Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 09/Aug 19:18

Japan-US Security Alliance System Re-Set – Analysis

The fault-line in the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region weaved by bilateral and regional arrangements between countries and region with the US as the key player that helped maintain equilibrium during most of the post-War years has now come under stress. The unilateral assertion of a single power with aggressive intent and design has demanded a relook in the security arrangements and appropriate response. Japan and the US as the two main players are seeking new mechanisms for a robust posture to help maintain regional order. This has entailed a series of meetings with counterparts in various endeavours. The US and Japan as two key players and alliance partners are in the forefront to cope with this new challenge. As two security partners, the two countries have held regular meetings of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). This is a regular meeting of the two countries’ foreign and defence minister, often referred to as the SCC or “the two-plus-two”, the latest of which was held in Tokyo on 28 July 2024. The participants agreed to establish a new US Joint Force headquarters for United Forces Japan (USFJ) to assume “primary responsibility for coordinating security in and around Japan”. This decision to upgrade military command functions of the US forces in Japan was for better coordination of their bilateral alliance amid China’s assertiveness in the region and the North Korean nuclear threat. Both sides also agreed to pursue expanded coproduction of air defense missiles. In the meeting, while Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara represented Japan, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken represented the US. While Kamikawa remarked that the countries “must consistently beef up the alliance and enhance deterrence” to defend the existing international order, Austin said the move to modernise their command and control structure is “one of the most significant developments in the history of (our) alliance”. This was the first such meeting since January 2023 that showcased close ties between the two allies following US President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race in November. Like with South Korea, another security partner of the US in East Asia where the nuclear debate has been simmering for quite some time and ignited by the statement made by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in January 2023, the US was compelled to issue reassurance to strengthen so-called extended deterrence to prevent Seoul to explore the nuclear path during Yoon’s visit to Washington in April 2023, a similar trends in Japan was another worry for the US. Yoon had said that if North Korea’s nuclear threat grows, his country may build a nuclear arsenal of its own or ask the US to redeploy in the south. This was for the first time such a statement came from the South Korean President since the US withdrew all of its nuclear weapons from the South in 1991. Washington removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea as part of its global nuclear arms reduction efforts. The situation has changed as the security environment in the region has dramatically changed and threat perceptions have increased. It was therefore the foreign and defence ministers of the Japan and the US vowed to strengthen extended deterrence, which included US nuclear shield to defend Japan’s security to prevent such an opinion from being voiced in Japan as well. The new policy decision is aimed to craft a policy that includes finding ways to increase the reliability of Washington’s commitment to protect its ally with all of its defense capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Indeed, like his predecessor and more illustrious Abe Shinzo who for the first time in post-War Japan seriously tried to craft a robust security posture by amending the peace clause Article 9 in the Constitution. As the process of amending the Article was found to be difficult and hit procedural roadblock, he diluted substantially the spirit of the Article without amending it by introducing collective self-defence. The Kishida administration’s policies are to pursue the path crafted by Abe. The larger goal is to raise Japan’s regional and global profile and this is being pursued by both national and international project. The decision to set up a US command system in Japan is a part of this larger objective. The stage was set during the summit between Kishida and US President Joe Biden in April 2024. The decision was following a reorganisation of Japan’s own defense forces and the resulting opportunity for a reinvigorated partnership between the two countries’ militaries. Against the backdrop of the strained security environment, the joint statement stipulated that the US “intends to reconstitute U.S. forces Japan as a joint force headquarters” to “facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation” between the US and Japanese defense forces in the Indo-Pacific, both during peacetime and during contingencies. The reconstituted USFJ is thus now expected to serve as an important counterpoint of the JSDFs’ joint operation headquarters that will be launched by March 2025 to unify the command of its ground, maritime and air services. At the same time, the four ministers cautioned Beijing that there shall be consequences if Beijing continues to seek reshaping the “international order for its own benefit at the expense of others” and called its coercive behaviour a “serious concern” to the alliance. At present, the roles of USFJ headquarters have been largely limited to the management of military bases in the Asian nation, which hosts some 54,000 US troops. The US Indo-Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, has authority over forces assigned to its vast area of responsibility that includes Japan. Since earlier different time zones hampered efficient interaction of the SDF and the US military, the new command system shall eliminate this drawback. Now after upgrade, the USFJ shall facilitate expanded missions and operational responsibilities. The new USFJ will be implemented through a "phased approach". Austin called it “the most significant change to U.S. Forces Japan since its creation and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.” Besides strengthening deterrence and operational capabilities, information sharing and cooperation in new and emerging domains such as outer space and cyberspace are equally important. Another area in which both Japan and the US are likely to explore to make the ties robust is to seek production capacity of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 ground-based interceptor missiles and medium-range air-to-air missiles known as AMRAAM, both developed in the US. This move has a direct bearing on Japan’s recent relaxation of its weapons transfer rules to facilitate arms exports. Such a policy would be a win-win proposition for both as the US faces missile stockpile shortage because of its increased supplies to Ukraine with weapons to fight against Russia. The Japan Times observed in an editorial on 2 August 2024 that the agenda contained in the joint statement is “extremely ambitious” but its success rests on three prerequisites. First: since the Kishida government has pledged to double defence spending to 2 per cent of gross domestic product by 2027, thereby meeting the standard set by the NATO member countries and breaching the self-imposed threshold of keeping defence spending below 2 per cent of the GDP, finding the required resource could be a huge challenge. The second perquisite is to balance the commitments Kishida made for increased welfare spending for the elderly as population continues to age as well as greater spending for child care that Kishida has promised with his commitment to hike defence spending. Kishida is found lacking in having an honest dialogue with the Japanese public about the changed regional security environment and the costs involved thereof. This conflict can come on the way in the next LDP presidential election, which will determine his political future. Kishida’s popularity rating is already plummeting. The Japanese people are aware that rising regional tensions means that crisis could develop into conflict and that they are not expected to be prepared to get entangled in such a contingency. The third requirement that follows from the second is that Kishida needs to remain committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes to assuage the fear of the public in getting entangled in any conflict situation. Though this is the most ideal approach, it is doubtful if it would work. This being said, Japan need not be expected to compromise its own self-esteem and accommodate countries that would try to impose their will on Japan. Diplomacy ought to be the best available option and means to address a dispute in a crisis situation, while at the same time not overlooking national defence and be prepared single-handedly or in cooperation with like-minded group of nations to address the challenge. In this light, the 2+2 Japan-US dialogue and the significance thereof bolstering the defence cooperation component, both in bilateral and regional context, emerge as significant. There are still uncertainties that continue to lurk after Biden’s withdrawal and Donald Trump’s increased chances for a rerun at the White House. If Trump does really make a comeback, his “America First” in the agenda could pose a new challenge to make the new command system operational. If Trump wins and chooses his appeasement policy towards China and North Korea, and renews demands for increased security burden sharing from both Japan and South Korea as he did during his last presidency, the regional security matrix in East Asia would have been reset and that would demand new approach to address. The world has to live with such unpredictability at the moment.