned Chinese shipping company COSCO investing$ 1.3 billion for a 60% shareholding. On plan, it is expected to reduce, by 20%, the trade costs between China and Peru. On a grander plan, China’s goal is to make Chancay a regional trade hub, opening a maritime and land route between China and Latin America. However, Peru’s neighbours, near and distant, have serious concerns about Chancay Port. The land connectivity from Brazil is an issue as it passes through the Amazon forest and the Andes mountains.[1] If connected to Brazil, it will undercut the region’s trade with the U.S., which says it will impose a 60% tariff on goods transiting through Chancay as it may be a conduit for Chinese goods entering the U.S. There are suspicions that this port could serve the dual purpose for China and the PLA Navy, which, could operate from here (See map). The U.S. gift of a few locomotives to Peru was dwarfed by the inaugural of the Chancay Port, the China showpiece in Latin America. Xi also ruffled feathers in his own neighbourhood. During the visit, the China Foreign Office Press release stated that Peru continued to support the One China principle. This drew a sharp response from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which called it “unwarranted statements, which disparage Taiwan’s sovereignty.” [2] In addition to education and food security, Xi’s bilateral meeting with Peruvian President Dina Boluvarte discussed cooperation in minerals, energy, infrastructure, transportation, communications, digital economy, smart customs, artificial intelligence (AI), green shipping, electric vehicles and solar power. China offered Luban[3] Workshops to Peru for skill development. And China’s Suzhou and Chancay were declared as sister cities. Xi prepared the ground for the grand visit prior to his departure to Peru, when he published an article in which he highlighted the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative leading to Global Community of Shared Future. China, it appears, has chosen well in Chancay, its gateway to Latin America. Despite Brazilian concerns, it was not inured to China’s lure. During Xi’s time in there, Brazil and China signed 37 agreements for cooperation across-the-board – from agriculture to infrastructure and industry, mining and technology, and health to culture, extending the cooperation ahead for the next 50 years in areas such as sustainable infrastructure and aerospace.[4] The partnership was upgraded from a global strategic partnership to a “China-Brazil Community with a Shared Future for a More Just World and a More Sustainable Planet” which brings the countries closer. The two presidents saw synergies between their national flagship policies and programmes like New Industry Brazil, the Growth Acceleration Program, the South American Integration Routes Program, the Ecological Transformation Plan and the One Belt One Road Initiative. Two task Forces, one on Financial Cooperation and another on Productive and Sustainable Development, will be established, with priority projects ready to go within two months. Not to be outdone by Peru, Brazil announced a port route between the Greater Bay Area of China (Guangdong-Macau- Hong Kong) and Port Santana Das Bocas in northern Brazil, the ‘biofertiliser route’[5] that will exchange the rich fertilizer and agricultural produce of Brazil with sustainable trade initiatives with China – and the expectation of reduced transportation costs and time by 14 days across the Pacific. Like Peru, Brazil seems to be following China’s patterns – making grand announcements of an Initiative to End Hunger by 2030 in the world, with claims that 80 countries have supported this, including China. However, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson did not mention it.[6] As usual, the statements put out by China and Brazil varied in content. China did have several other bilateral meetings with other countries in Latin America, from Chile to the Honduras. But Xi’s major interaction was with President Biden on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. Xi’s statement from his foreign ministry reads almost like a rebuke[7] to the U.S. The statement puts forth China’s four Red lines as the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right. The White House Read Out is passive in comparison and seems to be a justification of U.S. actions.[8] Western analysts dismiss the four red lines mentioned by Xi as exposing the CCP’s insecurity.[9] Multilaterally, Xi had much to say both at APEC and at the G20. At APEC, he expressed support for the Putrajaya Vision 2040 adopted by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders in 2020. This outlines a long-term goal to create an open, dynamic, resilient, and peaceful Asia-Pacific community by 2040 with three main economic drivers: Trade and Investment, Innovation and Digitalisation and Strong, Balanced, Secure, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth). He advocated an open global economy; support to WTO and multilateral trading; FTAs with Asia Pacific countries, and negotiations with ASEAN FTA 3.0, support for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the newer Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). The latter is a trade agreement between the US and Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, designed to facilitate digital trade and create a framework for the digital economy. In his speech at the G20 Xi got attention by his criticism of the US’s concept of “small yard high fences”[10] for important technology not being permitted to leave the US and especially not to China. Xi continued to plug for economic globalisation – of which China is the major beneficiary – and supporting developing countries to integrate digital, smart and green development. He also plugged the BRI, emphasizing its nature of reducing poverty reduction through cooperation, highlighted the 10 partnership actions with Africa, and announced that China would join Brazilian President Lula’s Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty. He announced China’s implementation of the G20 anti-corruption plan action plan by strengthening cooperation in fugitive repatriation, asset recovery, denial of safe haven and anti-corruption capacity building. China, he said, is pursuing high-standard opening up, particularly to the least developed countries – which now were provided zero-tariff treatment for 100 per cent tariff lines for them. Clearly, Xi garnered the attention of both APEC and G20. The red lines he mentioned in his meeting with President Biden, will be an important factor in China-US relations in Trump’s second term. China’s economic might seems to be influencing Latin American countries, as evidenced by the increasing interest in signing FTAs with China. The significance of the Chancay Port in Peru cannot be understated. It allows China entry into the economy of South America and surely opens up an opportunity for the PLA Navy to be supported from there. Finally, he was able to include China’s global initiatives in almost every meeting. All these successful Continental engagements, taken along with reports of China operating a communications centre in Cuba,[11] makes it apparent that it is increasing its influence in the proximity of the U.S., its main global competitor. About the author: Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House. Source: This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. References [1] Sousa, Dayanne and Gamarski, Rachel, “China’s $2b Peru port faces obstacles from the Andes to the Amazon”. Financial Review, November 17, 2024. https://www.afr.com/world/south-america/china-s-2b-peru-port-faces-obstacles-from-the-andes-to-the-amazon-20241117-p5kr8p [2] “MOFA response to claim made in China-Peru joint statement that Peru reiterates staunch commitment to “one China principle” ,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), Nov 15, 2024, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1330&sms=274&s=118630 [3] Lu Ban is an ancient Chinese woodcraft master who represents the Chinese tradition and spirit of craftsmanship. The Luban Workshop, a Chinese vocational training program, is named after him. It aims to nurture workmen around the world that are highly skillful, professional and innovative. [4] Planalto, “Brazil and China Expand Bilateral Relations During State Visit by President Xi Jinping”, Foreign Affairs, November 21, 2024. https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil-and-china-expand-bilateral-relations-during-state-visit-by-president-xi-jinping [5] Bnamericas, “Brazil, China sign deal on biofertilizer route to Amapá state”, November 05, 2024. https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/brazil-china-sign-deal-on-biofertilizer-route-to-amapa-state [6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on November 21, 2024″, November 21, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202411/t20241121_11530614.html#:~:text=The%20two%20presidents%20signed%20the,Plan%20of%20Cooperation%20Between%20the [7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Joe Biden in Lima”, November 17, 2024. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202411/t20241117_11527672.html [8] The White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China”, Briefing Room, Statements and Releases, November 16, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/11/16/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-3/ [9] Yu, Miles, “Xi Jinping’s four red lines ring false”, Washington Times, November 26, 2024. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/nov/25/xi-jinping-four-red-lines-ring-false/ [10] United States Department of Commerce, The Bureau of Industry and Security, “Update Conference on Export Controls and Policy”, March 25, 2024. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/compliance-training/3472-china-brief-2024-03-14-update-china-brief-final-rpd-knv-v2-w-occ/file [11] Funaiole, Matthew P.; Powers-Riggs, Aidan; Hart, Brian; Ziemer, Henry; Bermudez Jr., Joseph S.; Berg, Ryan C. and Hernandez-Roy, Christopher, “Secret Signals: Decoding China’s Intelligence Activities in Cuba”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 1, 2024. https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/