Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 17/12/2025 16:34

SMRs Are About Discipline, Not Hope – OpEd

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) have become one of the most frequently cited concepts in contemporary energy debates. The language surrounding them is attractive: small, modular, fast. Yet energy investments do not succeed on appealing adjectives. They succeed on engineering discipline, institutional capacity, and realism. SMRs are typically designed in the 200–300 MW electric range and are promoted as factory-built nuclear units assembled on site. In theory, this makes them suitable for remote locations, constrained grids, and systems requiring additional baseload capacity. In practice, however, "small" does not mean "simple." On the contrary, SMRs demand extremely high engineering precision. Specialized manufacturing, nuclear-grade quality control, complex logistics, and advanced on-site assembly are all unavoidable. What is reduced in size is not complexity, but tolerance for error. At this point, it is useful to look beyond nuclear power and recall lessons from large-scale LNG projects. Facilities such as Sakhalin-II and Yamal LNG, built in some of the world's harshest climates, relied heavily on modular construction. Major components were fabricated off-site, transported across vast distances, and assembled under extreme environmental conditions. These projects succeeded—but not because they were quick or cheap. They succeeded because they were meticulously engineered, tightly managed, and generously financed. The implication for SMRs is clear. Claims of "rapid deployment" are only valid where engineering depth, logistics capability, and institutional coordination already exist. Without these, speed becomes a slogan rather than a deliverable. This also helps explain why nuclear power historically developed around the 1,000 MW scale. Early civilian nuclear technology evolved from military research and was optimized for large, continuously operating baseload plants. Over time, however, these large projects revealed serious structural weaknesses: long construction periods, escalating costs, frequent design changes, and increasingly stringent post-accident safety regulations. Finland's Olkiluoto-3 plant is a well-known example. Originally expected to be completed in a few years at a reasonable cost, it entered operation more than a decade late, with costs nearly tripling. Issues ranging from concrete quality to welding defects demonstrated how scale amplifies risk in nuclear construction. SMRs emerged as a response to these failures—a search for manageability rather than magnitude. Yet today's global experience shows that expectations are running ahead of reality. Worldwide, the number of SMRs in commercial operation is extremely limited. Russia's floating Akademik Lomonosov and China's high-temperature gas-cooled reactor are the only widely cited operational examples. In Western countries, no SMR has yet reached full commercial service. Most projects remain in licensing, financing, or first-of-a-kind stages, where technical and economic risks are at their highest. Cost assumptions are equally sobering. Current estimates place SMR capital costs in the range of USD 6,000–8,000 per kilowatt. Promised cost reductions through mass production remain hypothetical, as no true serial manufacturing has yet occurred. Meanwhile, fuel supply chains are narrow, regulatory frameworks lack harmonization, and enrichment technologies are subject to strict international controls. From Türkiye's perspective, nuclear development continues to rely on large-scale units at the Akkuyu site. SMRs are still at the level of strategic discussion rather than concrete planning. Regulatory maturity, institutional experience, and transparency will be decisive factors if SMRs are ever to move beyond concept papers. Similar caution applies to proposals linking SMRs to Northern Cyprus's growing electricity demand. Without firm decisions on transmission infrastructure—such as subsea HVDC connections—SMRs remain a technical option rather than a practical solution. In the end, small modular reactors are neither a miracle cure nor a technological illusion. Under the right conditions, they may serve as a complementary energy option. But global experience suggests that expectations of speed and low cost are, for now, overstated. In energy policy, success is determined not by technological enthusiasm, but by engineering quality, regulatory credibility, and realistic planning. SMRs are no exception.